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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1800

COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES

Nos. 9 and 10 May 1983

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30 September 1983

## USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1800

### COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES

Nos. 9 and 10, May 1983

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language semi-monthly journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL No. 9, May 1983 (signed to press 18 April 1983) and No. 10, May 1983 (signed to press 3 May 1983).

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## FUNCTIONAL EXAMPLE OF COMMUNIST-LEADER DISCUSSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 83 (signed to press 18 Apr 83) pp 9-16

[Article: "Example of the Communist-Leader"]

[Text] "We must try to raise the rank and importance of the party member higher, higher and higher...." These words, spoken by V. I. Lenin at the creation of our party, which is soon to celebrate the 80th anniversary of its 2d Congress, have become one of its fundamental principles. Their importance is all the more obvious today. It was emphasized at the 26th CPSU Congress that communists are truly the unbending core of our society, its living spirit.

Throughout all of the years of struggle for and creation of the new world, communists maintained one of their most remarkable and unfading traditions--to always be on the fire line, at the forward edge of progress, wherever their unwavering conviction, unbending will, exceptional steadfastness, crystal-clear moral purity and the ability to encourage people to new summits are needed the most. Today, communists are an army of more than 18 million convinced warriors, a fighting vanguard that is confidently leading the masses toward the great goal. A concern for high ideological conviction, hard work, political activity and the personal example set by CPSU members is a requirement of the times. It is a product of the party's growing role in our developed socialist society--a society with a dynamic economy, mature socialist relations, real freedom and democracy. The CPSU's multifaceted activity is the sum total of the efforts of the millions of warriors. The party counts on each of its members as it would upon a fighting unit.

The demands laid upon any party member are great, but those laid upon the communist-leader are doubled. There is a well known principle in our Leninist party: The higher the communist's post the greater are the demands laid upon him, the greater is his responsibility and the more irreproachable is his authority. The communist-leader, emphasized V. I. Lenin, gains authority through his energy, through his ideological influence. Since the party's creation and throughout its entire history, the party duty of communist-leaders and the personal example they set have been measured by a special yardstick. The requirements imposed on communist-leaders are growing even greater today.

Without improving the work style and methods of those entrusted to lead the people, it would be impossible to complete the great and, to a significant

extent, new tasks posed by the party in all areas of economic and social progress. The success of the effort depends in many ways upon their devotion to the party's cause, their competency and their ability to inspire the collective and stimulate its creative energy through personal example.

Our party's principal requirement of communist leaders is to persistently strengthen high organization, exactingness, conscious discipline and order in everything within all spheres of life. Bureaucracy, sensationalism and lip service are contraindicated to the great and diverse work that must be done in this direction. "A leader who does not understand, who attempts to substitute systematic and persistent organizational efforts by showy but ineffective campaigns will not get much done," noted CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov.

There is only one brand of discipline in our party. Its Charter spells out identical responsibilities for all communists, be they common laborers or executives. Every CPSU member is obligated to act as the bearer of the ideological and moral qualities inherent to the Leninist party. There should be no need to state how irreproachable the communist-leader's moral countenance must be, all the more so because as the ideological maturity and political awareness of the masses grow, the criteria they use to evaluate the work and behavior of party members, and especially comrades in positions of leadership, grow also. The communist-leader stands in such a high position that both his successes and his failures are more noticeable and more tangible. More often than not, people measure his actions and deeds against the activities and authority of our party. Wherever he may be, the leader is required to display purposefulness, a party passion for work, the ability to inspire others with his enthusiasm and encourage all to serve the party and people in the best possible way.

The high requirements imposed on our leaders were emphasized with new force in the proceedings of the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum and in the CPSU Central Committee decree "On the 80th Anniversary of the 2d Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party." The essence of these requirements is that politically mature, highly moral, competent and resourceful people possessing organizational capabilities and a feeling for the new must occupy positions in all decisive areas and, of course, in matters of the country's military protection.

The Soviet Armed Forces contain politically mature regular military leaders who are wholly devoted to the cause of the party and people and who are well trained in military and technical respects. The untiring concern of the CPSU for their training, indoctrination and placement produces remarkable fruits. The Soviet officer corps is distinguished primarily by complete devotion to the party and people and the great cause of communism, and the desire to do everything to keep the armed forces on par with the highest requirements of modern times.

The ideological conviction of our regular military personnel, their political erudition and their ability to teach are in a close mutual relationship with their high professional competency. This is insured both by the fundamental military-theoretical knowledge of the personnel and by their daily intense practical efforts to train and indoctrinate the soldiers. Over 90 percent of the regimental commanders, all first and second rank ship commanders and all

commanders of formations and units of larger size have a higher military education. The principal party-political, engineering and technical posts in these structural units are also manned by officers with a higher military, military-political and technical education. Training in the field and at sea, exercises, flights, the study of highly sophisticated military equipment and weapons, and organization of all life and service in the units and aboard ships in strict correspondence with the regulations insure formation of high moral and fighting qualities and a commander's will in our regular personnel and promote perfection of military proficiency and acquisition of the necessary organizational skills.

Communist-leaders are the driving force behind the regular military personnel, their fighting vanguard. Nurtured in the traditions of the senior generation of party soldiers, communist commanders, political workers and military engineers are the bearers of the fighting spirit of the Leninist party in the army and navy, and the untiring organizers of the fight to implement its policy. Following the directives of the CPSU to the letter, they persistently fight to fulfill the task it has posed--to mobilize all of the energy and all of the strengths of the soldiers for further growth in the combat readiness of the units and ships in the complex international situation of today.

High combat readiness is the main indicator of the qualitative state of the troops and naval forces. It is the focus of the multifaceted activities of commanders, staffs, political organs, party organizations and all personnel of the armed forces. It is the focus of their capability for fulfilling their main purpose--dependably protecting socialist accomplishments and the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, and insuring the security of our country and of its friends and allies.

"Combat readiness cannot be something temporary, something seasonal, and it cannot stand still at some particular level," noted CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, USSR minister of defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov at the 6th All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries. "It must be constantly raised and improved." It is in the struggle for high constant combat readiness that the qualities that primarily distinguish the communist-leader are manifested: his high ideals and deep knowledge, his feeling for the new and his capability for assuming responsibility for solving complex problems, for promptly noting and supporting initiative and for mobilizing the will and energy of the personnel.

Without these qualities it would be impossible to successfully conduct the training and indoctrination of the personnel, to exercise leadership over military collectives or to solve the increasingly more complex problems of raising combat readiness. In all leaders, these qualities must exist in a dialectical mutual relationship. A person cannot be a good organizer without having a feeling for the new. The value of competency is low if the officer is passive and if he keeps himself apart from the personnel. It is only in their sum total that these qualities, when multiplied by the highest personal responsibility, permit communist-leaders to successfully complete the great and complex tasks facing the military collectives.

The absolute overwhelming majority of our communist commanders, political workers and military engineers fulfill their party and official duty

conscientiously. Through their selfless military labor, their endurance and self-control, their competency and ideological fervor, they unite the military collectives and direct the strengths and energy of the personnel toward raising combat proficiency and fulfilling their patriotic duty to the motherland in exemplary fashion.

Wide is the circle of communists occupying responsible posts in our military organism. But it would be valid to say that the central figure among these executives is the commander, since one-man command is the most important principle of development of the Soviet Armed Forces. The one-man commander is the champion of the party and state line, a strict upholder of Soviet laws and military regulations. Power, which presupposes the unquestioning obedience of persons of lower position and rank to those of higher position and rank, and personal responsibility for the battleworthiness of the unit and the ship and for successful fulfillment of combat training missions are cast in the single mold of the one-man commander. Acting in accordance with CPSU ideology and policy, in the spirit of Soviet laws, the commander works in close cooperation with the political organ and the political worker, and he relies upon the party organization. Party organizations show constant concern for raising the authority of commanders, and they serve as their dependable support in all missions. Typically over 80 percent of the unit and ship commanders are elected to party commissions, party committees and party bureaus, and they make their substantial party contribution to their activities.

Communist Lieutenant Colonel M. Kolosov is well known in the Strategic Missile Forces. Until recently he had commanded a unit that initiated socialist competitions several times. And each time, the personnel satisfied their difficult pledges and reconfirmed the title of their outstanding unit. Of course, the high results in training, service and discipline and the enviable stability of these results were the product of the joint efforts of commanders, political workers and the party and Komsomol organizations. But communist-leader M. Kolosov made an especially high contribution to unifying the entire military collective and to mobilizing it for the attainment of high combat perfection. Whatever the occasion, he is always able to cast the difficult process and indoctrination into a single mold, he has a perfect knowledge of the equipment, and he is a master of military affairs. An exceptionally self-controlled and disciplined officer, Communist M. Kolosov displays endurance, self-control and tactfulness in all situations, even the most intense. He knows how to win people over, but at the same time he would never allow himself to overstep the boundaries of familiarity. He is exacting and strict, and he is always able to mete out strict punishment for shortcomings and mistakes.

CPSU member Captain 1st Rank L. Kuverskiy is also distinguished by a keen party sense of responsibility for his assigned work. There are noteworthy landmarks in his military career: On being given a group to command, he raised it to an outstanding level, and when he took charge of a fighting unit, it became an outstanding unit. When he was appointed commander of a submarine, the submarine also earned the same title. Today, Hero of the Soviet Union L. Kuverskiy is the commander of an outstanding atomic missile submarine. But even at this high post he remains faithful to his rule: While making full demands upon others, be strict in the party way primarily toward oneself.



The star symbolizing a Hero of Socialist Labor was awarded by the motherland to one of the pioneers of the Baykal-Amur Rail Trunkline, Lieutenant Colonel S. Pal'chuk, for his military labor. The military railroaders he commanded erected more than 90 bridges, both large and small. Now Communist S. Pal'chuk is the commander of a railroad brigade. The communist's position has changed, and he has risen higher, but he is now even stricter in his attitude toward service and party duty. He continues to be exacting, tactful and benevolent toward others, he is still maximally exacting toward himself, and he offers a worthy example to those around him.

These communist-leaders represent different branches of the armed forces, their tasks are different, and the scale of their official duties varies, but there is one thing that these active warriors of the party have in common: the ability to work with people, to constantly indoctrinate them, to temper them spiritually and to maintain an attentive attitude toward the concerns and needs of their subordinates.

Multifaceted are the activities of the communist-leader in our army and navy environment, and broad is the range of his responsibilities and daily concerns. And all of his actions, all of his deeds are assessed from the standpoint of general party and state interests, the interests of strengthening combat readiness. This is why even the slightest weakening of effort in practical activity, why a superficial approach to leading combat training and to organizing service cannot be tolerated in our military work. This subject must necessarily be brought up because manifestations of organizational sloppiness, low aggressiveness, uncertainty of performance and the inability to persistently and consistently fight to achieve end results in combat training and military discipline always make themselves known in the style of leadership of certain comrades.

As we know, the districts and fleets are now summarizing the results of the winter training period. This year, the central one of the five-year plan, the personnel of our units and ships are demonstrating their monolithic unity about the Leninist Communist Party with new force, and they are attaining high results in combat training, in the mastery of weapons and equipment and in attaining firm discipline and organization. And this is primarily the result of the great and untiring work of our executives, our commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians, the officers of the rear services.

But on this background of great positive strides we cannot ignore the fact that some leaders who promised at the beginning of the year to attain high results in combat and political training, and who had adopted the corresponding socialist pledges together with their collectives, failed to take charge of the struggle to satisfy these pledges, failed to create the necessary intensity in the training process and failed to show adequate exactingness and diligence. In the end, their results were not as high as planned. Words diverged from deeds.

That is what happened in one of the units of the Odessa Military District. In it, the commander and his closest assistants tolerated the fact that a number of the lessons were conducted in a simplified situation; they did not take steps to intensify the training process, and they condoned poor use of the training

material base. Nor did the party organization make the unit's communists properly responsible for the quality with which the combat training plan was fulfilled. The end result was but mediocre indicators in the principal training disciplines, weaknesses in the skills of certain specialists and crews, and errors in equipment maintenance.

The work of any leader, and of a leader-communist in particular, is assessed on the basis of both his official actions and the educational consequences of his measures and decisions. To be a leader means to be constantly responsible for the combat readiness and military proficiency of subordinates, for discipline and for the political morale of the collective. Such is the demand of our party.

Satisfying this demand, the communists, who have been given the job of presiding over the important areas of military life, are called upon to see that every training day proceeds with a maximum return and produces the required end result. Every lesson, every training session and every exercise, if it is organized thoughtfully and with methodological competency, and if it is based on an interesting plan and conducted in an instructive manner will not only noticeably reflect upon the training level of the soldiers, but it will also have a substantial influence on the morale of the people and on the microclimate within their environment.

Firm order plays an inestimable educational role in the collective. Embracing all aspects of military life, order is the product of combat experience and the experience of peaceful years, of the requirements of the party and people toward the armed defenders of the motherland, and of the recommendations of military science. The communist-leader believes it his unavoidable duty to be in the front ranks of the fighters for firm military order. And this means daily and meticulous organizational work and indoctrination, remembering that administration by mere injunction, shouting and roughness cannot lead to success.

Understandably, the fuller communist-leaders are able to utilize the power of army and navy society, and primarily the power and influence of party and Komsomol organizations, and the more actively they take part in party-political work, the more successful they would be in their struggle for high combat skill and firm discipline, for military order and the goals of socialist competition.

Unfortunately not all communist-leaders make full use of the possibilities of party and Komsomol organizations in behalf of their goals yet. Sometimes in the course of their official duties they are unable to find the time to talk with activists, to penetrate more deeply into the affairs of the party and Komsomol organizations and to direct them properly to solve combat training problems, which naturally makes it impossible to utilize the potentials of the military collectives completely.

Every communist, the CPSU Central Committee teaches us, no matter where he works, must propagandize and implement the ideals of the Leninist party; he must devote all of his knowledge and all of the strength of his spirit to this exceptionally important work. Participation of our commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians in ideological work and political indoctrination imparts even greater effectiveness to the latter. Regular speeches



by such comrades and their personal influence mean, using Lenin's words, "a terribly great deal," and without them, there is no such thing as political activity. The conclusion that follows from this is that political organs and party organizations are called upon to continue to persistently encourage our leaders to take part in the ideological work and political indoctrination in the units and aboard the ships. And as a rule these leaders possess substantial knowledge, they have considerable experience in life and service, they are comprehensively trained, and they are endowed with great rights and powers.

A communist-leader's accessibility in his relations with other people and his capability for attracting people to himself and to be attentive of them in the party way are very meaningful to him in political work and in indoctrination. He cannot achieve success or his goals unless he knows his soldiers and communicates with them constantly. After all, not only does he learn about people better in such communication, but also he shapes their qualities and habits. Moreover the leader himself is able to reveal himself more completely, not only as a chief but also as a person. Frequently it is precisely ordinary conversation and daily communication that establishes the spiritual contact and mutual understanding which help to unify the military collective and maintain high discipline and organization within it.

This is why we cannot condone cases where certain communist-leaders forget the way to the soldiers' barracks or the seamen's quarters, especially during time off, and fail to study the requests and moods of the personnel. Moreover such people sometimes permit roughness, callousness and arrogance in their dealings with soldiers, which contradicts the very essence of our military regulations. "Roughness," noted M. I. Kalinin, "often originates with an inability to lead people; leadership is simply substituted by a formal 'right of power,' and helplessness is covered over by roughness, arrogance and self-conceit."

Such phenomena, be they sporadic in our army and navy life, must be fought decisively. And communist-leaders must be the first to do so. They are called upon to set the example of truly socialist, truly comradely relations with soldiers. At the same time they must teach other indoctrinators to always see before them not a mass of soldiers but concrete individuals, ones with characters, merits and shortcomings, to raise upon the shield of glory those who serve in exemplary fashion, with honor and merit, those who have served as wise teachers of the soldiers.

Mobilizing the efforts of the Soviet people to fulfill the plans of communist construction, our party is implementing measures on a broad front to raise the coordination of different elements of the economic mechanism, to increase production effectiveness and to insure thrift, high organization and firm labor discipline. In this great creative work, not only must we surmount the lack of discipline, carelessness and laxity that have developed to some extent in a few collectives, but we must also curtail abuses by certain officials and prevent cases of misappropriation of state property and other antisocial phenomena.

The party demands that we conduct a relentless struggle against those who abuse their position and permit carelessness and waste. And a person's position

can never be a protection from severe punishment if he behaves in such fashion.

The army and navy are an inseparable part of Soviet society, the society of laborers, and the entire way of life of the army and navy is a life of labor. Therefore commanders, political organs and party organizations must decisively curtail manifestations of self-interest and cases of waste, and they must strictly punish those who abuse their power, those who are resourceful and active not so much in the interests of achieving social goals as for the purposes of personal well-being, lining their pockets with the state's money and forgetting their high party and service obligations.

Naturally the exactingness displayed toward communist-leaders in this respect is especially great. The party and people trust them deeply, and they provide them with broad rights to complete their task of defending socialist accomplishments. This trust must be justified through great diligence, real effort and faultless morality. It must be emphasized once again that successful completion of the greater tasks of combat readiness and firm military discipline in the army and navy is directly dependent on the untiring party and official activities of leaders, and their high responsibility for their work.

All of our experience persuasively demonstrates that violation of party and state discipline, a disregard for universally accepted moral rules, a consumeristic attitude toward life and work, egoism and indifference to public affairs and concerns may arise as a rule wherever workers are shielded from criticism, where a fundamental assessment is not given to unworthy acts, where political organs and party organizations do not play a major role in indoctrinating the personnel in the spirit of high responsibility for their party and service obligations. And no matter how sporadic the digressions from communist morality may be in our environment, they must elicit the keenest interest from both chiefs and party collectives.

Nonetheless it would have to be said that some party organizations still display an atmosphere of indifference and relaxation; the shortcomings and mistakes of certain communists are blamed upon weak spots in the party organization in general. One tested means of indoctrinating communists and of correcting mistakes and shortcomings that is weakly used is criticism and self-criticism. Some organizations do not show adequate attention to signals from below, failing to make the analysis and required conclusions on their basis. For example, such cases are discussed in the article "A Strange Silence" published in this issue. It is only in an atmosphere of comradely trust, mutual exactingness and bold, principled criticism that shortcomings can be revealed in work, that their causes could be determined and that ways to prevent anything that diminishes our successes to even the slightest degree could be planned. Moreover it is the leader who must provide the example of a proper attitude toward criticism. This is one of the signs of his deep understanding of his duty, and an indispensable prerequisite of real authority in the masses. It would be pertinent to recall the following statement by V. I. Lenin in this connection: "The authority of military workers and appointees is undermined

not by the individual who points out harmful extremes and corrects them, but by the person who resists such correction."

Exactingness and an intolerance of shortcomings are not abstract concepts; they are mandatory, inherent elements of the Leninist style of party work. Mutual exactingness among communists is greater in party organizations in which relations between them are structured on a foundation of strong principles, in which strict compliance with Lenin's norms of party life is insured, in which people are taught to perceive criticism correctly, and in which the participation of each individual in party work is evaluated according to merit. Mature intra-party relations insure growth of the effectiveness and authority of the party organization and enhancement of its favorable influence on the tasks of combat and political training, political and military indoctrination of the personnel and maintenance of military order. It is also very important for each party collective to create conditions which would stimulate resourceful, conscientious military labor, and in which inactivity and irresponsibility would have an irreversible effect on the moral authority of the communist and his advancement in the service.

Political organs and party organizations wholly support willful, exacting chiefs who maintain military order with a firm hand and competently organize the training process. But no one can create a good reputation for a leader if his efforts are uninspiring, if he fails to gain authority through professional training, high party qualities, faultless behavior, modesty and simplicity.

Ideological and political indoctrination plays the most important role in shaping the communist-leader. Arming personnel with deep knowledge in Marxist-Leninist theory is a good guarantee against slipping into utilitarianism, against loss of perspective in work and of a sense of responsibility. Experience shows that party and military discipline is violated as a rule by people who are not politically mature and who do not possess firm communist convictions.

The effectiveness of the ideological and theoretical education of our regular personnel depends in many ways on the attention devoted to it by political organs. They are called upon to see that the study of Marxist-Leninist theory would proceed in organic unity with living practice, to persistently introduce the best training methods and to uproot dogmatism and recitation.

The party requires each communist-leader to display an organic combination of adherence to party principles with comprehensive professional competency, of discipline and diligence with a creative attitude toward work, of attention to subordinates with a high personal moral example, responsibility toward the people whom he is entrusted to lead, and responsibility toward the party and people. To remember one's high calling means to devote all effort, energy and organizational talent to the great cause of the Leninist party, to persistently mobilize soldiers for the fulfillment of its decisions and for the achievement of new, higher goals in the battleworthiness and combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces.

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## SREDIN REVIEWS LESSONS OF WORLD WAR II

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[Article by Col-Gen G. Sredin: "Results and Lessons of World War II: On Publication of the 12th Volume of the 'History of World War II 1939-1945'"]

[Text] Publication of the "History of World War II 1939-1945" has been completed. This multifaceted, fundamental work was prepared by the Institute of Military History of the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee and by the Institute of World History and the Institute of the History of the USSR, USSR Academy of Sciences, under the guidance of the Main Editorial Commission headed by CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, USSR minister of defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov. Deep, creative analysis of Soviet and foreign archival documents, of monographs, memoirs and other literature made it possible for the author collective to illuminate the birth, course and outcome of World War II truthfully and with scientific accuracy, and to soundly discredit the bourgeois falsifiers of its history.

Volume 12 is devoted to the results and lessons of the war, which was prepared for and unleashed by the most aggressive and reactionary forces of international imperialism. This war was the greatest and fiercest in the history of mankind. Four-fifths of the earth's population were attracted into its orbit, 40 countries of Europe, Asia and Africa were engulfed in the armed actions, and it was fought over vast areas of the seas and oceans. The war did colossal material harm to many countries, and it caused the death of more than 50 million persons. The Soviet people and the peoples of a number of other countries were threatened by physical annihilation, the plans for which were advertised by the fascist German invaders. And this did not happen primarily because the Soviet Union was in the vanguard of the forces fighting against Hitler's Germany and militant Japan.

From the first days of the Great Patriotic War the USSR Armed Forces assumed the main burden of the struggle against fascist aggression, and they carried this

burden on their shoulders all the way to final victory. The main battles with the aggressor's troops were fought on the Soviet-German front, and the course and outcome of World War II depended to a decisive extent on these battles, as did the fate of both Soviet and other peoples of the world, and the future of all civilization.

Documents and facts cited in this volume confirm quite obviously that no country but the Soviet Union would have been in the position to halt the fascist war machine and subject it to annihilatory defeat in that difficult and extremely dangerous time. The USSR Armed Forces not only withstood the series of setbacks in 1941-1942, but also, on recovering from them, they firmly seized the strategic initiative, and held onto it until the victorious conclusion of the war. It was namely on the Soviet-German front, and nowhere else, that the plans and designs of German fascism for establishing world domination were interred.

In the open military duel with the most powerful forces of international imperialism--that was what Hitler's Germany and militant Japan were during the war--our socialist state endured the harshest test and honorably defended its sovereignty. It successfully completed its mission of liberation and its international duty to the peoples of other countries occupied by the fascist invaders.

The true history of World War II is not to the liking of reactionary politicians and ideologists of the West. Tailoring the history of World War II to their taste and adapting it to the present extremely dangerous course of the ruling circles of the USA and its allied military blocs, bourgeois falsifiers are attempting to relieve imperialism of the blame for starting World War II and to shift it to the Soviet Union. Another goal of modern ideologists of anti-communism and revisionism is to avert recognition of the decisive role played by the USSR in the victory, and to prove that the USA and England supposedly deserve the credit for defeating fascist Germany and militant Japan.

In the volume reviewed here, the reader will find many documents and facts providing him with a better understanding of the imperialist policy of the 1920s-1930s that led to World War II, and permitting him to discern and evaluate the truly misanthropic designs of the enemies of peace and socialism today. And it is extremely important to discern and correctly evaluate them, since those who unleashed today's unprecedented arms race and who are stubbornly prodding mankind into the abyss of nuclear missile war, the fire of which may consume all life on earth, are in fact following the footsteps of the fascist aggressors.

The four parts of the work, which contain a total of 17 chapters, provide a thorough evaluation of the results of the war and the nature of armed conflict on the Soviet-German and other fronts, subject the art of war of the Soviet Armed Forces, of the allied armies of the states in the anti-Hitler coalition and of the countries of the fascist-military block to comparative analysis, and reveal the fundamental changes that occurred in the ratio of forces in the world after the war.

The volume's authors explain the sociopolitical nature of World War II from classical Marxist-Leninist positions. They emphasize that among the predatory goals in the aggressive war waged by Hitler's Germany and its allies, the aspiration to destroy the Soviet state and its armed forces was paramount. This, according to the plan of fascist leaders, was to clear the road for world domination by German imperialism.

On the side of the Anglo-French alliance, the war was also unjust and imperialist in its initial phase. Having declared war on Germany in September 1939, the governments of England and France initiated it not in the interests of the popular masses but rather in the interests of their bourgeoisie, which wanted to weaken a dangerous competitor and reinforce its big-power status. These countries provided essentially no real assistance to Poland, and the fate of this allied country--the first sacrifice to the aggression of Hitler's Germany--was of little concern to them. By negotiating a new deal with Germany, the ruling circles of England and France wanted to preserve their positions in the world and resolve their conflict with Germany at the expense of the USSR. This was the meaning behind the "strange war," which was essentially a continuation of the Munich policy.

But as the war progressed, a change began to occur in the sociopolitical nature of the actions of bourgeois states opposing the fascist bloc. This was not a simple coincidence. After the Germans crushed the national independence of a number of European countries, the people came to see that fascism leads to the elimination of the most elementary freedoms and jeopardizes the life of civilization itself. Not only communists but also many bourgeois functionaries understood the extreme danger. Nonetheless it was the popular masses, and primarily the working class--the most consistent expressor of the interests of the laborers, and the activities of its vanguard--the communist and workers parties--that played the dominant role in transforming the war from an imperialist one to a war of liberation.

But the main and decisive factor that made the war against the states of the fascist alliance a war of liberation was the entry of the USSR into this war as a result of the treacherous attack by Hitler's Germany. With the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, World War II went beyond the boundaries of the capitalist system: A duel between a socialist state and Hitler's Germany became its central theme. The reactionary, predatory goals of fascist Germany were opposed by the USSR's just goals, goals of liberation: protecting the socialist fatherland; liberating the peoples of Europe from enslavement; assisting the peoples of occupied countries in their struggle for liberty and independence; annihilating the fascist state--the most reactionary political regime, and defeating the misanthropic ideology of fascism; creating the conditions for a firm democratic peace following the war. Such goals were not and could not be pursued by a single bourgeois state. Thus it is no surprise that the struggle of all peoples of Europe enslaved by fascism merged into a single flow with the war of the Soviet people against fascist aggression, with the consequent sharp activation of the antifascist struggle of patriotic forces both in occupied countries and in the fascist states themselves.



There is great political and scientific significance to substantiating this indisputable conclusion on the sociopolitical nature of the war. After all, bourgeois falsifiers continue to spread the false idea that the USSR supposedly fought the war for predatory goals and even "attained them," while the USA and England supposedly fought without self-interest. The author collective of the volume persuasively unmasks those politicians and ideologists of the West who obviously find historic truth not to their liking and who distort the events of World War II.

The reader's attention will be attracted by the persuasive evidence the work provides on the decisive role played by the USSR and its armed forces in the defeat of fascist aggressors in Europe and of Japanese militants in the Far East. Noteworthy in this connection is U.S. President F. Roosevelt's admission cited in the volume: "From the standpoint of big strategy," he wrote back on 6 May 1942, "...it would be difficult to avoid the obvious fact that the Russian armies are destroying more enemy soldiers and armament than all of the other 25 states of the United Nations put together."

And in fact, the fascist German army suffered more than 73 percent of its total losses on the eastern front. Six times more Germans were killed and wounded in engagements with the Soviet Army than in the West European and Mediterranean theaters of war. On the Soviet-German front, fascist troops suffered up to 75 percent of their total losses of tanks and assault guns, more than 75 percent of all airplane losses and 74 percent of the total losses of artillery. Facts are stubborn things. All liars in politics and science are helpless against them.

The war was a serious test of the strength of two sociopolitical systems. Socialism, which demonstrated its tremendous superiority in the course of the military duel with fascist states, passed this test with the best grades. The authors of the volume assert with full grounds that "the decisive contribution made by the Soviet Union to the victory over fascist Germany and militant Japan attests to the strength and invincibility of the social and state structure, the economic system, the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, the moral-political unity of Soviet society and the indestructible friendship of the peoples of the USSR."

The main factor in the victory of the Soviet people in the war was Communist Party leadership of all of the efforts to organize the enemy's defeat. From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the book notes, the Leninist party assumed the role of political leader, organizer and ideological indoctrinator of all of the people and the armed forces. Expressing the fundamental interests and aspirations of the Soviet people, the party's domestic and foreign policy inspired the soldiers at the front and the laborers in the rear to acts of heroism in war and labor in behalf of the defense of the socialist motherland.

From the very beginning of the war the party and all of its executive organs concentrated their efforts on the war effort. Almost a third of the members of the party central committee, many secretaries of the central committees of the union republic communist parties and of the kray and oblast committees and other prominent party workers were sent to the front. More than 80 percent of

all communists were either at the front or in the sectors of the national economy directly associated with supporting the needs of the front. The party central committee and other party organs displayed great concern for providing the operating army with everything necessary to fight the enemy, for organizing the partisan movement in the enemy rear, for training officers and for improving party-political work and ideological indoctrination of army and navy personnel.

Through its fervent directional and organizational activities in the war, the party multiplied the trust and love of the broadest popular masses. Figures presented in the book showing how the party membership grew during the war attest to the party's truly unlimited authority. As of 1 January 1945 more than half of the party's membership was in military party organizations. Army party organizations played an enormous role in mobilizing the personnel for exemplary fulfillment of their mission.

A special chapter of the volume is devoted to the antifascist Resistance movement in Europe, and to the role played in it by communist parties. This chapter also discusses the struggle for national liberation of the colonial peoples in Asia, and the international solidarity of the Soviet Union with all opponents of fascism and imperialism. The lessons of World War II teach us that international solidarity of antifascist forces, which proved itself so effectively in those years, is vitally necessary today, in a time when the USA is aspiring to unify reactionary forces of the imperialist world for a crusade against real socialism and against other revolutionary detachments of modern times.

The lessons of the war also indicate that in a struggle against an aggressor, it is entirely possible to unify, within a single military alliance, the efforts of states belonging to opposing socialist systems. Such an alliance of states and peoples, with the USSR, the USA and England at its core, showed itself in a favorable light in the past war. Although it was not free of internal contradictions generated by back-stage anti-Soviet actions of American and English imperialist circles, on the whole its actions accelerated the victory over the aggressors. The cooperation between these countries that was started during the war could have been continued successfully in the postwar era, had the principles of peaceful coexistence been complied with strictly. The USSR has always displayed a preparedness for such cooperation with the USA, England and other capitalist countries, and for preserving and consolidating universal peace. But imperialists do not want this, preferring a course in opposition to countries of the socialist fraternity.

Revealing the role of the economic factor in World War II, the volume's authors emphasize that its course and outcome once again confirmed the correctness of one of V. I. Lenin's conclusions: In modern warfare, economic organization has decisive significance. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that in comparison with World War I, during World War II the main warring states produced four times more airplanes, almost eight times more guns and over 30 times more tanks and self-propelled guns.

Some American and English military historians are using various sorts of arbitrarily selected statistics in an attempt to prove that the "arsenal of



victory" of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition was supposedly represented by the economy of the USA, and that American Lend-Lease military deliveries supposedly played something close to a decisive role in supplying the Soviet Army with arms. The dependable data provided by the book completely dispel this myth, so zealously advertised in the West. The volume under review here presents concrete figures and facts proving that our army fought the enemy with reliance upon the might of the Soviet Union's economy. "Until the very end of the war," the authors write, "the USSR surpassed the USA in the production of a number of the most important resources of armed conflict: tanks, self-propelled guns, field guns, mortars etc. But the main thing is that Soviet military technology was utilized effectively against the strongest and most dangerous adversary on a great scale and in the decisive years of the war." The USSR also surpassed Hitler's Germany in the manufacture of the principal forms of military products.

As far as American Lend-Lease military deliveries to the Soviet Union are concerned, they represented only 4 percent of the total volume of Soviet production. The fact that Lend-Lease played a certain role in equipping our armed forces has never been rejected in the USSR. But there are no grounds for calling these deliveries a decisive factor in the outcome of the war on the Soviet-German front. To say the contrary, as bourgeois propagandists do, means to consciously ignore the real facts.

None of the warring states had to organize their war economies in such complex and difficult conditions as did the Soviet Union. No other country suffered the enormous trials that fell to its lot. Ignoring the difficulties, just during the second half of 1941 the USSR managed to move 2,593 enterprises and millions of people from the frontal regions to the East, to make these enterprises operational and organize military production in extremely short time, to redistribute material, financial and labor resources in the interests of the war and to complete other highly difficult tasks.

The war graphically confirmed that the Soviet state possesses a most sophisticated economic organization, one making it possible to effectively and purposefully utilize material and human resources in the interests of victory. This is precisely what permitted it to emerge the victor in the duel with fascist Germany and states allied with it, not only in the political and military but also in the economic area.

The lessons of World War II graphically persuade us that all plans of the present administration in the USA, with Reagan at its head, for organizing an economic war against the Soviet Union and for compelling it to build up arms until complete material exhaustion are written in the sand. Our state's present level of economic development, which is significantly superior to the war level, destines such plans of American imperialism to failure.

Armed conflict doubtlessly played the decisive role in the defeat of the fascist bloc. The nature of this conflict was determined by a large number of military, political and other factors that are thoroughly discussed in the volume. Analyzing the preparations made by fascist Germany and its allies for the war,

the authors quite validly conclude: "The lessons of World War II indicate that creation of aggressive military blocs is a serious threat to freedom-loving peoples and one of the preconditions of predatory imperialist wars." The present imperialist bloc policy and strategy is oriented on expansion of aggressive actions to global proportions, intensification of military-political pressure on socialist countries and infiltration of developing states.

The danger presented to peace by the present policy of the USA and its NATO allies becomes all the more obvious in the light of the lessons of World War II.

The reader will find the book to contain an analysis of the typical traits and specific features of armed conflict in World War II, to include: tremendous spatial scope; the decisive significance of continental theaters of war to attainment of the greatest political and strategic results in the war, although combat activities did assume considerable scope on the oceans and seas as well; use of multimillion-strong ground troops and sizable air and naval forces by the warring sides; high fluidity and intensity of military activities, especially on the Soviet-German front; the lengthy and stubborn struggle of the armies of both warring coalitions for strategic initiative, and so on. The main form of military activities promoting attainment of decisive military-political goals was the strategic offensive. The role of strategic reserves and the rear increased in this connection. Concurrently, the book concludes, the lessons of the war demonstrated the importance of the ability and preparedness of the troops for conducting strategic defense when fighting a strong enemy.

In the extremely complex situation of World War II, the Soviet Armed Forces displayed their proficiency in engagements with the bourgeois world's most powerful army--the fascist army. The savagery of the fighting on the Soviet-German front cannot compare with the fighting on other fronts. All the way until the summer of 1944, there were an average of 15-20 times more enemy divisions on this front than facing the troops of the USA and England in North Africa and Italy. In sum total, there were from 8 to 12.8 million enlisted men and officers at this front, as well as a quantity of combat equipment never seen before in the history of war. Aggressive combat activities made up 93 percent of the time that the front existed. The Soviet Army not only endured a combat situation of unprecedented intensity, but it also inflicted a lethal blow upon the enemy.

To defeat the enemy, during the war the Soviet Armed Forces conducted 50 operations involving groups of fronts, about 250 frontal operations and thousands of engagements and battles in the course of which, as the book validly emphasizes, "military theory and practice were enriched by outstanding examples of strategy, operational art and tactics." The military reader will be highly interested in an expanded analysis of Soviet military strategy, which corresponded completely to party policy and was distinguished by purposefulness, deep scientific foresight and decisiveness of goals and plans. It proved itself to be immeasurably superior to the strategy of fascist aggressors.

One important result of World War II, the volume emphasizes, was not only the destruction of the aggressor's extremely reactionary political systems and military organizations but also the defeat of fascist and militarist ideology,

which shaped the social consciousness of the masses and set the spiritual stage for preparing for and pursuing a predatory war. In the collision between two ideologies of incompatible classes, communist ideology took the upper hand. Its victory was one of the manifestations of socialism's superiority over capitalism, and an important indicator of the just nature of the war waged by the Soviet people.

The last chapters of the volume reveal the situation in the world following the defeat of fascist Germany and militant Japan. The main result of the victory was a decisive change in the ratio of forces on the planet in favor of socialism and to the detriment of imperialism. A world socialist system arose, becoming a dominant factor in social progress. The Soviet state acquired even greater authority and influence. The communist and workers movement transformed into a tangible political force in the world. The decay of imperialism's colonial system grew in intensity, which in the end led to the complete failure of colonial empires and formation of new independent states, some of which assumed a socialist orientation and a socialist path of development. The general crisis of capitalist increased sharply.

However, contrary to the hopes of all peoples that had anticipated a firm peace following the victory over fascist aggressors, at the fault of imperialists of the United States of America and its allies the international situation grew worse as early as in the second half of the 1940s. Today the imperialist circles of the USA and other NATO countries are preparing for a new world war against the USSR and countries of the socialist fraternity, they are appealing for a "crusade" against communism, and they are increasing world tension to dangerous limits. Apparently the lessons of World War II did not teach imperialists much, since they are once again striving for world domination. These lessons demand alertness from all to whom peace is precious, all who are concerned about the fate of mankind.

To restrain aggressors and avert a new war, we must decisively counteract the military preparations of imperialism. The Soviet Union is doing everything possible to strengthen the defense capabilities of countries in the socialist fraternity, maintain its armed forces in a state of high combat readiness and thus prevent international reaction from catching us unawares. The party and state, noted CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, will unshakably defend the vital interests of our motherland and maintain high alertness and a preparedness to offer an annihilatory repulse to any attempt at aggression. It is to the completion of these tasks that the multivolume fundamental work "History of World War II 1939-1945," which has been met by military readers with great interest, is dedicated.

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#### EFFECT OF SOCIAL OPINION ON MILITARY DISCIPLINE DISCUSSED

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[Article by Col V. Mikora, candidate of historical sciences, recommended for use when studying the subject "Formation of Public Opinion in the Military Collective as a Means of Reinforcing Military Discipline"]

[Text] That morning, the platoon commanded by Lieutenant N. Klimachenkov was gripped by excitement right from the start. It became known that last night, while on a pass to the city, Private K. Os'minin grossly violated military discipline. In the breaks between lessons the soldiers actively discussed what had happened. Some spoke directly to the offender with unconcealed condemnation. Their questions were biting: "How could you dare?", "Why didn't you think about the collective, about its reputation?".

In the evening, the lieutenant gave orders for the platoon personnel to convene in the classroom. Prior to this he had talked with the platoon's Komsomol group organizer, with the junior commanders and with the activists. The officer came to understand from the discussion with them that the collective was seething. The privates and NCOs were angered by the offending act of their fellow serviceman. An atmosphere of public condemnation arose about the offender.

On receiving the report from his assistant, Sergeant L. Solodukha, Lieutenant N. Klimachenkov declared:

"Comrades! Let's hold a meeting of the platoon personnel. Everyone knows the story about Private Os'minin's unworthy behavior."

The meeting had barely begun when a messenger from headquarters informed the officer that he was wanted by the senior chief immediately. The officer left without disturbing the meeting. Lieutenant N. Klimachenkov was certain that it would proceed in organized fashion and that the culprit would get his due. He was aware of the maturity of his subunit and the attitude of the personnel toward violations of military discipline, and he had no doubt that Os'minin was not going to enjoy the next few minutes. The soldier would have to listen to many unpleasant things from his comrades. And that is what happened. Despite the absence of the platoon commander the collective discussed the unworthy behavior of one of its members in a coordinated, sincere and thorough way, and as always, the active Komsomol members and NCOs set the tone.

Moving ahead a little, let me say that this meeting did not end without an effect on Private K. Os'minin. He was to long remember this principled discussion with his comrades. In the future he not only avoided deviations from the norms of proper behavior, but he also attained significant successes in service. Thus the platoon commander's competent utilization of public opinion that was healthy in content and active in its methods of influence was a decisive factor of the changes that occurred.

Utilization of the resources of collective influence for indoctrination purposes is the most typical trait of the disciplinary practice of many one-man commanders. Under their competent direction, public opinion always stands guard over military order and encourages the personnel to active military labor, to multiplication of the glorious traditions of the army and navy.

The public opinion of the military collective (the feelings, viewpoints and aspirations of the people, their attitude toward current events and toward the activities of each soldier) has its unique features predetermined by the character and objective conditions of the personnel's day-to-day life. On one hand the objects of its assessments include, besides various events in the international and domestic life of the country of national significance, problems associated with the main task--maintaining the subunit's and unit's high combat readiness. On the other hand public opinion has exceptionally great influence upon the personality. This unique feature is predetermined by the collective nature of military activity itself. The tendency for the interdependence between the soldier and the collective to grow as crew-operated weapons develop also has important significance.

The commander, political worker and party and Komsomol organizations play the leading role in formation and function of public opinion in the military collective. Their words, opinions and assessments of events and facts, their idealism and their authority are especially substantial. And the deeper they study the mood, viewpoints, aspirations and needs of the soldiers and the more purposefully they indoctrinate them in the spirit of communist morality, the better is the moral climate of the collective and the more favorable are the conditions for advancement of the soldiers to new summits of combat readiness.

The power of the opinion of the army collective can also be explained by the fact that a large proportion of the personnel of subunits and units are communists and Komsomol members--active expressers and champions of highly idealistic public opinion, and the vanguard of the collective. In this regard the day-to-day activities of servicemen in the leading subunits and units, in which the resources of public influence have been utilized right from the beginning of the current training year to insure punctual fulfillment of socialist pledges by all soldiers, are especially rich with instructive examples. The personal examples set by active communists and Komsomol members in this effort is an inspiring example to others. They set the tone for those around them through their active life position, their complete dedication to military labor and their intolerance of all negative manifestations.

Full consideration of age-related features of first-term soldiers is especially typical of the best military collectives. "In his young years," said M. I.

Kalinin, "the individual is most greatly predisposed toward friendship, toward the collective support of comrades." Gaining popularity among peers and winning their recognition and approval are motives that go a long way to define the behavior of young people in uniform. It is a matter of honor for commanders, political workers and all organizers of indoctrination to utilize this factor in behalf of strengthening military discipline and raising the cohesiveness, battleworthiness and combat readiness of units and ships, for the purposes of optimizing the conditions under which the personality of the Soviet soldier takes shape.

It should be kept in mind that all collective opinion is necessarily tuned to a particular moral wave. It is a manifestation of the moods, attitudes, orientations, morals and traditions that have evolved in the given subunit. Thus depending on the moral maturity of the collective, its influence upon soldiers can perform a dual role: In one case it can be a strong moral and psychological barrier to the spread of unfavorable phenomena, and in the other it can serve as a nutrient medium for them.

Highly moral public opinion has grown deep roots in the overwhelming majority of the military collectives. As an example the following principles have the most favorable educational influence upon all day-to-day activities of the personnel: Earning a badge of honor in formation is the same as earning an order in combat; when there are outstanding soldiers present, no one should fall behind; all the best from the collective to the personality, and from the personality to the collective; hard training means easier combat, and so on. But at the same time some detachments and crews follow the narrow-minded stereotypes, where the soldier sleeps as the world passes by. The harm in such stereotypes is that they have an unfavorable influence on the activeness of the personnel. Finding anyone who approves of such harmful ideas is extremely rare. Their arising is generally excluded wherever the party and Komsomol organizations are strong and wherever work with people proceeds skillfully and concretely.

Life demonstrates that in some collectives, even those that work well together, far from all tasks and requirements fall within the sphere of public opinion to an equal extent. Successfully shaped, healthy opinions concerning some issues often coexist with the absence of adequate attention to other problems. For example in 9 out of 10 violations that affected joint activities associated with work on combat equipment the personnel of the subunit in which Officer S. Ivanchenko serves initiated public condemnation of the offenders, while in regard to absences without leave, the collective responded properly only in two cases out of 10. Obviously, public opinion concerned with military activities themselves is active in the subunit, while its attention to disciplinary offenses is disproportionately weaker. Of course, such one-sidedness must be corrected through the purposeful work of commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations.

The effectiveness of the opinion of a military collective is intensified when the collective stands together. Research and experience have shown that absolute unanimity of opinions does not exist from the very beginning in subunits



and units in relation to every problem of life and training. There is only a tendency toward such unanimity. After all, the bearers of public opinion are concrete people or individual groups characterized by different levels of professional training and moral maturity.

Objective conditions that would promote arising of viewpoints on fundamental issues that are divergent from the values, traditions and behavioral norms established in our society are absent from army collectives. The public opinion that asserts itself in subunits of the Soviet Armed Forces is unanimous and highly idealistic, as a tendency. Only occasional primary collectives (detachments, crews) or microgroups in which opinions on some problems of day-to-day life are based on immature and false value judgements are encountered. Phenomena of this sort have their causes. The latter include partial or temporary inconsistency of the interests of the collective and the personality, conflicts between soldiers, insufficiently deep assimilation of the ideological and moral principles of proper behavior by some members of the collective, and a low level of development of criticism and self-criticism in the collective. Up-rooting these causes is an indispensable prerequisite of insuring an educational role for the collective. It is toward this end that the purposeful daily activities of officers must be directed.

How does healthy public opinion come into being in a collective?

Let us note first of all that this process includes both formation and development of public opinion. The first phase is concerned with educational leadership--that is, with what the commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations do to control the opinion of the collective. The second phase has to do with the way it is born, develops and grows stronger, transforming into a stable tradition and becoming an ethical rule of life for soldiers of the subunit.

It should be kept in mind that a military collective's public opinion also goes through several stages in its development. In the first stage individual, often rather different assessments of particular facts and events arise; in the second, these assessments undergo correction. In this case every member of the collective is given a possibility not only to state his opinion but also to compare it with the position of a fellow serviceman and to express his own attitude toward it. This stage deserves the most persistent attention of commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations; the points of view arising in the collective must be evaluated promptly and fundamentally, and they must be controlled efficiently. Otherwise any exchange of opinions may turn out to be beyond educational influence. When public opinion is formed in this way, it may not always correspond to the requirements of the military oath, the military regulations and the norms of communist morality.

In the third stage different opinions concerned with basic points of view are united, and public opinion takes shape. However, this is not a simple summation of individual opinions, but the result of qualitative processing of individual viewpoints at the level of collective awareness. Active efforts by party and Komsomol organizations and the purposeful activities of indoctrinators at all levels promote acceleration of this process on a healthy, highly idealistic

foundation. In the fourth and final stage, fully formed, unanimous public opinion manifests itself in the results of the activities of the subunit's personnel. It is expressed in this case in concrete decisions, rules, customs and traditions which gradually transform into the moral and ethical norms of the military collective.

Formation of public opinion is controlled primarily by studying and fundamentally evaluating the individual positions of the soldiers in regard to a concrete event, and by means of educational influence upon the personnel with the purpose of developing correct value judgements and subsequently generalizing and uniting individual opinions. It stands to reason that if we wish to create healthy public opinion, we cannot limit ourselves to completing just one of these tasks. They must all be completed together.

Analysis of individual opinions is an important and critical phase in the work of commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol active members aimed at shaping healthy public opinion in the subunit. The best indoctrinators make extensive use of pedagogical observations, personal communication with soldiers and other forms of work for this purpose. Well organized acquisition of information on incipient (not already formed!) moods and opinions within the collective and on their concrete bearers is an indispensable prerequisite of deep analysis of public opinion. This helps officers in the subunit to clearly determine which opinions to hold up, which opinions to change, whom to support, whom to correct, whom to "neutralize" and so on.

Such information allows commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations to exert purposeful pedagogical influence upon the personnel. Indoctrinators must display psychological insight: In every situation, they must correctly evaluate information on the moods within the collective, and when necessary they must take carefully conceived steps aimed on one hand at supporting and developing individual opinions that are in keeping with the goals and objectives of military activity, and on the other hand at counteracting all that is contrary to the requirements of the military regulations and the norms of communist morality. It is very important in this case for the nature of these steps and the time of their implementation to be selected with a consideration for the concrete situation. Assume for example that most soldiers evaluate a certain fact in the same way as their commander. In this case there is no need for conducting preliminary discussions, providing explanations, holding debates and so on. It would be suitable to hold a meeting of the personnel right away, without postponements. Such a meeting would have a fast effect, inasmuch as soldiers with an incorrect opinion on the issue under discussion will change it under the influence of the majority right during joint discussion. The effectiveness of implementing such a measure, or one like it, is also justified by the fact that it would make it possible to uproot embryonic immature judgements and exclude the possibility of their subsequent spread. But now assume that several different lines of thought supported by a significant proportion of the personnel are discovered in the collective. In this case other forms of work must be planned: debate or discussion, personal conversations or meetings with a person knowledgeable in the given issue, and so on.



Commanders, political workers and party and Komsomol organizations influence public opinion and its formation primarily by determining the subject matter of collective discussions, selecting the appropriate forms of work (meetings, debates, personal interviews, evening discussions on specific topics, discussions of books and movies, and so on), by controlling who participates in these measures, through their own attitude toward particular judgements and through personal example. Irrespective of the form these measures take, each must be preceded by thorough work with the active members directed at analyzing moods within the collective and determining the nature and order of fulfillment of the given task. It is also through the active members that the personnel are prepared for correct perception of suggested ideas and of decisions arrived at by the collective. This work represents a unique sort of "incubation" period, without which it would be difficult to count on success.

Communication off the job and individual contacts of the servicemen also have an active influence on the formation of public opinion. Communication is not just discussion, but an important form of psychosocial interaction among people. In addition to transmitting experience they exchange ideas and interests, and they form personality sets and positions. Daily communication allows commanders, political workers and active party and Komsomol members to grasp the subtlest nuances in the moods forming in a collective, and tracing their birth, development and extinction. Concurrently, communication also performs a feedback function. By talking with privates and NCOs, subunit officers get information on events and moods in the subunit first-hand. This sort of information often serves as a basis for making adjustments in political indoctrination, including in the process of forming public opinion and in its practical utilization in behalf of strengthening military discipline and raising combat readiness.

Thus formation of public opinion in the military collective is a multifaceted, interrelated process of analyzing the orientation of individual and group opinions of the servicemen, and then generalizing and unifying them for their subsequent materialization in the course of military activity. This process is essentially one of raising the moral awareness of the personnel, of creating stable norms of behavior. As the collective develops, the sphere of competency of its public opinion broadens to include problems of ever-increasing complexity.

When politically and morally healthy public opinion arises on the basis of a deep analysis of military duty and of the requirements of the manuals and communist morale, it can serve as an important lever for instilling discipline in soldiers. This is evident primarily in the best units and subunits. Thus not a single gross violation of discipline has been committed for over 3 years in the regiment in which Major A. Kukushkin serves. In it, the struggle for the strictest possible order is broadly based on discussion of the corresponding problems at party and Komsomol meetings and at meetings of the personnel. There is good reason why most soldiers gave the following answer to the question as to what has the most effective influence on persons violating the established rules of behavior: "Condemnation of the act by fellow servicemen."

Conscious discipline is an important indicator of the social and moral maturity of the military collective. In many ways it predetermines the nature of the collective's influence upon the personality. Unfortunately, development of the

collective's exactingness and utilization of the collective's public opinion for educational purposes is one aspect of the work of commanders that is still difficult for them. Certain disciplinary measures and moral lectures often dominate in their work with subordinates, while public opinion and collective demands are not always placed into action. As a consequence such commanders fail to utilize a powerful lever for indoctrinating the people.

Special studies proved that the individual evaluates himself in accordance with how he believes those surrounding him evaluate him on the basis of criteria adopted by the society. In view of this, public opinion makes conscious self-assessment a personal necessity of the soldier, encouraging an active desire for self-improvement. Public opinion also assists in resolving various contradictions and conflicts. In the sphere of moral attitudes, moreover, it reveals its preventive purpose more than anywhere else: Public opinion has a capacity for curtailing any deviation from the military regulations while it is still in embryonic form. By approving or condemning the behavior of some one soldier, public opinion has an influence not only upon him but also upon all. Thus it fights an invisible war against what we might term potential offenders.

Public opinion exercises its educational functions through many channels. One of them is exactingness. Its orientation and the level and methods of its realization have a significant influence, inducing disciplined behavior in soldiers. However, these requirements are perceived by the personality in different ways depending on their content and on the forms in which these demands are presented. Special studies have shown that in a number of cases the demands of the public are not always perceived by those toward whom they are directed. Sometimes they simply fail to reach their addressees. As a rule, demands having to do with established rules of behavior that are not reinforced by the personal example of the indoctrinators themselves are perceived the most weakly. This obligates all commanders, political workers and active party and Komsomol members to be constantly exacting not only toward their subordinates but also toward themselves.

It is important to differentiate the use of public opinion's educational influence, with a consideration for the particular features of different categories of servicemen. Thus in the late period of their service, some soldiers begin to feel as "ex-soldiers," and their thoughts tend more and more into nonmilitary concerns. Such a mood has an effect on discipline. By the way they talk and act, some servicemen claim a privileged position in the subunit, often to the detriment of the rights of young soldiers. It must be qualified immediately that such phenomena must not be thought of as unavoidable in the life of a collective. Wherever indoctrination is well organized, no problems arise in the mutual relationships between soldiers in their later and earlier periods of service, and the military regulations and their requirements serve as the immovable foundation of the behavior of all. Special measures aimed at preventing claims upon a special status by individual servicemen also produce good results. Thus commanders and political workers of a number of subunits have come up with the idea of raising the social activity and responsibility of soldiers in their later periods of service by more persistently encouraging them to take part in training and indoctrination. One such direction of activity that has been selected is to have soldiers in the fourth period of their service conduct lessons with young soldiers.

This practice has recommended itself in the battalion in which Major V. Rybalko is the deputy commander for political affairs. Here, soldiers in their later periods of service are subjected to considerable training. They are acquainted with the methods of conducting lessons. To make this activity more socially meaningful, soldiers asked to conduct lessons adopt socialist pledges. The soldiers report the results of their work to the collective, and the latter makes an evaluation. It is indicative that as the number of lessons they conduct increase, a change occurs in the interests, viewpoints and attitudes toward service displayed by soldiers in their later period of service; their official authority and social status rise. They suggest initiatives for improving the training process more frequently, and they display greater initiative in competitions for exemplary military order, which in turn promotes improvement of the moral climate in the subunit, and activation of its public opinion.

And so, the public opinion of a military collective is a powerful and active factor, promoting an increase in the discipline of the personnel. It comes into being and it develops through purposeful organizational work and political indoctrination by commanders, political workers and the party and Komsomol organizations of the subunits. The more fruitful and effective their activity is in this direction, the more confidently the personnel travel the road of unconditional fulfillment of the requirements of the USSR minister of defense on improving military proficiency, strengthening discipline and raising the combat readiness of the troops.

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'TRAINING' INCIDENTS IN DRA DISCUSSED BY HSU MAJ R. AUSHEV

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 9, May 83 (signed to press 18 Apr 83) pp 57-62

[Article by Maj R. Aushev, Hero of the Soviet Union: "Our Officer's Honor"]

[Text] As with every cadet in a military academy, I have little free time: There are lectures to go to, there is independent study in the library, and there are the field exercises, all of which mean a full life for me today. Nonetheless when I am invited to meet with a worker or student collective, or to take part in confidence-building exercises for schoolchildren--there are an especially large number of invitations on the eve of Victory Day, I try to find a couple of hours or so, and satisfy the request.

I know quite well how much the Soviet people love their army, how proud they are of it, and how interested they are in things having to do with the life and work of soldiers. After all, there is perhaps no family in our country in which someone had not served in the armed forces--someone who had not defended the motherland during the war or protected its borders in peace. The war decorations of the veterans, the letters of gratefulness from commanders, the certificates and the photographs recall this to us, and tell the story today.

We have such mementos in our family as well. My grandfather Yusup participated in the civil war, and his sons and grandsons served and are now serving in the army. For example two of my brothers, Adam and Bagautdin, are also officers. On the whole, our family is closely associated with the army.

I am often asked: What made me and my brothers decide to go into the military? Was it the romantic, heroic image of the soldier, or the shine of an officer's shoulderboards? That played a part, I must admit. What boy has not dreamed of wearing a Chapayev cloak, of flying a modern fighter, of participating in a military parade in Red Square? But over the years our dreams grew up as we grew up. We began looking at an officer's work more realistically: marches, training combat, life in a tent, responsibility for subordinates. But even with all of this, we still selected this path. Because we know quite well that our motherland needs this profession, that this is a profession of real men. As far as an officer's shoulderboards are concerned, to me they represent primarily the glory of war heroes, the glory of Gastello, Karbyshev, Klochkov and Pokryshkin, of our military leaders, our military chiefs and our fearless cosmonauts. This

glory imposes very high responsibility. To bear this glory honorably and to multiply it means to serve the interests of the country in every act, to dedicate all of one's strength and knowledge to insuring dependable protection of the socialist fatherland. These are not just noble words. Behind them are Soviet officers honorably carrying the baton of heroism, of selfless faithfulness to patriotic and international duty.

It is always with special emotion that I read Lieutenant Aleksandr Stovba's book of verses "Song of Violent Thunder." Its lines reflect the spiritual world of the modern officer, his thoughts of duty and honor:

When the fighting gets tough,  
Time passes so swiftly for officers and soldiers.  
There, with their submachine guns at ready,  
Your comrades lie in wait.

Their life depends on you,  
Oh, how you soar into immortality!  
You're the first to take the bullet,  
Out of love for friends and motherland.

How rich these lines are in spiritual wisdom! Officer Communist Aleksandr Stovba died the death of a hero covering his comrades with fire, having fulfilled his military and international duty to the end. But his comrades in arms have remained in the officer corps, and their actions--both the ordinary, mundane actions and those committed in unexpected, sometimes critical situations, their service--a hard and noble one, and their fight to increase the combat readiness of the platoons, companies, squadrons and batteries are a mirror reflection of the great integrity of their characters, the richness of their spiritual world and their high sense of honor.

There was a time when I served in one of the units. We the officers shared equally with the soldiers all of the burdens of life in the field, be it in desert or mountains, in blistering heat or freezing cold. And wherever we were, we tried to be an example of endurance, composure and a readiness to perform any missions.

I will never forget the time in difficult mountain terrain when Lieutenant Abdygul Chotbayev volunteered to drive through a seemingly impassable slide first. I also recall the daring of Lieutenant Vladimir Nazarov, who rushed to the assistance of helicopter pilots downed in a remote region, encouraging other soldiers to follow him.

In those rather harsh conditions of service, my officer comrades placed special value on the honor of their rank. While we differed in character and army experience, we were united and led by a high sense of responsibility, a sense of duty.

Of course, all of these qualities, which are manifested not only in unusual conditions but also in day-to-day combat training, are not given to the officer together with the diploma when he graduates from military school. They are

nurtured by both the family and the school. Senior comrades--commanders and political workers--help cadets and young officers deepen these qualities. The images of many of these commanders and political workers often rise before me.

At one time, Colonel Vasiliy Nikiforovich Prikhod'ko was the commander of our cadet battalion. He is now in the reserves. But his example, the example he gave as a communist and a veteran, is still remembered in our army. Always well composed and self-controlled, he was strict and just in his relations with us. His attentive gaze noticed everything: our successes and failures, our merits and shortcomings. The commander was always ready to help. We learned many things from our communication and our intimate talks with him--talks concerning the honor of being an officer. I personally tried to emulate my commander. We even learned many useful fine points from him, and our memory of him has survived many long years.

Lieutenant Colonel Yevgeniy Vasil'yevich Vysotskiy is of the postwar generation, the son of an officer in the border troops. He went through all of the initial stages of a commander's development, and he was given the command of a regiment--our motorized rifle regiment. As an officer he earned the lofty title of Hero of the Soviet Union for valor and courage displayed in the performance of military duty, and to us, his subordinates, he was an example in everything. We respected him for his enormous diligence, self-control and purposefulness. But perhaps what we liked most about Vysotskiy was his unlimited exactingness toward himself, his ability to look you right in the eye, his capability for enduring the trials of service with honor and merit. The principle which he followed and which he tried to encourage us to follow may be expressed like this: The spiritual steadfastness inherent to every courageous person and his honor are tested and grow strong not only in extraordinary circumstances but also in ordinary, mundane situations. "Sometimes of course it becomes necessary to gather all of your courage together for the one big push," he said. "But the main thing is to always be honest. Honest to yourself and to other people."

The truthfulness of these words has been demonstrated many times. I recall for example the case of Lieutenant A. Kostenko. On joining the unit after graduating from school, he was in no hurry to immerse himself into the affairs and concerns of the military collective. The difficult years of training were behind, he reasoned, and hard years of service were ahead; a rest was appropriate. While he worked himself into the unit at his leisurely pace, the combat training missions grew more and more complex. As the time for a final readiness inspection came nearer, the young commander began to sense that the outstanding platoon that had been entrusted to him was no longer earning outstanding grades. Realizing his mistake, he began to make up for lost time at an accelerated pace. He was in turmoil himself, and he raised the tension of those around him as well. But it is not all that simple to catch up with comrades who have pushed on ahead. As a result the platoon failed its pledges. Through his bitter experience the lieutenant confirmed the old truth: Dishonorable fulfillment of assigned work will not lead to any good. There is reason why we say that honor is something that must be protected right from the start.

What appeared to be a harmless indiscretion by a young officer, a mild case of laxity, mushroomed into a loss of the lead and the prestige of the collective,



and a significant loss to the commander's honor. Doubled and tripled efforts were subsequently required by Kostenko to correct the situation and to restore his good relations with his fellow servicemen.

But most officers with whom I have served behave differently. I warmly recall, for example, Lieutenant Valeriy Nikulin. No matter how difficult the training day, he was always optimistic and smiling, and his appearance alone improved the mood of the soldiers. But at the same time he was also exacting and attentive of other people, approaching fulfillment of all tasks efficiently and creatively. He graduated from school with a gold medal, and he was given the command of a separate platoon that had occasion to complete company-scale combat training missions.

An officer's honor was higher than anything else for Nikulin. I bring this up because of the great seriousness and responsibility with which he considered his advancement to the position of company commander. He came to me for advice at that time: Would he make it, what did I think? I told him confidently that he would make it. And I thought about how important it is for an officer to be modest, to be exacting toward himself. After all, when an officer assesses his work and service self-critically, when he studies hard himself and teaches subordinates that which would insure victory over a strong and technically well equipped enemy, he elevates both his honor and that of whatever collective he happens to be in charge of.

My studies at school and the academy, my life experience--not very extensive but rich in events, my service and my work as secretary of a subunit's party organization persuaded me that communist ideology is the foundation of an officer's high political morale and work qualities. It is upon communist ideology that the high political morale and work qualities of an officer, his conscious attitude toward military duty and his exactingness toward himself and others are based. Communist ideology is what predetermines the spiritual countenance of the officer, his feelings and will, and permeates all of his deeds and acts.

As we know, the main form of raising the ideological-theoretical level of officers is lessons in the Marxist-Leninist training system, and "within" it--independent study. Much depends here on self-discipline, on each of our understanding that we must constantly raise our ideological level, from one day to the next, we must expand our political outlook and we must deepen our knowledge of military pedagogics and psychology. But sometimes this self-discipline is lacking. Some comrades feel that authority simply goes with the position, and that there is no need for working to keep it up. They limit themselves to performing their official responsibilities, and they work without an eye on the future. As the years pass, the spiritual world of such officers becomes poorer, they begin to fall behind the demands of life, and they reduce their exactingness toward themselves. And then they offer the excuse that they are too busy, that the conditions for planned independent study are absent.

True, we usually serve in places far from capitals and cultural centers, but newspapers, magazines, radio and television are available everywhere today, and there are cultural and educational institutions. And books--the best and

most dependable guides into the world of knowledge and feelings--are everywhere. All of this is a tremendous support to raising our ideological-theoretical level and to improving our professional knowledge. Of course, we must know how to use our time sensibly. We must learn how to distinguish what is most important, most significant. The poet was right when he said: "The spirit must labor both day and night, both day and night." These words have the most direct bearing on the officer. He will be unable to develop other people properly if he does not show concern for his own growth, if he does not engage in self-education.

I recall stating this thought at a certain party meeting. Of course, I had to reinforce it with an example. And it was easy for me to find one among many: I described the life and service of one of our active communists--Captain Vladimir Kudin, the battalion deputy commander for technical affairs. Despite the great amount of work he had to do, this person devoted a great amount of attention to studying the pressing problems of the party's domestic and foreign policy in the Marxist-Leninist training system, he was avidly interested in the latest in political, creative and technical literature, and he was one of the active members of the agitation-propaganda group. To serve with Kudin means to be sure that equipment is operable, that it is 100 percent ready to go, as they say. And when that is true, nothing is an obstacle. If a breakdown should happen, the soldiers are able to correct the problem competently and nimbly under Kudin's guidance. Sometimes they may even spend an entire night "casting spells" over a vehicle, but by morning it is in formation, ready to move. The following incident once occurred. Kudin was injured in a slide while crossing a pass. We summoned a helicopter to evacuate the officer down into the valley. But when the helicopter landed we could not find the deputy commander for technical affairs right away. As we found out later, immediately after his wounds were dressed he went back to the tail of the column where a crew was replacing caterpillar tracks in complex conditions. It was only in response to a direct order from the commander that Kudin went aboard the helicopter. It is no wonder that people say the individual creates his own surroundings, and not the other way around. For courage and valor displayed in the execution of military duty, Captain V. Kudin was awarded two orders of the Red Star.

What makes our military profession heroic is self-sacrifice, devotion to duty. For practical purposes an officer is never off duty. He may be required to divorce himself from his personal affairs at any moment, and exert maximum strength in the performance of his duty. This requires truly iron dependability of all of us, dependability upon which people, and primarily comrades in arms, can count on. Can there be any comparison for the responsibility an officer bears before the party and all the people for the subunit or unit entrusted to him, for the training and indoctrination of subordinates, for military order and for the condition of weapons and combat equipment?

It has always been with a special emotion that I have looked at the faces of young people joining the subunit. Yesterday's schoolchildren, workers and students. The people entrust them, their sons, to the officers to temper them spiritually and physically and to impart political, military and technical knowledge and the required habits. And the development of the soldier and his maturation depend to a decisive extent on the knowledge, the professional and pedagogical skill and the personal example of the officer. It is no accident



that people associate him with notions of strong will, faultless morality, organization and discipline, initiative and a creative approach to work. All of these qualities of an officer have a favorable influence on subordinates and on the military collective, and they promote attainment of high effectiveness in training and indoctrination.

It is very important to an officer's authority to never allow a void to form between word and deed. Faithfulness to one's word and the ability to do what is promised, what is planned elevate the officer morally, increasing the respect shown toward him. And on the other hand, he who likes to make many promises and adopt high pledges but who does little to carry them through is worthy of the most acute criticism. Sometimes such an officer attempts to conceal the deficiencies in his work by eyewashing. He justifies his mistaken ideas by saying that he is concerned for the honor of the subunit. But it is precisely this sort of "concern" that casts a shadow on the good name of the collective. Whatever the case, glossing over shortcomings and embellishing the real state of affairs can only do harm.

Experience shows that wherever adequate concern is shown for maintaining the honor of commanders and political workers, one will find a healthy moral atmosphere, clear military order and strictly proper mutual relationships between chiefs and subordinates, between all servicemen. And in a strong, unified collective, every soldier, including the young one, gains confidence in his strengths and in the support of comrades, and he serves with inspiration, with high spirit.

I could cite many examples both from my own service and from the lives of my comrades that confirm the notion that people are attracted to those commanders and political workers who give off an air of deep ideological conviction, vital force and calm confidence.

Take Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Liz as an example. I spent a lot of time together with this officer, a former platoon commander who had subsequently accepted a company. What attracted me as well as other comrades to this person was his love for the service and for people, and his enormous diligence. He never sought the easy way, he always selected the heavier burden for himself. No matter what tasks his subordinates had to perform, they could always see their commander working with vigor. This raised the spirit of the soldiers, and it gave them strength. And when nothing was going on, Aleksandr did not leave his subordinates, he did not put himself apart, as some officers do, in "his own" circle. If a recent newspaper is available in the field, he acquaints the soldiers with the news, he comments on it, he answers whatever questions may arise, or he simply asks his soldiers what they are writing from home. Through his devotion to duty and his attention to the concerns and needs of people, the young officer earned real respect in the collective. And it is no accident that he was the one most soldiers retired into the reserves wrote to, thanking him for the good school of life which he provided to them and which is now helping them in their work at shock construction projects, plants and kolkhoz fields. Liz showed me some of the letters--from sergeants G. Gavrilov, A. Tarasov and other soldiers. One could see that Aleksandr is happy that his former subordinates do not forget him, and he takes pride in this. And why not?

I could understand what he was feeling: Recognition by other people is a special honor. Honor that is earned through one's actions!

This kind of honor is never gained by those officers to whom service is a burden and whose behavior is dominated by insolence, roughness and disrespect of other people. Unfortunately, there are still such officers around. It is without special pleasure that I recall the time I served together with Captain A. Zinchenko. Showing no special love for his work, this officer often violated discipline, he came to lessons unprepared, and he spoke with people roughly. And off the job, his behavior was unworthy. The command and the party organization applied considerable effort to indoctrinate Zinchenko, but he continued to follow his downhill course. Acts of his that were unworthy of an officer, that did insult to military honor and that were incompatible with the principles of communist morality were examined at a comrade's court of honor. On its petition, Zinchenko was demoted to a lower position.

What more need be said? This was not one of the pleasant cases. When things go as far as a comrade's court of honor, inevitably the question of shortcomings in indoctrination of officers arises. It is found that the command and the party organization had not been exacting enough, that they did not stick to their principles, and that they failed to notice an individual's shortcomings in time.

An officer's honor compels us not to fear conflicts in matters of principle. Bad is the collective in which it is believed that only chiefs or members of the party organ are obligated to talk to a person about his shortcomings or unworthy acts. Whenever an officer selects the wrong, unworthy line of behavior--be it in his work, in his relations with people or at home, his closest fellow servicemen have the first obligation to point out his mistakes. Both excessive formality and all-forgiveness on one hand and bureaucratic callousness, roughness and arrogance in relations with a junior officer on the other are identically alien to comradeship among officers. After all, all of us are defenders of the motherland, and we serve the one cause of the party and state. And in this we are all equal.

The party constantly reminds us that poor work, indifference and irresponsibility have a direct and irreversible effect on material rewards, on the position and on the moral authority of the worker. All of this has a direct bearing on us, the officers, people entrusted with the job of training and indoctrinating soldiers.

Concern for observing the honor of an officer begins with his deep internal realization of the special mission imposed by the party and people upon a defender of the country, and which he performs wherever he is sent. Whatever an officer is doing, be he in formation with his comrades, leading his subordinates in a training attack, serving a watch on the ocean, flying, or walking the city streets, he is always in the public eye. Why? Because he is the continuer of the shining glory of the Soviet officer corps, the preserver of its traditions and honor. Subordinates, chiefs and all Soviet people have faith in his courage, his spiritual steadfastness and purity, his discipline and endurance, his human dependability. They believe that on any day and at any hour, our officers will fulfill their duty before the party and people no worse than the older generation that wrested a victory in the gravest of all wars. That they will perform selflessly, with merit and with honor.

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## OUTLINE OF LECTURE ON GUARDING STATE SECRETS

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[Article by Lt Col K. Pashikin: "Strictly Safeguarding Military and State Secrets, Being an Alert Soldier"]

[Text] The objective of studying this subject is to help students understand more deeply V. I. Lenin's commandments and the directives of the Communist Party on raising the alertness of Soviet people and soldiers of the army and navy. Every private and seaman must recognize his personal responsibility for strictly safeguarding military and state secrets and maintaining the high combat readiness of his subunit, unit and ship in these times of an international situation that has been sharply aggravated at the fault of the imperialists.

Six hours are devoted to the study of this subject. It would be suitable to apportion this time as follows: 2 hours for lecture (narration), 2 hours for independent study and 2 hours for a seminar (discussion).

Illuminating the following questions is recommended in the lecture (narration):

1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the alertness of Soviet people and soldiers of the army and navy.
2. Displaying indefatigable alertness, being always on guard--the duty of each soldier.

It should be noted in a brief introduction that our country is firmly pursuing a Leninist peace-loving foreign policy course. Clear confirmation of this can be found in the peace initiatives spelled out in the report "Sixty Years of the USSR" by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, and in the appeal "To the Parliaments, Governments, Political Parties and Peoples of the World" adopted by a joint solemn session of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Supreme Soviet and RSFSR Supreme Soviet on 22 December 1982. New motivations for solving intricate international problems in behalf of strengthening peace and the security of nations are offered in the political declaration of Warsaw Pact states adopted in Prague.

However, the aggressive circles of imperialism, and primarily of the USA and other NATO countries, are doing everything they can to block detente, and they are aspiring to resurrect the spirit of the cold war. Imperialist "hawks" have declared a "crusade" against communism. The development of events is

becoming increasingly more dangerous. The threat of war, primarily nuclear war, is intensifying.

In their desire to achieve their insidious plans, the enemies of peace and progress are ready to use all resources at their disposal. They are intensifying subversive actions against the USSR and other socialist countries, they are spreading anti-Soviet and anticommunist psychosis, and they are trying to discredit the social principles of socialism. The ideological diversions of imperialism are intimately intertwined in this case with subversive intelligence activities.

The highest alertness is required of the Soviet people and soldiers of the armed forces under these conditions. Lenin's statement that we need discipline and military alertness raised to the highest limit is acquiring special urgency today. Competing with the motto "Raise alertness, dependably insure the security of the motherland!", Soviet soldiers are always on guard, ready to foil any aggressive plans of imperialism.

#### 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the Alertness of the Soviet People and Soldiers of the Army and Navy

Beginning presentation of the first question, the instructor should note that questions on indefatigable revolutionary alertness and political watchfulness in relation to the unabating intrigues of class enemies and the subversive actions of imperialists and their agents occupy a special place in V. I. Lenin's immortal ideological-theoretical legacy. In his works, he revealed the objective necessity for constant alertness of the Soviet people and the personnel of our armed forces. This necessity, in the leader's opinion, stemmed primarily from the fact itself of the existence of a capitalist system hostile to socialism. Back in 1916, in an article titled "The Military Program of the Proletarian Revolution," Vladimir Il'ich pointed out that the victory of socialism in one country will elicit not only friction but also a direct desire of the bourgeoisie of other countries to defeat the victorious proletariat of the socialist state (see "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], Vol 30, p 133).

Lenin's prediction was fully confirmed. Immediately after the victory of Great October, world imperialism initiated a savage armed struggle against the young Republic of the Soviets together with the internal counterrevolution. In addition to direct military actions, the enemies of Soviet rule made broad use of all sorts of secret subversive methods--counterrevolutionary conspiracies, assassinations, diversions, espionage and so on.

Under these conditions V. I. Lenin called upon all laborers and soldiers of the Red Army to decisively fight the enemy's intrigues and to be in constant combat readiness. The appeals of the great leader, and his articles and letters are permeated by a passionate spirit of revolutionary alertness and a high sense of Soviet patriotism: "The Socialist Fatherland is in Danger!", "Everything For the Struggle Against Denikin!", "Letter to Workers and Peasants on the Occasion of the Victory over Kolchak," "Protect Yourselves Against Spies!" and others.

Explaining the insidious tactics of both overt and covert enemies, the leader of the party and the founder of the Soviet state demanded that we increase our alertness tenfold, that we root out with all of our effort and capture the agents of imperialism "from all of their hiding places, unmask them and punish them mercilessly, since they are the most evil enemy of the laborers; cunning, knowledgeable, experienced, patiently awaiting a convenient moment..., stopping at no crimes to do damage to Soviet rule" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 39, p 155).

V. I. Lenin always interpreted revolutionary alertness in inseparable unity with strengthening the country's defenses and raising the combat readiness of the armed forces of the socialist state to repel aggressors and to defend the accomplishments of the revolution. No revolution is worth anything, he emphasized, unless it is able to defend itself. This is why he devoted so much attention to strengthening the fighting power of the armed forces of the young Soviet republic, and why he appealed to the people to do everything possible to keep the combat readiness of the Red Army high and to strengthen its battleworthiness. V. I. Lenin believed that being always on guard was the first commandment of our policy, the first lesson that must be assimilated by all workers and peasants.

V. I. Lenin believed observance of these requirements to be the most important indicator of the political maturity of the Soviet citizen, and of his patriotism. He was keenly opposed to all carelessness and indifference. "...he who forgets the constantly impending danger, which will not cease as long as world imperialism exists," Vladimir Il'ich warned, "he who forgets this will forget about our laboring republic" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 42, p 173).

The instructor should subsequently emphasize that Vladimir Il'ich displayed special concern for preserving the secrecy of classified information on the Red Army, its organization, armament, logistics and battleworthiness. We are in a situation, he noted, where military secrets are becoming very important issues, and the most significant to the Russian republic. A special decree of the Defense Council adopted under his signature in July 1919 emphasized the need for the fullest possible maintenance of secrecy in questions concerning the supply of our army in combat, and war plants and institutions. Vladimir Il'ich himself attached secrecy labels to many documents of a military nature, and he demanded that they be transmitted "all in code."

V. I. Lenin's military correspondence and his multifaceted practical activities associated with leading the armed forces persuasively show how much significance he attached to strict alertness, to preservation of secrecy when preparing for and conducting military operations, when developing plans, when estimating the situation and the enemy forces, and so on. For example in a telegram to the commander in chief and the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front on 24 April 1919 he gave orders to hinder the Whites from bringing up fresh forces to the Vilnya, to hasten the advance of our reinforcements, to retake the city in the shortest possible time and to intensify alertness for operations in this sector. And on 26 April of that same year V. I. Lenin telegraphed a message to the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caspian-Caucasian Front stating the need for the strictest possible control, identity checks, attentive surveillance and unquestioning alertness in connection with the fact that enemy vessels had slipped through unnoticed from Baku to Guryev.

V. I. Lenin carefully analyzed all cases of reduced alertness. He spoke strongly against all lack of discipline and violations of order that could cause secrets to be revealed, and he made sure that all workers observed the rules of handling classified materials strictly. For example on learning that information on the positions of individual fronts had been published in the VOYENNY BYULLETEN' of the Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA) on 25 January 1919, he immediately demanded an explanation from the republic's Revolutionary Military Council: "Why are these secrets going through ROSTA? Where is the guarantee of secrecy?" ("Leninskiy sbornik" [Lenin Anthology], Vol 34, p 95).

And when it became known to V. I. Lenin that some workers of the railroads and the directorates of military communications were spreading secret information, he demanded a court martial for one or two of them. On 12 May 1921, in a note to Peoples Commissar of Justice D. I. Kurskiy, he demanded an investigation as to why an extraordinary official for army and navy supply sent the Labor and Defense Council an uncoded document containing secret information on the army's numerical strength. An investigation was conducted, and the guilty were punished.

The propagandist could also present the following case to confirm how keenly and seriously V. I. Lenin felt about maintaining secrecy. In fall 1919 the professional revolutionary S. Ter-Petrosyan was sent with the code name Kamo to Baku for underground work. Interventionists and Musavatists were running rampant there at that time. An uncoded letter was sent to Vladimir Il'ich from Baku to tell him that no information had yet been received as to whether or not Kamo had arrived. V. I. Lenin immediately gave orders to "send a coded message that no one must ever use the code name Kamo, and that it must be immediately replaced by a new one. The city in which Kamo is located must be referred to only in code" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 54, p 421).

Lenin's demands of always being on guard and his directives associated with raising alertness and strictly maintaining military and state secrecy imparted and reinforced a feeling of personal responsibility for defense of the accomplishments of October in every citizen of the Soviet Union and every soldier of the Red Army, inspiring a burning hatred of class enemies and a readiness to fight them to the last drop of blood.

The interventionists and White Guards were defeated under the guidance of the Communist Party with V. I. Lenin at its head. The country began peaceful development of socialism. But even during this period V. I. Lenin emphasized that our steps toward peace must be accompanied by efforts to increase our military readiness. In his speeches given in 1920-1922 he appealed for the greatest caution in international affairs, demanding that alertness not be weakened to any extent. Speaking in December 1921 to delegates of the 9th All-Russian Congress of the Soviets, he emphasized that we were surrounded by people, classes and governments that openly express the greatest of all hatred toward us, and that we were always but a hair's breadth away from attack. Speaking to the delegates of the congress, he instructed them to be on guard, to preserve the defense capabilities of our country and our Red Army as they would their own eyes.



Following Lenin's commandments, the Communist Party is nurturing the Soviet people and the soldiers of the army and navy in the spirit of high alertness and a readiness to dependably defend the socialist fatherland and the historic accomplishments of socialism. The CPSU Program demands that we display unweakening alertness in relation to the aggressive intrigues of the enemies of peace, that we keep a constant watch over peaceful labor and that we be constantly ready to defend our motherland with arms.

The need for constant high alertness and combat readiness of the army and navy is emphasized in documents adopted by congresses of the Communist Party and its Central Committee, as well as in orders and directives written by the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy.

The party and Soviet state show constant concern for strengthening the country's defenses, and they are making a persistent effort to see that the Soviet Army and Navy receive the military and technical equipment and the combat and political training required of the missions facing them. "The Politburo has believed, and does so now, that giving everything necessary to the army and navy," noted CPSU General Secretary, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov in a speech to the November (1982) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, "is mandatory, especially in the present international situation."

The 26th CPSU Congress devoted considerable attention to strengthening the country's defenses, reinforcing the power of the army and navy and raising the alertness of Soviet soldiers and all laborers. The congress subjected the present international situation to a deep, comprehensive analysis, and it revealed the presence of an acute struggle between two directions in world policy. On one hand there is the course of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity toward bridling the arms race and strengthening peace and detente. On the other hand there is the course of imperialist circles toward undermining detente and spiraling the arms race upward, a policy of threats and interference in foreign affairs, and suppression of the struggle for liberation. As had happened many times in the past, they are attempting to justify this course by false proclamations of a mythical "Soviet military threat."

Adventurism, a readiness to stake the vital interests of mankind on narrow self-interested goals, is especially evident in the policy of the most aggressive circles of imperialism, noted the 26th CPSU Congress. They have posed a truly unattainable goal--blocking the road of progressive changes in the world, and recapturing the role of rulers of the fates of nations.

The aggressiveness of the reactionary circles of imperialism has grown especially in recent times. The USA and other NATO countries are making intensive military preparations aimed against countries of the socialist fraternity. Military expenditures are growing without restraint, and the arms race is escalating. Preparations to place about 600 American medium-range nuclear missiles in some West European countries are especially dangerous to peace. The plan, as is admitted across the sea, is to achieve "nuclear encirclement" of the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact.



Recently the American press published a plan written by the Pentagon and the U.S. National Security Council with the title "Defense Directives for Fiscal Years 1984-1988." This document calls for a first nuclear strike by the U.S. Armed Forces against objectives on the territory of the USSR and other countries of the Warsaw Pact, and it foresees the use of nuclear medium-range weapons in West Europe. It also reveals the dangerous intentions of the White House to militarize outer space. "Considering the situation that has now evolved in the world arena," noted CPSU Central Committee Politburo member, USSR minister of defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, "the CPSU and the Soviet government conclude that on one hand we must double and triple our efforts in the struggle for peace, for reducing the danger of nuclear catastrophe hanging over mankind, and on the other hand we must continually strengthen the country's defenses and the fighting power of the Soviet Armed Forces, and maintain the greatest alertness."

Completing the presentation of material on the first question, the instructor should note that Lenin's commandments and the directives of the Communist Party concerning alertness have become a law of life for Soviet soldiers. No matter where the private or seaman serves, and no matter what responsibilities he fulfills, he is always a defender of his motherland, its vigilant guard. And there is no duty that is greater or more sacred to him than serving in the Soviet Armed Forces, than being always ready to decisively halt the provocations of enemy agents and repelling all aggressors.

## 2. Displaying Indefatigable Alertness, Being Always on Guard--The Duty of Every Soldier

Presenting the second question, the instructor must first of all recall to the students that subversive activities and the "secret war" against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries occupy a special place in the aggressive plans of imperialism.

The main center of espionage and subversive activities is the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Through the efforts of the American administration, this agency has recently become extremely active. The American press admits that allocations to intelligence activities are increasing now to a greater extent than in all the history of the USA, except in wartime. Just in the present fiscal year 1983 they increased by 25 percent. The CIA's budget has exceeded \$1.5 billion, and it will continue to increase. The number of agents in the espionage department is also growing.

There are other intelligence services besides the CIA that engage in espionage and subversive activities in the USA. They include the National Security Council, the FBI, the Combined Military Intelligence Directorate of the Secretary of Defense and others. The intelligence services of the FRG, England and other NATO countries are following the lead of American intelligence.

What are they interested in? The range of issues of interest to imperialist intelligence is extremely vast. Agencies are trying to collect information on the status of our industry, agriculture, transportation and aviation, on

scientific research being conducted in our country and in other socialist countries, on introduction of new technology and so on.

However--this should be emphasized specially--enemy intelligence is applying its main effort primarily to obtaining military secrets. The number one mission of all agents of imperialist intelligence agencies is to determine the defense capabilities of the USSR and the state of our armed forces. They are trying to obtain information--at any price and by all available means--on the military-economic potential of the USSR and its allies, on plans for military mobilization, on the equipment of the armed forces and especially on the latest weapon models, on the air defense system, airfields and missile launchers, on the combat training of the troops and their locations, on the security provided to military objectives and other data having significance to defense. Enemy intelligence agencies are also interested in facts characterizing the political morale of the personnel of our armed forces and of the armies of the socialist countries.

We can see from all of this how important it is for each private and seaman to always maintain high alertness, to strictly maintain military and state secrecy, to know how to unmask the enemy and to ward off his intrigues decisively. This requirement of the defenders of the motherland is legislatively documented in the military oath and in military regulations. Taking the oath, every private and seaman solemnly vows to be a disciplined alert soldier and to strictly maintain military and state secrecy. These obligations are also imposed upon the soldier by the USSR Armed Forces Internal Service Regulations.

What is alertness? It must be explained to the students that alertness is one of the most important moral, political and fighting qualities of Soviet soldiers. It possesses clearly expressed political, military and moral aspects. In the political sense, alertness means assessment of social phenomena from a clear position, intolerance of all manifestations of ideology and morality alien to us, and of the hostile intrigues of anticommunist forces, and the ability to unmask slanderous fabrications and provocative rumors and to decisively repel the ideological diversions of imperialism and its accomplices.

In military respects, alertness would be unimaginable without a high readiness to defend the socialist fatherland with arms. A soldier's high combat readiness is the highest manifestation of his alertness. This is why being alert means, to the private and seaman possessing faultless combat skills, displaying military proficiency and being ready to fulfill a combat order at any moment.

The moral aspect of the alertness of Soviet soldiers is manifested in their attitude toward duty, in their ability to always maintain self-control, in their readiness to engage in combat immediately, in exemplary fulfillment of the requirements of the military oath, the regulations and orders from commanders and chiefs, in an attitude of intolerance toward gullible people, braggarts and thoughtless people who have lost their feeling of responsibility for keeping military and state information entrusted to them secret.

The propagandist should emphasize that communist conviction, ideological steadfastness and unlimited devotion to the socialist motherland, the cause of the

party and the ideals of communism lie at the basis of the high alertness of Soviet soldiers. The greater the ideological maturity of the private and seaman the deeper he understands party policy, the clearer is his idea of the disposition of class forces in the world arena, the better he recognizes the historic purpose and missions of the Soviet Armed Forces, the keener is his sense of alertness and political vigilance, and the higher is his combat readiness.

The Communist Party devotes constant attention to indoctrinating the Soviet people, including soldiers, in the spirit of high ideological conviction and selfless devotion to the socialist motherland and the cause of communism, and to shaping a clear class position and political alertness in the people.

This task has become especially important today in connection with sharp aggravation of the class struggle in the international arena and intensification of imperialism's ideological diversions against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Having declared a "crusade" against communism, for practical purposes the USA is now waging a psychological war against our country. Ideological saboteurs are attempting to slip bourgeois views and morals alien to us through, and to poison at least some part of the Soviet people, especially the young, with skepticism and political apathy, and to weaken the moral and political unity of Soviet society.

Under these conditions every Soviet citizen and every private and seaman must display high political alertness and the readiness to repel all provocative actions by our adversaries and to actively oppose the spread of spiritual malaise.

Those soldiers who believe that secrets are kept only in safes, beneath a profusion of seals are mistaken. Secret information is entrusted to one extent or another to every private and seaman. For example they know the strength of their subunit, its structure, its location, the availability and the combat characteristics of armament and combat equipment, the content of lessons in combat and political training, the names of commanders and chiefs, the supply norms, the locations of training grounds and so on. All of these data are military secrets, and under no circumstances can they be revealed.

This would be a pertinent place for the propagandist to recall to the students that servicemen bear criminal liability for revealing military and state secrets. Thus the law on criminal liability for state crimes considers giving military and state secrets to the enemy to be an especially dangerous crime. Offenders of such a grave crime are subjected to severe punishment. Strict responsibility for revealing military and state secrets and for losing secret documents is also foreseen in the law on criminal responsibility for military crimes. In particular, it states that revealing information of a military nature that falls within the definition of a state secret is punishable by imprisonment for a period from 2 to 5 years. But if such a crime produces grave consequences, the term of imprisonment is from 5 to 10 years. During the lesson it would be desirable to acquaint the students with these laws and to read the appropriate statutes.

High alertness is one of the soldier's weapons. Soldiers who fought at the front always remembered this. They strictly preserved military secrecy, and

they competently foiled the plans and intrigues of the enemy. Here is an example. On one occasion our troops pushed the enemy out of a major population center and stopped to rest. During this time a person in the uniform of a Soviet soldier appeared at the location of one of the units. Pretending to be a wounded soldier returning from the medical battalion, he asked people how to get back to his own unit. He found occasional simpletons who mentioned the names and locations of neighboring units in their conversations with the stranger.

Sergeant V. Derevyankin behaved differently. Instead of answering the "casualty's" questions, he demanded his papers. On examining them attentively, he ordered him to surrender his weapon and follow him. Realizing that resistance was useless, the culprit obeyed. It was revealed that this was a fascist agent sent into the disposition of the Soviet troops.

We are all aware of the act of heroism committed by Private Yuriy Smirnov. In summer of 1944, in one of the battles for the city of Orsha, he was wounded and taken prisoner while unconscious. When the Soviet soldier regained consciousness, the Germans began demanding secret information from him. Faithful to his oath, Komsomol member Smirnov completely refused to reply to the questions, and he did not give any military secrets to the enemy. The fascists then subjected him to cruel torture. But no atrocities were able to break the steadfastness of this Soviet soldier. The enraged fascist monsters crucified him on the wall of a shelter.

Many other defenders of the motherland also behaved as Yuriy Smirnov did. In that same year, 1944, our scouts discovered a concrete underground shelter in the vicinity of the Polish city of Lublin. The Soviet soldiers examined it and established that this was a torture chamber used by Hitler's butchers. They made out the following words scratched onto the wall of the cellar with a chunk of brick: "We are dying because we would not give away military secrets. Avenge us."

These acts of heroism are a clear expression of the great spiritual strength of our soldiers, their unshakable faithfulness to their duty and their high feeling of responsibility for the motherland's fate.

The glorious traditions of the war veterans are being honorably multiplied by today's generation of the motherland's defenders. There are innumerable examples of alert Soviet soldiers who have foiled the dangerous intrigues of the enemy.

Enemy agents that do manage to sneak into our country conceal themselves meticulously, trying to make themselves totally indistinguishable from ordinary Soviet people. At the same time, they do everything they can to obtain secret information and to do damage to our country's defense capabilities. In their subversive activities, spies try to make use primarily of people with loose tongues as well as unstable, morally degraded individuals. They try to capitalize on the carelessness and thoughtlessness of certain individuals. It is no accident the foreign intelligence organizations advise their agents to use the services of loose-talkers and braggarts. "Practice being able to listen for hours

on end to the ramblings of a loose tongue," state the instructions of one intelligence organ. "Without realizing, he will reveal strictly preserved secrets. Study people, force them to talk. Drink with the man. Wine is your ally."

People whose weakness is alcohol are a real find for enemy agents. Benumbed by alcohol, they lose their sense of responsibility, and their tongue becomes especially uncontrolled. There is reason for the saying: "What is in a sober person's mind is on a drunkard's tongue." Experience shows that the grossest violations of military discipline, including the loss of official and personal papers, and the revelation of secret information usually happen in the presence of casual acquaintances, in situations involving drinking. This is why the most decisive struggle must be waged against such harmful morals and habits.

Some privates and seamen wishing to boast about what they know to relatives, friends and acquaintances, blurt out secret information even without malicious intent. Before saying anything they might even caution: "This is just between you and me...." It never occurs to such a loose-talker that he is essentially doing something criminal, forgetting the old soldier's rule: What you don't want the enemy to know, don't even tell a friend."

Of course, we should not think that everyone interested in the life of servicemen is a spy. What we usually encounter are simply individuals who like to socialize. Nonetheless we should not share information of a military nature with a casual acquaintance. When a private or seaman understands well the significance of military secrecy, he himself does not try to "find out" something secret. That is the right way to act.

Soldiers serving abroad must be especially alert. Agents of imperialist reconnaissance organizations are prepared to use any carelessness of a soldier for provocative purposes, any slightest mistake or careless act, the slightest deviation from the requirements of the regulations and the military oath. They are prepared to go to any means to blacken the name of the Soviet soldier, to slander him in the eyes of the local public and to undermine trust in the Soviet Army and in our country. High discipline, iron endurance and constant vigilance will help the soldier to promptly unmask all intrigues of our adversaries and prevent possible provocations.

Enemy agents believe conversations on the telephone and radio to be a major source of secret information. Communications have always been and continue to be among the most important objectives of the "secret war." Today their significance has risen even more, since in addition to development of communication resources, the technology of eavesdropping and radio interception has advanced far forward.

According to the foreign press the intelligence organs of the USA have at their disposal thousands of radio interception posts scattered over the entire world. Airplanes outfitted with the American "warning and control system" (AWACS) making it possible to "peek into" foreign territory to a depth of 400 kilometers and more are crowding the airspace near socialist countries. Using various electronic resources operating on land and at sea, in the air and in space, the intelligence organs of imperialist states are attempting to obtain information of interest to them, primarily of a military nature.

This is why it is so important for all who use the telephone, telegraph and radio to keep military secrets. It should also be considered that the equipment supplied to the agents themselves is constantly improving as well. They use miniature eavesdropping apparatus, radio receivers and radio transmitters that fit into a fountain pen, a wrist watch, a lighter or a cigarette case. All of these "microspies" make it possible to listen in on and record telephone conversations without connecting to the cable network.

Soldiers on combat duty bear special responsibility. After all, they are required to be the first to promptly detect and ward off all attempted aggression. This is why exceptionally high proficiency, discipline and organization are required of them. Every soldier must deeply understand the state importance of his mission and his responsibility for its faultless fulfillment, and why he must be constantly ready to act in the most complex combat situation.

High alertness has great significance during guard duty and watches. These are interpreted as combat missions, ones requiring decisiveness and initiative. To always be on guard is an inviolable law of guard duty and watches. Security and protection of a facility assigned to a guard is his most important responsibility, one which he must fulfill to the end, even at the price of his own life if need be.

There are many examples in the history of the armed forces where dangerous plans of enemy agents and of various malefactors were foiled owing to an alert guard.

Once, Junior Sergeant V. Rybakov was standing guard at a military facility. His post was on a busy city street with fast-moving cars and many pedestrians. And although this was the way things always were at that post, the sergeant did not diminish his alertness. He noticed a black limousine reduce speed as it passed by the facility and then turn back. The soldier spotted a movie camera in the hands of one of the passengers. A duty officer summoned by him and the corporal of the guard detained the vehicle. Its passengers stated in broken Russian that they were tourists, and the explanation they gave for their strange behavior was that they were supposedly interested in the sights of the city. But the movie film confiscated from the "tourists" was found to contain numerous shots of the front of the same building, and of people leaving it in uniform.

Such cases graphically confirm the validity of the saying: "At your post you are at war: Be doubly alert!" A soldier on combat duty or performing the responsibilities of guard duty or a watch must constantly remember that the enemy never sleeps. And he must do everything he can to constantly be on guard, to vigilantly protect the state interests of the USSR.

It would be desirable for the propagandist to present concrete examples of high alertness, of efficiency on combat duty, on guard duty or on watch to the soldiers of his subunit, unit or ship.

Concluding the presentation of the material on this subject, the instructor should once again recall to the students the entire complexity of the present international situation, and the great danger of the aggressive course of the



reactionary forces of imperialism headed by the ruling circles of the USA. He should emphasize that under these conditions we must be triply alert, ready to offer an annihilatory repulse to an aggressor at any moment. To be alert, to strictly preserve military and state secrecy and to serve combat duty, guard duty and watches in exemplary fashion is a legal obligation and at the same time a patriotic duty of every Soviet soldier.

Reading the following is recommended for the students during independent training: V. I. Lenin's letter "Watch out for Spies!" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," Vol 38, p 399); the appropriate section of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Politizdat, 1976, pp 110-112); articles 31, 32, 62 and 63 of the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; the proceedings of the 26th CPSU Congress (pp 19-31, 65-66); CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov's speech to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 22 November 1982 and his report "60 Years of the USSR" at the joint solemn session of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on 21 December 1982; Chapter X of the training manual for political lessons, "Na strazhe Rodiny" [Standing Guard Over the Motherland], (Voyenizdat, 1978).

It would be useful to organize an evening viewing of the documentary films "To Always Be on Guard," "Our First Commandment," "The People's Faithful Sons" and "I Serve the Soviet Union," and the filmstrips "V. I. Lenin's Commandments to Soviet Soldiers on Alertness and Constant Combat Readiness" and "Alertness--Our Weapon." It would be suitable to use albums of the appropriate visual aids.

Discussing the following questions is recommended in the seminar (discussion):

1. Which of V. I. Lenin's commandments on alertness and combat readiness do you know?
2. What requirements did V. I. Lenin impose on military and state secrecy?
3. How did the 26th CPSU Congress describe the intrigues of imperialist reaction?
4. What tasks did the 26th CPSU Congress pose to the motherland's defenders?
5. What does being alert mean to a private or seaman?
6. What is the foundation of a Soviet soldier's alertness?
7. Why is the significance of alertness and constant combat readiness rising today?
8. What requirements do the military oath and the military regulations impose upon the alertness of Soviet soldiers?

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# 'FALSIFYING TRICKS' OF WESTERN 'MILITARY MARXOLOGISTS' EXAMINED

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[Article by Col A. Dyrin, doctor of philosophical sciences: "Upside-Down, or Falsifying Tricks of 'Military Marxologists'"]

[Text] The class struggle in the world arena is being waged in all spheres of social life, and with special acuity in ideology. Never before had imperialism committed such great forces and resources to ideological battles. A fear of the future has compelled the magnates of capital to create hundreds of institutes of various profiles, to pay the salaries of mobs of "Marxologists" of varying caliber and orientation, forcing them to "seek out contradictions" in the scientific revolutionary philosophy, to "prove" the impossibility of its ideals and to use both direct slander and the methods of pseudoscientific criticism.

World reaction is laying special hope on diversions in the military-political area. The leaders of the USA and other imperialist powers are trying to "justify" their aggressive doctrine, the unrestrained arms race and the course toward the scuttling of detente and confrontation with the socialist world through deliberate falsification of the international and the military policy of countries in the socialist fraternity. And inasmuch as this policy rests upon the unmovable foundation of Marxism-Leninism, it is precisely beneath it that bourgeois ideologists are digging. In this case the main targets of falsification they select are those works of Marx, Engels and Lenin that provide a truly scientific interpretation of the problems of war and peace, of the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary struggle and the struggle of liberation, and armed defense of the socialist fatherland and the accomplishments of world socialism. New fabrications--concerning "Red militarism," "communist aggression," "the Soviet military threat" and so on--are born and old ones are renewed by assaults upon truth and through sophisticated "scientific" tricks.

Distortion of the essence, place and role of the military-theoretical legacy of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism has now become so active and has assumed such great scale that it has transformed into a unique sort of "military Marxology," a branch of general bourgeois "Marxology." Thus it makes sense to examine in greater detail its social role, and its basic tendencies and tactics. The purpose of such an examination, naturally, would be to gain a possibility for fighting our ideological enemies more actively and persuasively.

Let us recall that the philosophical, economic and sociopolitical aspects of the teaching on war and armies found in the theoretical legacy of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism exist in the deepest, most inseparable unity with judgements concerned with specifically military issues (that is, those pertaining to the problems of military organization, military equipment, tactics and so on). This is one of the points of speculation by bourgeois ideologists. They artificially subdivide the military-theoretical legacy of Marx, Engels and Lenin, making some of its parts absolute and diminishing the importance of others--the most important ones at that, and they distort the real place and true role of the military aspect of the ideology and policy of communist parties.

Bourgeois "critics" and "interpreters" of Marxism-Leninism believe that by falsifying its military-theoretical side, it would be "easier" to penetrate into the "communist camp" and to sow confusion and vacillation in its ranks. They also account for the fact that military issues occupy a significant place in the life of modern society, and that they are sometimes advanced to the forefront, as witnessed in the use of imperialist armed forces to support domestic and foreign policy; the active political role played by armies in developing countries; use of weapons in the national struggle for liberation and so on. Finally, they also consider the fact that a left-wing movement and groups that insistently proclaim themselves to be on the side of the "military doctrine" of Marx and Lenin exist in the modern world.

Under these conditions the demand for sources of literature on military issues is growing ever larger. And this demand generates a supply: Editions of particular works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and other Marxists on military issues as well as various collections of their statements on military subjects are appearing with increasingly greater frequency in the book markets of nonsocialist countries. But so that all of these books could serve as a unique weapon against Marxism-Leninism and the policy of communist parties, bourgeois ideologists make a clearly arbitrary selection of the works to be published, and they make direct or indirect distortions of their texts as, for example, when mention is not made that certain passages are left out or when what is most important and most significant is dropped from the text. Moreover the collections often contain works not only by Marx, Engels, Lenin and other real ideologists of the revolutionary proletariat but also those of various opportunists: "legal Marxists," social chauvinists of the Second International, Trotskyites, anarchists and other enemies of Marxism-Leninism of this sort. The bulk of the literature on the military-theoretical legacy of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism is served up in the same way as well.

Modern bourgeois "military Marxology" did not arise in a vacuum. The first attacks upon the military-theoretical viewpoints of Marx and Engels occurred while the founders of Marxism were still alive. Later on their military viewpoints were subjected to distortion in speeches by the social-chauvinist leaders of the Second International--M. Shippel', E. Bernstein and A. Zyudekum and, later on, K. Kautsky. In the essentially lampoonist works of E. Dran ("Friedrich Engels as a Military Theorist") and I. Bonomi ("Friedrich Engels: Problems of War") published in 1915 in Germany and in 1918 in Italy, these renegades from Marxism attempted to use false references to Marx and Engels as a means for

justifying their shameful betrayal of the cause of the proletarian revolution in the years of the world imperialist war. At that same time, during the war, V. I. Lenin brilliantly defended the teaching of Marx and Engels against the vulgarities of social-chauvinists and other enemies of Marxism, and he enriched and theoretically developed it in the new historical conditions.

Following the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the spread of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and the swift growth of their attractiveness compelled the leaders of anticommunism to reorganize. Today, the present strategic plan of bourgeois ideologists is becoming increasingly more evident: continue in the traditional directions of anticommunism, and expand and intensify the ideological struggle on problems associated with the military-theoretical legacy of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism. It was with this purpose that the latest trend in the distortion of Marxism-Leninism and the policy of communist parties arose and is now being developed and propagandized in the most active manner. It essentially entails imparting completely exclusive, priority significance to military issues in Marxist-Leninist doctrine through the use of falsification, lies and slander, and thus to "theoretically" substantiating the infamous myth of a "Soviet military threat."

Analysis of modern bourgeois literature on the military-theoretical legacy of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism would show that it is basically dominated by two directions that appear diametrically opposed at first glance. First of all there are the attempts at examining military issues apart from all other aspects of Marxism as a social theory--that is, attempts at a unique form of political and ideological "mutualization" of the Marxist-Leninist military-theoretical legacy. For example Engels is declared to be a prominent and even an outstanding military theorist, but not at all a proletarian theorist, and in this sense one not differing from military philosophers of the 19th century (I. Vallakh, W. Henderson and others). Second, the literature aspires to interpret military issues in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin in unity and in a mutual relationship with other problems of their revolutionary doctrine. Speaking in the words of bourgeois "Marxologists" themselves, this approach entails "clarifying relationships" between "the military teaching" of Marxism and its "social theory" (D. Blazius, K. Kernig, R. Taker, R. Danzhevil', M. Berzher, B. Maysner and others).

While these two approaches are outwardly opposite, they pursue the same goal--rendering the military aspect absolute and exaggerating its place and role in the theoretical legacy of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism with the purpose of "proving" that "military doctrine" is supposedly the main element of scientific communism and that reliance upon armed violence is the essence of the political strategy of communists. It is precisely this false thesis, one which has nothing in common with the real state of affairs and which has a provocative political-ideological nature, that is being forwarded more and more by bourgeois ideologists as the overall crisis of capitalism grows in intensity and as the forces of democracy and socialism enjoy further victories.

Let us look at the facts. "War itself," proclaims the West German military historian R. Khen, "is a means of bringing the proletariat to power. Marx and Engels are totally indifferent to...the question as to whether it is just or unjust war."

It is entirely obvious that this is unpardonable slander of Marxist theory and its creators. Throughout their entire lives, Marx and Engels waged a decisive struggle against the point of view that supposedly "war is the primary motive force of history," that it "leads to power," and so on. They never supported "war in general"--that is, any war, and they interpreted and evaluated it primarily from the proletarian class position, concretely and in a differentiated manner, revealing the social nature and the possible influence of armed conflict on the revolutionary workers movement. This is the only way that Marx and Engels determined their attitude toward a particular war. During the debates in the General Council of the International on the inception of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 Marx directly declared, for example, that the problem of war must be examined not from a general standpoint but from the point of view of each war taken individually.

Falsifying these universally known facts, D. Blazius, another West German "Marxologist" ascribes an abstract definition of war to Marx and Engels in his article "Carl von Clausewitz and the Principal Philosophers of Marxism" with the purpose of persuading the reader that the founders of Marxism supposedly "welcomed war as a great catalyst of history, as a crisis phenomenon, following which they hoped to achieve their revolutionary ends," that they interpreted war as a weapon "by means of which a revolutionary transformation may be effected in the existing state and social structure," and that Lenin supposedly also interpreted war between states as a means of victory of the proletarian revolution.

Moreover, with zeal worthy of better application, this apologist of imperialism proclaims without any grounds that after Marxist ideology is consolidated as state policy, war between socialist and capitalist states supposedly becomes "a legal, in the Marxist sense, instrument of arriving at a classless society." Therefore the danger of wars in general and of a new world war in particular emanates not from imperialism but from socialism, since the contradiction between the East and the West, which carries the threat of a war that would annihilate mankind, supposedly arose "only owing to geopolitical consolidation of Marxist ideology."

Speaking in the words of Engels, one does not know what is more amazing here, the tricks in deduction or the falsifications of history. It should be obvious to any objective researcher who exhibits even the slightest honesty that idealistic and essentially reactionary viewpoints such as these that are ascribed to Marx and Engels had never been shared by the latter. Instead, they had always been criticized and fought against. The founders of scientific communism initiated this fight in their "German Ideology," emphasizing that it was precisely from an idealistic viewpoint that "violence, war, plunder, lawlessness and so on were declared to be the motive force of history."

Later on, revealing the falseness of the assertions of E. During, who declared that violence, and consequently war, is the main motive force of social development, the "source of life," and the cause of all social revolutions and overthrows, in his brilliant work "Anti-During" Engels decisively argued against overstatements of the role of violence and of the role of war, and he demonstrated on the basis of concrete historical facts that violence is not a cause but the result of economic relations that have evolved in a particular way.



The classicists of Marxism not only revealed the source of violence and wars, which is rooted in private ownership, in the domination of some classes over others. They also persuasively demonstrated that the most important historic changes, primarily the transitions from one socioeconomic formation to a higher one, occur on the basis of the development of material production and of all other aspects of the life of society, and that these changes are brought into being through social revolution. In this case, revolutionary violence in the hands of the proletariat may play a great historical role, Marx and Engels asserted.

It should be recalled that the founders of the revolutionary teaching of the proletariat were very scrupulous in their examination of the question as to the relationship between different resources and forms of class struggle. Communists, Marx and Engels emphasized on more than one occasion, have never asserted that they would use identical means to attain their goals. The proletariat, they noted, would prefer peaceful resources of struggle, and would utilize them to the extent possible. The proletariat would take up arms only when it is forced to do so by the violence of counterrevolution which, more often than not, tends to use military resources of suppression against a revolution, and even as an act of prevention at that.

The classicists of Marxism-Leninism foresaw that an international union of the workers of all countries would in the end do away with the most acute form of political violence--war. This would become possible in a society where labor is in power, and where peace is the principle of international relations. Such a society is a reality today. It is personified by the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist fraternity. United by common political structure, adherence to the cause of peace, socialism, democracy and national independence, they are voluntarily developing full cooperation between each other on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and international solidarity. Today, the community of socialist countries has become a dynamic economic force in the world, a dominant factor of world policy. The successes of the socialist countries persuasively show that the future belongs to socialism.

This terrifies aggressive imperialist forces most of all. In order to discredit the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the eyes of the world public, they resort to the services of liars such as the Israeli Zionist I. Vallakh and the West German ideologist K. Kernig. As an example in his work "The Relationship Between Engels' Military Doctrine and His Social Theory. Comments on the Genesis of Modern Conflict Theory," the latter not only galvanizes the false thesis that "Engels' military doctrine" is the central point of Marxism and that the main thing in communist ideology is the conception of armed violence, but he also identifies the Marxist definition of war with the fascist definition, deriving a modern "theory of aggression" "from the principles of Marxist thought."

Kernig is not the only one to make absurd attempts at turning the military-theoretical legacy of the classicists of Marxism-Leninism upside-down. Thus in his work "The Marxist Revolutionary Idea," the English "Marxologist" R. Taker substantiates the "militaristic orientation" of all Marxist doctrine by the fact that the political terminology used in it is of a "military nature." It is true

that Marx did in fact use military terminology in relation to some social and political phenomena ("social war," "the political army of the revolution" and so on) with the purpose of emphasizing the acuity of the problem or the special scale of some particular process. But what does this say about Taker's conclusions? Only that he arrived at them through a special sort of "logic." It is no accident that a fellow countryman of his, M. Evans, caustically noted in a review of Taker's book that were we to follow this "logic" even "Das Kapital" would have to be interpreted as a presentation of "Marx's military theory!"

Also permeated by a unique and, more accurately, anticommunist logic are the "mental exercises" of R. Danzhvil', the compiler of a French collection of the works and statements of Marx and Engels on violence. In his extremely lengthy introductory article and numerous commentaries (occupying more than a third of a work totaling 660 pages!), he deliberately allocates a central place to military issues, thus distorting not only their essence but also the meaning of Marxist theory in general. Works on war, Danzhvil' declares, are "the most decisive and most warlike part of Marxism.... They impart completeness to the works of Marx and Engels, and they represent a general conclusion arrived at from their theoretical studies in economics, philosophy, politics and history."

Incidentally, this false conclusion arrived at by Danzhvil' is only a starter, only a prelude. The obsessive idea that violence in general (and armed violence in particular) plays a priority role in the social life of people became the central topic of all of his other commentaries in this collection. And Danzhvil' attempts to ascribe this "idea" to, of all people, Marx, Engels, Lenin and modern communists. Once again, turning everything upside-down, he tries to suggest to the reader that not only modern communists but also the founders of their "doctrine" allocated a fully special, exclusive historical role to violence, seeing it as the main motive force of social progress, and so on.

We could go on and on with examples of this sort, since despite its obvious absurdity, in the face of further aggravation of the international situation by imperialism, this idea has been found to be highly attractive and advantageous to bourgeois ideologists and politicians as a kind of theoretical "foundation" and an ideological "substantiation" of the myth of a "Soviet military threat." Thus, having received a "stamp of approval" in the works of a number of "Marxologists," this idea and this tactic of distorting communist ideology and politics are now becoming more and more acceptable to bourgeois, opportunistic and, in general, all anti-Lenin, anticommunist, anti-Soviet ideology and policy.

Can we not find evidence of this, as an example, in the highly persistent attempts by the Italian falsifier of Leninism A. Pellitsia to persuade his readers that "Lenin identified war with politics" and that the USSR recognizes, as an implement of its policy, "only the absolute form of war," which supposedly "permits Russia to realize its ideological goals in a very convenient way"? Or how about the American "Marxologist" M. Berzher, whose article "Engels' Theory on Withering Away of the Army--The Key to Development of Marxist Revolutionary Tactics" suggests the fabricated thesis that "the doctrine of the revolutionary tactics of Marxism was developed by Engels in the course of his military studies"?

Here as well the essence of the matter is turned upside-down, because everything did in fact happen exactly the other way around: In the course of developing the revolutionary tactics of the proletariat, the founders of scientific communism were forced by life itself to also analyze the forms and resources of armed violence, inasmuch as it had been used on several occasions by the bourgeoisie against the working class. A clear understanding of the enormous significance attached to the military side of preparations for and conduct of a proletarian revolution was, in the words of Engels himself, the main factor that motivated him to initiate a deep analysis of military issues.

In a book recently published in Switzerland, "Lenin's Political Grammar. Forms of Political Speech and Its Influence," Sh. Rua attempts to portray the idea of armed violence, so necessary and desirable to today's reactionary forces, as the central point of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, asserting: "War is in the center of Marxist philosophy." B. Semmel, the editor and compiler of the collection "Marxism and Military Science" published in Oxford in 1981, also bases his work on the same basic approach--overstating the place and role of military problems in Marxism-Leninism and in communist policy. Proclaiming their goal to be to "demonstrate the sort of role played by ideology in formation of strategic military doctrine" and to "analyze how Marxist ideology helps to form Marxist military science and how military science has altered (?) the facade of Marxism," bourgeois ideologists once again enter into the faulty circle of traditional falsification.

Yes, there is a military-theoretical aspect to Marxism-Leninism (military-philosophical, military-economic, military-political). Moreover, the military-theoretical (in the broad sense of the term) legacy of the classicists of scientific communism also includes military historical and specifically military aspects--that is, ones pertaining to the issues of military development and to the strategy and tactics of armed conflict.

But the military side of revolutionary theory--a side which concerns itself only with one of the possible resources of sociopolitical struggle, to include of course revolutionary struggle and struggle for liberation (but not with the goals and objectives of this struggle), has never been and cannot be the main factor of Marxism-Leninism. History itself tells us this, since neither in theory nor in practical politics has the communist movement staked its future solely or primarily on military violence. The single exception to this perhaps strictest and most immutable rule is the periods in which imperialist aggressors compelled us to wage war in the defense of the socialist fatherland and the accomplishments of socialism. It was only in this special case--that is, during the war and--let me emphasize once again--only in the area of the practical activities of the people, the party and the socialist state, that military issues are brought to the forefront, becoming in this sense the main and central factors. Only in this special case.

The meaning behind the latest falsification examined here, perpetrated by "Marxologists" who distort the real place and actual role of the military-theoretical aspect of Marxism-Leninism, is obvious. Its ideological goals and political purpose are clear: It is another diversion by imperialism and its

apologists against communist ideology and the policy of all of the planet's communist parties, one having the goal of hindering peace and social progress.

The urgency of fighting against such diversions by imperialism at a time when it is increasing military tension in the political sphere and when the struggle in the ideological sphere is becoming considerably aggravated cannot be doubted. It is undoubtable because today, speaking in the words of V. I. Lenin, the question "can be posed only as follows: either bourgeois or socialist ideology." Our study of the problems of military-scientific theory and our criticism of our ideological enemy must proceed in Lenin's style, actively and aggressively, on a real scientific basis and with adequate effectiveness.

"Without armament and armies, there can be no wars. As far as I can understand, the ideas and ideology of Marx and Marxism are humane to the highest degree, inasmuch as they place the main focus on maximum satisfaction of the needs of one and all in the world. Were Marx still alive today, I have no doubt that he would be the first to propose an end to destructive wars and to weapons of mass annihilation, to prohibit all arms so that people could live in an atmosphere of peace without experiencing fear and working in behalf of a universal flowering."

There is good reason why I included this passage from a letter, published in PRAVDA, from Dzh. R. Mendzheri to CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Yu. V. Andropov. How sharp a contrast exists between the thoughts of this simple mother and the thoughts that various sorts of "Marxologists," official propaganda and the U.S. president himself, who is preparing for a "crusade" against world communism, attempt to suggest to her and to millions of Americans daily and hourly. The teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin is all-powerful because it is true. The Soviet people, communists of all countries and all progressive mankind know this well. No one has the power to shake their faith in the final triumph of communist ideals!

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## U.S. 'PRETENSIONS TO WORLD MASTERY' DISCUSSED

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[Article by S. Borisov: "Washington: Brazen Pretensions to World Domination"]

[Text] The situation in the world, which has undergone sharp aggravation in recent years, elicits great concern, deep anxiety and apprehensions about the future in all honest people on earth. Two diametrically opposite directions have revealed themselves in world politics with unprecedented clarity--the line of the Soviet Union, other socialist states and all peace-loving forces directed at strengthening peace and confirming equal coexistence of states with different sociopolitical structures, and the course taken by imperialist countries, headed by the USA, toward aggravation of the international situation and preparation for nuclear war.

With every year, the forces of imperialism encounter increasingly greater difficulties. The capitalist world is experiencing the most protracted and deepest crisis of its postwar history.

The sharp turn to the right in the foreign policy course of the USA, and to a certain extent of the entire capitalist world, is a blatant class reaction to further deepening of the general crisis of capitalism, constriction of the sphere of its domination, consolidation of the positions of socialism, and the successes of the struggle for national liberation. Yet another desperate attempt by capitalism is being undertaken to turn the course of world events in its favor, to halt or at least retard the process of world liberation, and to force the arms race so as to disturb the presently existing near-equality and achieve superiority over the Soviet Union.

After R. Reagan came to power in 1980, Washington began to openly develop plans for nuclear war against the Soviet Union. Before Reagan had been in the president's chair for even a year, a secret plan was adopted requiring the USA to create a potential for victory in a protracted nuclear war, something possible in the minds of people across the ocean.

The idea that detente had not brought any benefits to the USA and the Western world and that it was a "one-way street" grew to exaggerated proportions over a number of years in the 1970s. Despite the basic objections of sober-thinking

politicians, this fundamentally false idea was actively supported by President Reagan and raised aloft by Washington as the sole justification for a five-year military program totaling almost \$2 trillion.

When Reagan began appointing his own people to high posts, the political horizons of the USA were blackened by a sizable flock of the proponents of cold war--"hawks" and "neo-hawks" who had been openly hostile to even the slightest attempts at achieving arms control during the administrations of Nixon, Ford and Carter. The goal of this militant gang is crystal clear: achieving, through political and economic pressure and through direct threats of the use of arms, a radical change in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and even in the political system existing in our country. In foreign policy, Washington's most shameless circles shifted their emphasis to preparing for a war against the USSR and other Warsaw Pact states with the objective of annihilating socialism as a sociopolitical structure.

Moreover, under Reagan's administration these plans are being proclaimed with unprecedented brazenness and cynicism incompatible with the universally accepted norms of communication between states. "...in an attempt to justify these hegemonic pretensions," notes Comrade Yu. V. Andropov in replies to questions from a PRAVDA correspondent in March of this year, "the distortions of the Soviet Union's policy are so unpardonable and the tactics being used are so dirty that frankly speaking, the following question begs itself: Exactly what standards is the president following in his affairs with other states?"

The abrupt zig-zag in American foreign policy did not occur suddenly. Preparations for it were made out of the public eye. Colin Gray, one of the most shameful apologists of nuclear war and, by an ironic twist of fate, an advisor to the Washington administration on arms control, wrote back in 1980--that is, prior to the elections: "The United States must plan to defeat the Soviet Union, and in such a way that our losses would not preclude the possibility of postwar restoration of the United States. Washington must determine the goals of war, among which the annihilation of the Soviet political leadership and arising of an order compatible with Western ideals in the postwar period should be adopted as the extreme."

Militant voices that threatened our country and states that had recently become independent had also made themselves heard in previous administrations. But in Reagan's administration the proponents of nuclear war seem to have taken the upper hand in all affairs. The political orientation and nature of the objectives reflected in the budget of this administration indicate that it is now making plans, without any vacillation at all, to prod the planet into the abyss of a nuclear holocaust.

An astounding phenomenon unprecedented in the history of this country has occurred in modern America. The most reactionary politicians and the maniacs of nuclear war have occupied high positions where special discretion and common sense are required. Paul Neitze, Richard Perle and Richard Pipes are the people who develop policy for the Reagan administration, write political declarations and prepare policy variants that are subsequently transmitted upstairs to be used as the basis for making the most important decisions. For the



most part, they are diploma-carrying theorists who feel at ease in a scientific environment. But what is so startling in their blood-thirsty declarations is their obvious inability to at least partially imagine the physical consequences of what they propose!

People in Washington enjoy getting together and talking about the "national interests" of the USA. That could be understood; there is nothing shameful about that, as long as these interests do not conflict with the legal aspirations of other members of the world community, as long as they are not a cover for imperial ambitions. Vital interests, among which the possibility for existing in guaranteed security and peace is paramount, are something every nation, every country has, and our obligation is not only to defend our own interests but also respect those of others.

The fact that all of the war plans being drawn up today in the USA are subordinated to the idea of unleashing a nuclear war against the Soviet Union is distinctly evident from the example offered by the "Defense Directives for Fiscal Years 1984-1988," which UPI reported on in mid-January 1983. This document directly calls for a first nuclear strike against the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries by American armed forces, using medium-range nuclear weapons in West Europe in particular. It also discusses the intentions of the U.S. administration to actively militarize space and to prepare for making an "effective strike" from outer space.

The directives concretely examine the possibility that the USA would refuse to negotiate with the USSR on arms control, if such negotiation would hinder implementation of the plan for changing the ratio of military forces in Washington's favor. These directives are of the same brand as Reagan's appeal "To the Peoples of Europe," a nice example of political hypocrisy, in which he proposes that the USSR and the USA sign an agreement concerning medium-range missiles based on the same old infamous "zero variant." Washington's militant course, openly one of world policeman, was once again confirmed in the president's "State of the Union" message. "Our strategy for preserving peace and freedom," Reagan said, "must be based on power...."

Militant speeches describing all kinds of new military programs, military preparations and the latest forms of armament, including in outer space, erupted out of Washington as a continuous flow in recent months. Perhaps the most indicative in this aspect is President Reagan's military policy statement on 23 March 1983. Even in the United States his statement was referred to as "Reagan's militaristic program." America must intensively arm itself and become the dominant military power in the world--such is the essence of this shameless, unbridled chauvinistic policy.

Meanwhile, to confuse public opinion, a certain "new conception of defense" has been invented across the ocean. Its obvious intention is to disarm the Soviet Union before the face of an American nuclear threat. Trillions of dollars are being squeezed out so that there could be even more weapons on land, on water, in the air and in space. Plans have been made for dramatically increasing all forms of nuclear arms. The president also announced broad measures to create qualitatively new conventional weapon systems. He is thus opening up yet another

direction in the arms race. All of this represents another dangerous step by the American administration on the road toward all-out nuclear war. This is precisely the assessment validly given to the "new conception" by peace-loving international society.

The statement made by the boss of the White House was subjected to principled evaluation in Comrade Yu. V. Andropov's replies to questions from a PRAVDA correspondent. The replies elicited a great response from the world public. They unmask the president's deceit, and they hit right on target, the foreign mass media note. The press in the socialist countries and progressive publications in all the world are now emphasizing with special force that Comrade Yu. V. Andropov could not have used anything but a firm and decisive tone in his replies, given the unpardonable methods the American president is using. And what is even more important, his replies were made in the face of the threat that implementation of the USA's militant plans would create for all the world. At the same time, decisively repelling attempts to destabilize the international situation even more, the Soviet Union is continuing to emphasize its desire to continue the dialogue, to prevent nuclear catastrophe through joint efforts.

The propaganda support being provided to the USA's present military strategy pursues the goal of dulling the alertness of the people, getting them used to the notion that nuclear war is an acceptable reality and crushing all of their resistance to the unrestrained arms race and to the war preparations being made by the forces of imperialism. Besides plans for "limited" use of strategic offensive forces, the USA's present military strategy foresees the possibility of local nuclear wars in certain regions, primarily in Europe. This was officially confirmed by the president himself at the end of 1981. And seconding Reagan, Defense Secretary C. Weinberger declared that "the United States must be prepared for all war, in any region of vital importance to our interests." In other words, according to the Pentagon's design, war may engulf not only Europe, which continues to be viewed as the main theater of military operations, but also the the Near, Middle and Far East, all sea and ocean theaters.

The strategy of "direct confrontation" is a logical development of the conception of forward basing, and it rests fully upon it. The American military-political leadership is actively attempting to expand the USA's military presence in key regions of the world. Let us recall that the United States now has over 1,500 military facilities and bases and over half a million servicemen stationed on the territories of 32 countries. American medium-range arms are present not just anywhere, but literally right at our threshold. Many hundreds of American missile carriers that can make nuclear strikes on our territory are concentrated along the entire perimeter of the USSR.

The ruling circles of the USA and NATO are continually trying to expand the composition and "zone of responsibility" of this bloc and to create its affiliates in various regions. In June 1982 Spain was drawn into the North Atlantic alliance through the efforts of American militants. Clearly such a step can do nothing to weaken military-political tension in Europe. On the contrary, aspiring to attract new states into NATO, Washington is prodding them along the dangerous path of war preparations, of subordination to the aggressive strategy of the Atlantic alliance.

For practical purposes the USA's relations with its European allies are not those of real allies--that is, equal and disinterested. France is disliked because there are communists in its government. The FRG was forced to sign a military treaty according to which, in the case of a "crisis situation," the USA could more than double the contingent of its ground and air forces on West German territory. Earlier, a similar treaty was imposed upon Norway. They are trying to make Turkey a stepping stone for rapid deployment forces. The USA is attempting to utilize its military ties with Turkey to exert pressure on Greece to stay in NATO. Speculations on intergovernmental conflicts and on the supposed "military threat" on the part of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact are the principal factors of the method of American actions in West Europe. The approval of the bosses of the White House is earned only by countries such as Great Britain and Italy that willingly support Washington's militant standards.

In recent years the disagreements between the USA and a number of West European states have become increasingly more noticeable. There is an obvious inability in the United States to come up with constructive ideas and sensible policy capable of introducing stability into development of the international situation in the nuclear era. And even within the NATO framework, even though this bloc is pursuing a coordinated policy of forcing the arms race, of "psychological warfare" against socialism, of interference into the affairs of Poland and so on, significant conflicts exist. While the present U.S. administration categorically rejects a course toward detente, many West German governments continue to recognize detente to be the sole real and sensible alternative to world nuclear catastrophe.

This is why the ruling circles of the USA feel that another goal of the course toward confrontation is to take the other NATO members in hand and encourage them to act in the single direction desired by the USA. The disagreements between Washington and its European allies attest to the deepening of inter-imperialist conflicts. Given the strategic plans of the Pentagon, which looks at Europe as a place of possible nuclear conflict, the interests of the European states compel them to assume a more cautious position in relation to the USA.

Utilizing the mechanism of NATO, the Reagan administration is attempting to transform West European states into hostages of its military doctrine and aggressive policy, and it is trying to nudge them onto the path of confrontation with socialist countries. So that this could be achieved, the real position of the USSR is being shamelessly falsified, and everything possible is being done to undermine and destroy the foundation upon which peaceful development in Europe has rested for the last few decades. Washington is striving to cast doubt upon treaties and agreements on the inviolability of the borders that came into being in Europe as a result of the victory over Hitler's Germany.

A line toward undermining economic cooperation between the East and the West has become another direction of the USA's hegemonic actions. In recent years the USA not only reduced its own economic ties with countries of the socialist fraternity, introducing all sorts of sanctions and resorting to the methods of economic warfare, but it is also attempting to force its allies to do the same.

However, the past years have shown that the states of West Europe cannot successfully resolve the problems of employment, raw material and power supply or the

marketing of industrial goods without economic contacts with socialist countries. Therefore the pressure exerted by the Washington administration upon West Europeans in this area does not always produce the results it wants.

To achieve its ends in relation to its West European partners, the United States is placing all of its levers into action. The American nuclear umbrella and the direct presence of the U.S. armed forces in Europe do of course limit the possibilities West European states have for political maneuver. This is why their subordination to American demands is the greatest in military issues. But even in this area their subordination is far from complete.

Sensible West European politicians are beginning to recognize more and more that the USA does not presently identify its security with the security of Western countries. And Washington's imperial ambitions, and equally so the many cases of inconsistency between the economic interests of West Europe and the interests of the United States, sometimes generate resistance to Washington's dictatorship in the ruling circles of the West European countries.

Despite the fact that life itself has often demonstrated the infeasibility of creating a South Atlantic alliance in the South Atlantic--SATO, the Pentagon has continued to keep this topic on its agenda for a number of years. As is the case in its North Atlantic prototype, economic and military-strategic considerations of the imperialist states play an important role in formation of the new bloc. As we know, the natural wealth of South Africa is being exploited not so much by its own capital as by foreign monopolies, primarily American and English. Over 360 American companies have invested their capital into the economy of the Republic of South Africa--a total of almost \$3 billion. The investments into this country by English monopolies are estimated at \$7 billion.

The USA has long believed the Republic of South Africa to be a faithful partner, one conveniently located on an important marine route from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. Relying upon military bases in South Africa and some other countries of this region, it would wish to control the enormous expanse from the shores of Australia to the Arabian Peninsula and Ognennaya Zemlya [transliteration; Fireland?] which, according to the American yardstick, is within the sphere of the USA's "vital interests."

Latin America traditionally occupies a special place in the USA's imperialist policy. For many long years the USA applied its so-called "Monroe Doctrine" to all of the Western Hemisphere as a justification of "exclusive rights." The present head of the Washington administration is continuing to follow this same hegemonic principle, one based on the formula "America for Americans" (for Washington, to be more accurate--S.B.), in all of its practical dealings with Latin America.

Reagan's course in relation to Latin America is unique in that he is in fact placing a barrier in the way of the development of internal socioeconomic processes that could strengthen the independence of southern neighbors and undermine the USA's hegemony in this vast region. The USA's militant activities in Latin America have attained unprecedented proportions.

The big-power nature of the USA's policy in the Western Hemisphere became even more obvious following the armed conflict between London and Buenos Aires in the South Atlantic over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. The armed conflict in the South Atlantic and the ungainly role played in it by Washington, which took the side of its British ally, demonstrated to Latin America and all the world its true face as world policeman, which it strives to conceal behind the mask of "champion of liberty and democracy."

Washington's signing of bilateral military treaties with countries such as Israel, Egypt, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan is another expression of the USA's neocolonial pretensions of world domination and military expansion in different regions. By these agreements, the USA is attempting to compensate for the loss of its official allies in the Near and Middle East (following the collapse of CENTO). The USA intends to achieve full military-political control over this region, which borders directly on the Soviet Union. Both existing American military bases and ones being created there now, the American aircraft carriers plowing the coastal waters, and the resources present in the region for delivering and guiding nuclear weapons (for example AWACS airplanes) are beyond the control of the national governments. Deliveries of American arms and modern combat equipment to Near East countries also serve the "global" interests of the USA. Clearly all of this not only infringes upon the national sovereignty of Near East states but also transforms them into the hostages of Washington's aspirations of world policeman.

Today the Pentagon plans to transform Lebanon, devastated by the Israeli invasion, into an outpost for rapid deployment forces in the Near East. This is in addition to the American military contingent that is still present in Lebanon within the composition of "international forces." Moreover, considering that Israeli aggression is continuing and that the high tension in the Near East is not showing any signs of decrease, the deployment of American troops in that area harbors consequences which may be beyond anyone's control. To make matters worse, these consequences are not only local but also of a broader scale.

Recently there have been increasingly greater grounds for alarm in connection with the increase in the USA's military presence in the Indian Ocean. Deployment of interventionist rapid deployment forces here, erection of more and more new military bases and the addition of nuclear weapons to American arsenals are all transforming the Indian Ocean into a powder keg that jeopardizes the effort toward universal peace. Creation of a new so-called Central Command ("CENTCOM") on 1 January of this year is evidence of the USA's openly aggressive course in the Indian Ocean. The sphere of its actions includes 19 Asian and African states.

Besides the Pentagon, American special services, and primarily the CIA, have been placed into motion in the main direction of the USA's policy of world policeman. R. Reagan personally spelled out the tasks of the espionage and sabotage organizations. According to NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE the CIA is presently enjoying a "boom." Washington is broadly engaging in secret subversive operations in various regions of the world with the purpose of destabilizing the situation, overthrowing governments that are not to the liking of Uncle Sam and undermining the unity and power of the forces of socialism, peace and progress.

Washington's Pharisees are sounding the propaganda bell of the USA's "peace-creating" role throughout--from the Near East and the south of Africa to Central America. But what is happening in fact? What we actually see is the shedding of the blood of people killed by American weapons, the sales of which have attained record levels during the present administration in the White House. Participation in the monstrous plunder by the Israeli war machine in Lebanon, the unceasing threats and provocations against Cuba, armed provocations against Nicaragua, support of military dictatorships in Latin America and Asia, overtures to racists in the south of Africa, an increase of almost 30,000 persons in the number American servicemen abroad just in 1982, creation of new regional military commands in the armed forces system, and intensification of subversive activities abroad: These are only some signs of American imperialism's aspirations for world policeman, of its brazen pretensions to world domination.

However, attempts at using force in different hot spots on the planet are being met by growing opposition from peoples treasuring their independence and peace on earth. The swiftly growing struggle of the broad popular masses against the military danger has become a noteworthy sign of our times. The forces of peace are more powerful than the forces of war. As far as the dreams of transoceanic strategists of attaining military superiority over the Soviet Union and over the entire socialist fraternity are concerned, there is no substance to them. "The strategic balance that has evolved between the USSR and the USA, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO," it was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress, "objectively serves to preserve the peace on our planet. We have never tried to attain military superiority over the other side, and we are not doing so now. This is not our policy. But we will not allow anyone to achieve such superiority over us. Such attempts, and negotiations with us from a position of strength, are absolutely unpromising!"

Favoring constructive dialogue on the acute issues of modern times, the USSR and other countries of the socialist fraternity are proposing the path of negotiations and not confrontation, the path of sweeping the mines of potential conflict from various regions of the planet and transforming them into zones of peace and tranquility. "There are no problems, worldwide or regional, that could not be justly resolved by peaceful means," it was emphasized in the Prague Political Declaration of Warsaw Pact States.

This is the high goal of the peace-loving policy of the CPSU and the Soviet government. Our country invariably supports establishment of equal and mutually advantageous relations between states and peoples, and broad, fruitful cooperation among all peoples of the planet, free of dictatorship and interference in foreign affairs, providing mutual advantage and working to the good of all mankind. The Communist Party--the vanguard of the Soviet people--is doing everything it can to insure favorable external conditions for their creative labor.

The USSR Armed Forces are standing an alert guard over this labor. The growing danger of war emanating from reactionary imperialist circles, declared USSR



minister of defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union, D. F. Ustinov, compels us to "strengthen our country's defense capabilities and support the fighting power of the army and navy at the required level." Their constant combat readiness and the high military proficiency of the soldiers are a dependable guarantee of the security of our motherland and our friends--the Warsaw Pact allies.

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## ROLE OF DISCIPLINE IN MILITARY PREPAREDNESS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 83 (signed to press 3 May 83) pp 17-24

[Article by Col V. Manilov: "Military Discipline and Combat Readiness"]

[Text] With the increased scale and complexity of the tasks involved in communist creation, there has been a natural rise in the importance of organization and discipline in all spheres of life and activity for our society. This pattern has also appeared in the area of military organizational development and in strengthening the combat potential of the USSR Armed Forces. This is why the commanders, the political bodies, the party organizations and all the Army and Navy personnel warmly accepted and viewed as a guide for action the tenet of the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee of strengthening responsibility on all levels for carrying out official duty and observing the interests of state and society as well as waging a more decisive struggle against any violations of discipline.

The firm and consistent line of the greatest possible strengthening of discipline in the Armed Forces has been dictated by the present situation in the world and the greater threat of war deriving from imperialism. In war, V. I. Lenin emphasized, the upper hand is gained by the side which has the greatest equipment, organization and discipline. The demands on the combat readiness of the Army and Navy at present are exceptionally high. This must constantly be on a level guaranteeing the immediate rebuff of any aggressor and the secure defense of the socialist fatherland. Combat readiness to a decisive degree depends also on the state of military discipline.

Many factors determine the relationship between military discipline and combat readiness. This is also substantially influenced by the development level of military affairs, the degree of the technical equipping of the army and navy and by the quality of the personnel's professional training. However, the essence of discipline and combat readiness, like the nature of their relationship, have always been determined and are determined primarily by the political purpose of the armed forces and their place in society.

As is known, the nature, standards and rules of discipline as well as the methods of establishing it stem from the production relations prevailing in a given society. V. I. Lenin pointed out that the organization of social labor in a serf-owning society was based on the discipline of the rod, in a capitalist

society on the discipline of hunger while the communist organization of social labor, with socialism being the first step to this, will last the more it is based upon the free and creative discipline of the workers themselves. Consequently, each new social order requires new relationships between people and a new discipline.

Marxism-Leninism views military discipline as a copy of discipline in society while its specific "military" traits and features are viewed as the direct consequence of the political purpose of a state's military organization. V. I. Lenin said with pride that the Red Army created unprecedentedly strong discipline not by the rod but rather on the basis of awareness, dedication and self-sacrifice of the workers and peasants themselves.

Combat readiness also has a clearly expressed sociopolitical nature. Its most important components are the technical equipping of the army and navy, the level of the military professional training and morale of their personnel. Each of these components possesses relative independence. However, taken together, in a reciprocal relationship and causality, they in no way produce a simple arithmetic total but rather form a fundamentally new quality, that particular, extremely complex sociotechnical characteristic which is known as combat readiness.

Man is the central element in combat readiness. Even the most powerful, ultra-modern military equipment is lifeless without man. And in order, in the words of K. Marx, to resurrect it from the dead, it is essential to have live labor, in the given instance, the labor of a soldier. As this is the case, then for developing high combat readiness it makes a great deal of difference what the modern soldier is as an individual, what are his political convictions and moral standards, his professional, psychological and physical qualities.

Since man is the main embodiment of military discipline and combat readiness, all the diverse lines of their relationship are focused precisely on him, giving a clear sociopolitical tint to this relationship. The Soviet Armed Forces are a part of the people sharing the same life with them. The requirements of military discipline are also determined by this and they express the will of the people, the fundamental interests and ideals of the working class and all the workers. For the Soviet soldier discipline is not a harsh burden but rather a profoundly felt necessity and a stimulus for the all-round development of the individual, for mobilizing its best qualities, initiative and creativity in the name of the high, noble aim of military service, that is, the secure defense of the freedom and independence of the homeland and its security. This aim is most clearly embodied in constant high combat readiness which is rightly viewed as the crown of troop training in peacetime and the key to victory in war.

Bourgeois ideologists and politicians, in endeavoring to play down the sociopolitical nature of military discipline and combat readiness, interpret these as some strictly "technical" categories. Here they endeavor to speculate on the similarity in individual traits and requirements of discipline and combat readiness in the armed forces of states with different social systems. In actuality, there is such a similarity. But this is purely external and is caused by the identical nature of the weaponry of modern armies and navies and by the forms and methods of its operation and combat employment. Actually any, even

the seemingly most "technical" requirement of military discipline and combat readiness has a completely determined class content and political focus.

For example, let us take weapons. In their technical data, these are comparable for all modern armies. But ensuring their readiness for action and the effectiveness of the combat employment of weapons directly depend upon the awareness, will power and ability of those controlling these weapons. In one way or another servicemen always reflect on the social purpose of the demands to master the weapons and to maintain them in combat readiness as set out in the regulations, manuals and orders. Against whom are the weapons directed? Whose interests are defended by them? What aims are they to achieve? Daily practical military service inevitably gives rise to these questions while a war poses them with all acuteness and confronts each person who must press the machine gun trigger or the button for a missile launch. Victory or defeat ultimately depend upon what the answer will be and what will be the state of troop morale.

The ruling circles of the imperialist powers cannot ignore this objective law of war. For this reason they have endeavored to isolate the armed forces from the people, from the penetrating of any progressive ideas into the barracks and have opened up full force a strong machine of ideological anesthesia as well as disciplinary and moral-psychological intimidation of the servicemen. According to the evidence of the American officers H. Jeffers and D. Levitan, the system for training recruits in the U.S. Armed Forces is aimed at developing submissiveness and unquestioned obedience by destroying the personality of the young soldiers with the subsequent turning of them into "what is required," namely, into unthinking automata.

Of course, discipline founded on fear, the rigid suppression of the personality, on greed and individualism is objectively contradictory to the conditions for operating modern, predominantly collective weapons. While this contradiction can be smoothed over in peacetime and compensated for by bribery and harsh routine, under combat conditions it inevitably becomes more acute. Individualism and selfishness exclude cooperation and mutual aid, egoism and misanthropy are incompatible with dedication and particularly self-sacrifice while fear of punishment is nothing in comparison with the fear of death. Hence, the decline in discipline with the start of combat operations, the dissension and disobedience which are characteristic of imperialist armies. And hence the decline in troop morale which is directly proportional to the increased danger and losses suffered and even the complete loss of battleworthiness by individual subunits and units.

However, it would be wrong to underestimate the level of combat readiness in the armies of the leading imperialist powers. They are thoroughly equipped technically and are well trained in professional terms. As for moral-psychological training, this is based on intensive and specific anti-Soviet and anticommunist influencing of the servicemen and on this level has produced certain results which must be considered.

The military threat to socialism the embodiment of which is the U.S. and NATO armed forces is a harsh reality of our times. Present-day Washington policy has exacerbated the situation up to extremely dangerous limits while those who

have set and are carrying out this policy cynically debate the possibility of a "limited," "extended" and other varieties of nuclear war and are intensely augmenting the material base for initiating and conducting it.

In soberly assessing this and in thoroughly considering it, the CPSU and the Soviet state have shown proper concern for strengthening national defense. The men have responded to this concern with intense labor. In the army and navy the socialist competition under the motto "Increase Vigilance and Firmly Ensure the Security of the Motherland!" has become widespread. The commanders, political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations have mobilized the personnel to master the weapons and military equipment, to increase ideological tempering and to fully carry out the assumed obligations. Here they proceed from the fact that the most important condition for the successful and high quality carrying out of all the tasks confronting the subunits, units and ships is good organization and strong military discipline.

In the present stage of development of the Soviet Armed Forces, the concepts of "strong military discipline" and "high combat readiness" have been filled out with a new content and presume an incomparably higher than hitherto level in the qualitative state of the army and navy. The limits of these concepts have also been substantially broadened.

Thus, military discipline, in being one of the basic components of combat readiness, also serves as an optimum form for the activities of the Armed Forces. Precisely, for example, those such as the discipline of alert duty, technical and technological discipline, time discipline, the discipline of operating weapons and combat equipment and so forth.

The role of the personal discipline of the servicemen and the discipline of the military collectives has increased to an enormous degree. As for combat readiness, the most important demand on it at present is that it should constantly rise and be improved and always be on the level of the most recent scientific and technical achievements and military art. The time factor also has a truly all-encompassing and continuous influence on the training of the troops and naval forces.

The ability of the servicemen to perform their duties expertly and the troops and naval forces to act efficiently in a most complex situation with the most acute shortage of time is an indispensable condition for high combat readiness. At the same time the time expended in carrying out an order, instruction, standard or any practical tasks operates as one of the determining indicators for military discipline, organization and order. And this involves all of the Armed Services, all the branches of troops and naval forces, regardless of the position of the specific units and ships.

The probable enemy possesses weapons and has created groups of troops which would make it possible, without any extended preliminary preparation to commence military operations. Nuclear missile weapons have, as is known, virtually an unlimited range. From this it follows that wherever the troops and naval forces are stationed, they can be under the threat of attack from the very first minutes of a war and should always be ready for immediate retaliatory actions. All of this unconditionally demands the highest combat readiness, maximum

self-possession and organization from each Soviet soldier and from the Armed Forces as a whole.

The necessity of the strict and complete fulfillment of disciplinary requirements is also dictated by the constant greater complexity of the content and conditions of troop activities to maintain combat readiness. At present, according to estimates of foreign researchers, there are almost 2,000 military-technical specialties or 5-fold more than in the 1950's. The intensity of military labor has also substantially increased. For example, a launch crew of a missile unit must perform almost 15-fold more operations to execute a launch than the crew of a conventional weapon. But the main thing is that the demands on quality performance have been sharply strengthened, including: precision, accuracy, absolute correctness and completeness in performing the combat procedures.

At present, discipline cannot be reduced to simple efficiency, even ideal. Under the conditions of modern combat, the servicemen and troop collectives often will be forced to act independently, autonomously, outside of their customary ties and relations. This is why high combat activity, initiative and the creativity of the personnel aimed at the better performance of a combat task are indispensable components in true strong discipline. These qualities are based upon a clear awareness of the responsibility for the assigned job, a profound interest of each man in overall success, on high political and technical knowledge, intelligent tactical thinking, psychological strength and physical tenacity of the servicemen.

Of primary significance for ensuring high combat readiness are teamwork and solidarity of the troop collectives and, consequently, rigid centralization of control, precise coordination of actions and the concentrating of efforts on the unconditional fulfillment of the commander's order or the posed combat task.

Obviously all of this presumes the consistent realization of the principle of one-man leadership on an immutable basis of party loyalty. Precisely on this basis an atmosphere of comradeship, respect and attention to the individual, just exactingness and concern for men, mutual aid and collaboration is established in the troop collective. And precisely on this basis the traditional professional, military-technical ties and relationships of the servicemen are complemented by ties of spiritual kinship. These ties under the conditions of a developed socialist society are becoming evermore diverse and profound, they give the Soviet Armed Forces an unbreakable inner strength and ensure the effectiveness of the efforts of the solely-responsible commander to maintain combat readiness on a proper level.

The growing tasks of combat readiness are carried out the more successfully the closer and more organically these are linked with the strengthening of military discipline. The approach of the commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations to this problem stems from the general party tenet of the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and consists in viewing the state of affairs with combat readiness and discipline not only broken down, for instance, for each formation, unit or ship but also each sub-unit, crew, team, right down to the individual serviceman.



At times it happens that shortcomings and oversights are concealed behind generally favorable "average" indicators. Frequently, behind the back of the pacesetters sit those who work sloppily. In such instances can one expect a healthy moral atmosphere in the collective? Obviously not. But without this it is impossible to have truly strong discipline corresponding to the present demands of combat readiness. Consequently, of fundamental importance is the organization of all the life and activities of the personnel in strict accord with the regulations and orders, that is, an organization of service which includes any escape hatches whatsoever for idlers, slipshod workers or obfuscators. But in assessing the activities of a collective, it is equally important to objectively and accurately determine the personal contribution of each serviceman to carrying out the set tasks and correspondingly employ moral and material incentives.

It is quite apparent that the command and political personnel play the determining role in carrying out an apt and responsible approach to posing and carrying out the tasks of strengthening military discipline and combat readiness. They direct the training and indoctrination of the men as well as all the life and activities of the troop collectives. And this presupposes that each leader, in the words of V. I. Lenin, has "his own properties" and namely unconditional competence, industriousness, demandingness for himself, irreproachable honesty and flawless discipline. Only a fusion of these "properties" gives an officer the moral right to command, to lead, and serves as the basis of his authority.

The importance of authority cannot be overestimated. Certainly subordinates endeavor to equal a superior, they link their notions of organization and discipline with his style of work and employ him as a "model" for their attitude toward the job. Unfortunately, certain officers do not consider it essential to carry out the demands which they themselves place on subordinates. Here we should remember Lenin's words that "if we are to conscientiously teach discipline to the workers and peasants, then we must start with ourselves" (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 50, p 63).

In the work of strengthening discipline, as perhaps in no other type of officer activity, of enormous importance is the vital organic tie of the commanders and the political workers with the mass of servicemen, that is, closeness to the men. Such closeness has nothing in common with familiarity but rather presupposes an even-handed, comradely attitude toward subordinates and the considerate satisfying of their needs. Of course, this in no way excludes the just exactingness of the regulations or the unswerving observance of military subordination in an official situation. Precisely not feigned but rather actual closeness to the men multiplied by the highest professional and moral authority of an officer gives rise to that unbounded confidence in him by subordinates and which impels each man to carry out any order or instruction of the commander in the best manner and forms the collective will of the subunit, unit or ship. The closer the superior is to his subordinates, the better he knows their achievements and shortcomings and the greater the opportunity he has to shape the character of the men and to effectively influence the forming of correct public opinion and healthy relationships in the troop collective.

The ability to rely on the collective and to fully utilize its powerful indoctrinational potential in the area of strengthening discipline is one of the indispensable conditions for success. What is particularly important here?

Primarily an exacting and scrupulous study of the true state of discipline, an analysis and disclosure of the reasons for the development of improper relations, the mobilizing of the party and Komsomol aktiv to eliminate them, systematic contact with the personnel and thoughtful, painstaking individual indoctrinational work.

It is particularly essential to correctly organize work with the sergeants. It is no secret that the level of troop combat skill, the maintaining of firm proper order and, consequently, the combat readiness of the subunit, unit and ship depend enormously upon their responsible and conscientious attitude toward their job and toward carrying out their duties.

To see to it that each troop collective is a united, friendly and close family with an ardent desire to worthily carry out their duty to the motherland, as was emphasized at the Sixth All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization Secretaries, is the task of tasks for the commanders, the political bodies, the party organizations and all the Armed Forces communists.

One of the crucial aspects is the establishing and maintaining of proper order in the Army and Navy. Such order includes, along with the exemplary standing of alert duty, guard and internal duty, a precise organization of the operation and maintenance of equipment and exercises in military and political training. It also means correct relationships among the men during service and in everyday routine, the strict observance of the daily regimen and a reasonable organization of leisure for the personnel. It is important, as was pointed out by the USSR Minister of Defense, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, to see to it that the position in life for each serviceman is determined by the conviction that the regulations and orders are a law which must be carried out, without exception, unswervingly and unconditionally!

Military discipline is a social, political and moral category. It is based upon an awareness by each serviceman of his personal responsibility to defend the socialist fatherland. This awareness impels him not only out of sense of duty but also out of his conscience to observe the procedures established in the Army and Navy and to flawlessly carry out the requirements of the regulations and the moral standards established in them. A unity of duty and conscience is formed as a result of the mastery of the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, the assimilating of the ideas of socialist patriotism and internationalism and the turning of ideological and political knowledge into firm convictions. Communist conviction gives a soldier an unlimited inner strength, it dictates the necessity of unchallenged subordination of personal interests to the interests of the collective, the state and society, and helps organize all his activities in strict accord with the goals and tasks of constant high combat readiness. Hence, the honesty to oneself and one's comrades in arms, justness, humility, orderliness and sincerity--all these indispensable attributes of conscious socialist discipline.

Feigned efficiency or excessive zealotry behind which are frequently concealed irresponsibility, negligence and a disregard for proper order are the antipodes of conscious discipline. As are, incidentally, a liberal attitude toward the violating of proper order and an unprincipled position by an outside observer.

Without any exception, the tasks of combat readiness demand from each soldier the highest self-discipline, the carrying out of the duties of military service with full spiritual and physical strength and implacability for any manifestations of formalism, oversimplification or irresponsibility. Without this, in particular, it is simply impossible to have the effective mastery of military equipment and the achieving of a level of military skill necessary for the successful carrying out of modern combat. Such skill presupposes the rapid mastery of a large amount of knowledge and the acquiring of firm skills, moral and psychological qualities which ensure the maximum use of the capabilities residing in the equipment in any, even most complicated situation.

The path to skill lies through a precise and correct organization and advanced procedures for the exercises, daily control over the prompt, strict and complete implementation of the training plans and programs and over the results of each training hour and through the unswerving observance of order and the rules for servicing, storing and operating the equipment. All these demands of the moment have been reflected in the motto "A Higher Level of Mastery for the New Equipment" and under this during the current year there will be an improvement in the technical and special training of the personnel.

It is essential to emphasize that the group nature of the employment of modern weapons has immeasurably strengthened the dependence of the overall success not only upon the level of the individual skill of each man but to an equal degree upon the strength of the habits of joint actions and upon collectivist conduct. A feeling of a helping hand and the firm conviction that fellow servicemen will not let you down but will support you in a difficult moment, in a word, all that includes the highest concepts of soldier friendship and troop comradeship, serve to ensure combat readiness. Conversely, any instances of a noncomradely attitude in the troop environment cause tangible harm to it. This is why it is so important to decisively check the attempts of some "experienced" soldiers and sailors to "dress down" the men commencing service and even put off a certain portion of their work to their shoulders. Such phenomena are absolutely alien to the very nature of the socialist army and there should be no place for them in our Armed Forces.

A completely scientifically sound and long-tested unified system of standards for the activities and conduct of the Soviet soldier both in peacetime and in a combat situation is to be found in the combined-arms and combat regulations. These give the commanders and chiefs active means for influencing their subordinates. The correct and able use both of commendations and reprimands encourages military service and effectively influences a rise in combat readiness. At the same time any distortions of disciplinary practices tell negatively both on the authority of the superior himself, upon the indoctrination of the personnel and on the general state of affairs in the troop collective.

In the strict and precise execution of the requirements of the regulations is to be found the key to mastering the ability to fight in a modern way and achieve victory over a strong, well armed and trained enemy. Such ability ultimately embodies combat readiness.

As is shown by the experience of the best subunits, units and ships, the organizing of all the life, service and training of the personnel in full accord

with the requirements of the regulations is the most effective and productive means for strengthening discipline. Firm proper order makes it possible to place each serviceman under those conditions where the steady habit of disciplined conduct is developed and reinforced in him and becomes a character trait. These conditions serve as good grounds for a healthy moral atmosphere in the collective, for correct relationships among the servicemen, for increasing their legal knowledge and for successfully carrying out the entire range of ideological and indoctrinational measures. Certainly the strengthening of discipline is an area of work where headway is not made by slogans alone. "We must," said the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, in a meeting with the Moscow machine tool builders, "provide a greater content for the struggle for discipline and link it directly with the carrying out of production quotas and then there will be, as they say, no unproductive letting off steam."

For the Armed Forces, all their "production quotas" in one way or another are tied to combat readiness. And this means that the questions of strengthening military discipline should be solved together with the tasks of increasing the combat readiness of the units and ships. In ensuring such unity, an inestimable role is played by party political work. Active and continuous, specific and to-the-point, it ensures the unison of the ideological training of the men with instilling in them the practical skills of disciplined conduct, it injects into the masses of soldiers a spirit of organization, professionalism and responsibility and unites them for the sake of the single cause of constant, high combat readiness.

The stronger military discipline is, the higher the combat readiness of the Army and Navy and the more dependably the peaceful labor of the Soviet people who are creating communism is defended. Imperialism, with its powerful military machine is a serious, perfidious enemy. In the struggle against such an enemy, taught V. I. Lenin, "it is essential to have military discipline and military vigilance brought to the highest limits." Hence the importance of the political, ideological and organizational measures which have been well thought out, clearly planned and consistently and comprehensively executed in each military collective in the area of the steady strengthening of discipline and proper order.

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### ACCELERATED S&T DEVELOPMENT NOTED IN DEFENSE INDUSTRIES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 83 (signed to press 3 May 83) pp 25-29

[Article by Candidate of Economic Sciences A. Sukhov: "A Union of Creative Thought and Creative Labor"]

[Text] The development of the productive forces in a socialist society is closely tied to scientific and technical achievements and to their introduction into the national economy. Even during the first years of Soviet power, V. I. Lenin pointed out that socialism is inconceivable without "equipment constructed according to the last word of modern science..." (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 36, p 300). In following Lenin's legacy, the Communist Party and our states in all the stages of national economic development have given unflagging attention to scientific and technical progress. Up to the present, the USSR has created a powerful scientific potential and science more and more is being turned into a direct productive force. Its achievements are being employed in the interests of all the people and for their good. Scientific and technical progress serves as the main lever for creating the material and technical base of communism.

Characteristically, under socialism not only are the natural and technical sciences being turned into a productive force but also the social sciences and humanities, as a force contributing to the transformation of all aspects of society's life. It is a question of research on the basic patterns of mature socialism. Of particular importance is the work done by economists related to the interdisciplinary programs for national economic development, the placement of productive forces in regions and the elaboration of problems concerning production efficiency, improved product quality and better management of the nation's economy.

The 26th CPSU Congress stipulated that scientific and technical development should in the future be even more subordinate to the solving of the economic and social tasks in Soviet society, to accelerating the conversion of the economy to the path of intensification and to increasing the efficiency of social production.

The task has been set of increasing the effectiveness of scientific research, significantly shortening the time for introducing scientific and technical achievements and deepening their link with production. This party demand was reemphasized at the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. "We possess great reserves in the national economy," said Comrade Yu. V. Andropov in a speech at the plenum. "These reserves must be sought out in accelerating scientific and technical progress and in broadly and rapidly introducing scientific and technical achievements and advanced experience into production."

At present, the number of scientific workers in the USSR has reached 1.4 million persons. This is an impressive figure and the USSR employs 25 percent of all the scientific workers in our world. Soviet scientists produce approximately one-third of the entire world's scientific product. They firmly hold leading positions in many theoretical and applied areas. It was the Soviet Union that was the first to put up a nuclear power plant and go into space. Our scientists developed the laser and its beam is employed in the welding and cutting of metals, in surgical operations, electronics and in thermonuclear fusion units. The entire world also knows the achievements of our scientists in developing new areas in chemistry, in establishing a new scientific and technical sector of biochemical technology and in other areas of knowledge.

The 11th Five-Year Plan is an important stage in further developing all areas of science and technology and in significantly increasing the nation's scientific and technical potential. The task set by the 26th CPSU Congress of bringing all the national economic sectors to the forward limits of science and technology places great responsibility on our scientists, designers, engineers and production managers.

Scientific and technical progress serves as a basis for intensifying social production and for increasing the effectiveness of the national economy. What are its basic areas? These are primarily the search for and development of new types of energy and the creation and putting into production of more advanced structural materials. We must also mention the changeover to waste-free and resource-saving production methods which ensure the maximum complete and integrated use of raw products, labor, energy and material-technical resources. Here also we must put full mechanization and automation of production and the realizing of scientific management principles on all levels of social production.

The strengthening of the alliance between scientists and production workers is one of the basic factors in accelerating scientific and technical progress. If we want to make successful progress, the party teaches, then it is essential to adopt truly revolutionary measures and create a strong, permanent alloy of science and production.

During the current five-year plan, the modern-equipped experimental facilities of the scientific institutions will be further expanded and equipped. The organization of scientific information is being improved so as to ensure the immediate application of completed developments, scientific achievements and advanced experience in practice. This has been well aided by the growing ties of the enterprises with the nation's scientific centers and by the creative collaboration of the production workers with scientists and employees from the



leading design and engineering bureaus. It is difficult to overestimate the role of the scientific-technical societies [NTO] and the creative associations of specialists, rationalizers and inventors. Their activities are aimed at saving material, fuel and energy resources, at introducing waste-free production methods and carrying out the USSR Food Program.

Thus, the NTO presently bring together 11 million persons. In January 1983, the Sixth All-Union NTO Congress was held. Over the time which passed since the previous congress, the NTO have developed and sent to the state and economic bodies around 1 million proposals and recommendations related to scientific and technical development and to the practical employment of their achievements.

The Army and Navy inventors and rationalizers have also made a major contribution to the development of the USSR national economy. Their work not only contributes to further increasing the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. To their score are numerous developments which are widely employed in radio electronics, communications, machine building, medicine and so forth. The original, bold inventions and rationalization proposals by the military inventors have provided many millions of rubles in profit, in being embodied in diverse equipment in many sectors of the socialist economy.

In recent years, the NTO have carried out a number of measures to reduce heavy manual labor. For example, with the direct involvement of the NTO organizations in 90 oblasts, krays and republics of the nation, long-range regional programs have been worked out. Over the years of the Tenth Five-Year Plan alone, this has made it possible to shift more than 500,000 persons from manual labor to mechanized and ease the working conditions of 800,000 employees. At almost 20,000 industrial enterprises and production associations of the nation, integrated systems for controlling product quality are employed and this has made it possible to reduce losses from defective products and increase labor productivity and the proportional amount of superior quality products.

A distinguishing feature of the 11th Five-Year Plan is the implementation of the state integrated scientific-technical programs. In being worked out by the USSR Gosplan, the USSR State Committee for Science and Technology and the USSR Academy of Sciences, they have been incorporated as a component part in the 1981-1985 national economic and social development plan. A total of 170 state comprehensive scientific-technical programs (41 of them are specific) has been approved. These should realize the most effective scientific and technical achievements, including series output of new products even during the current five-year plan. Approximately 120 programs involve the solving of major problems and creating technical devices, production processes and materials which will be introduced into production in the 12th Five-Year Plan.

These are all aimed at carrying out major national economic tasks. Thus, there are the questions of improving the nation's fuel and energy complex, developing machine building and the agroindustrial complex, tapping the zone of the BAM [Baykal-Amur Mainline], producing consumer goods and the greatest possible improving in the working and living conditions of the workers. The choice of the comprehensive scientific-technical programs for the 11th Five-Year Plan and up to 1990 has been made proceeding from the current and future needs of the

national economy as well as from the development trends of science and technology. These programs make it possible for the scientists, designers and production workers to focus their efforts on developing and rapidly introducing into practice more advanced equipment and production methods.

The basic share of the burden in carrying out the scientific-technical program rests on machine building. For this reason, the following particular feature is characteristic. A majority of the programs pursues the aim of developing the basis of machine building itself in order to accelerate the process of modernizing production equipment in all the sectors and sharply reducing manual and heavy physical labor. This applies primarily to the coal industry, metallurgy, agriculture and construction. A number of scientific-technical programs envisages the creation and introduction of mechanization and automation for materials handling and warehouse work as well as the container and pallet transporting of freight and the production of standardized reusable crating. The realization of the quotas for just these programs by 1985 will make it possible to release around 900,000 persons from unskilled labor. Almost a million workers will receive the opportunity to retrain and acquire a new, interesting specialty and find a more useful application for their abilities.

Industrial robots play a special role in production mechanization and automation. A special scientific-technical program envisages an approximate 6-fold increase in their number by the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan. "Robotization" of many types of production and the development of automated systems will become one of the most crucial areas in technical development. Certainly more and more people must work in unusual, so-called extremal conditions such as underwater, in a vacuum and in areas dangerous to human health.

Industrial robots are a new means for the full automation of production and these differ from traditional ones in their universality (multiple functions) and rapid readjustment for new operations. Their introduction is the concluding stage in the full automation of series and small-series production, as the prerequisites are created for developing fully automated, adjustable lines, production sections and entire production lines.

Over the last 7-8 years, in our nation robots have come a great distance from the first experimental models to the organizing of their series production and introduction into industry. Over 100 models of industrial robots and manipulators have been developed for automating the production of stamping, machining of parts, galvanizing, casting, welding, painting, assembly and other production operations. The production of machine complexes has been developed for injection molding, automatic adjustable sheet-stamping lines based on mechanical processes and individual "machine tool-robot" modules. The introduction of robots in a number of types of production will increase the productivity of live labor by 2-3-fold. The use of each manipulator provides an economic effect from 8,000 to 12,000 rubles a year.

The USSR has already acquired great experience in developing automatic lines. The broad introduction of machine tools with numerical program control combined with manufacturing centers and robots will make it possible in the not distant future to create fully automated production in machine building. A start to this has already been made at the Petrodvoretz Timepiece Plant.

One of the scientific-technical programs is aimed at the greatest possible development of powder metallurgy. The production of metallurgical powders, in comparison with 1975, will rise by 4.4-fold by 1985 and by 10-fold by 1990. Calculations show that the introduction of each thousand tons of articles from powder will save the labor of 190 workers, it will free 80 metal cutting machines, 1,500-2,000 tons of rolled ferrous and nonferrous metals and will provide a savings from 1.3 to 2 million rubles. Scientific institutes, design bureaus and plants from 48 ministries and departments are participating in carrying out this specific program. There are already results at hand as new production methods and unique materials have appeared in industry.

Approximately 20 scientific and technical programs "reinforce" the USSR Food Program as approved the May (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Measures are being carried out aimed at the further development of scientific research and the accelerated introduction of scientific achievements in the sectors of the agroindustrial complex. At present, it is particularly important for this to pool the efforts of the scientific collectives from the most diverse specialties, regardless of their departmental affiliation. Here the essence of the matter is that it is important to find the most dependable ways to reasonably utilize the natural, biological, technical, economic, organizational and social factors and resources for increasing the efficiency of agriculture and the entire agroindustrial complex.

Within the scientific and technical programs relating to agriculture, scientists are developing new breeds of animals and poultry. For example, 17 new production processes are being developed for producing livestock products. Seven of them by 1985 will already be in use on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes. In dairy livestock raising, herds are being formed with an annual milk yield of 5,000 and more kilograms of milk per cow. Highly mechanized complexes are being developed and involved in milk production and the raising of young cattle.

The development of livestock raising undoubtedly requires a more dependable feed supply. One of the integrated programs is aimed at this. Over 100 scientific research institutes and other institutions of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture and 12 organizations of the Ministry of Machine Building for Livestock Raising are involved in carrying it out.

The realization of the quotas of the 170 state integrated scientific-technical programs during the 11th Five-Year Plan alone will save 4 million tons of ferrous metals, 50 million tons of standard fuel units, 14 billion kilowatt hours of electric power and will save the labor of 3 million persons. As a whole, as the preliminary estimates indicate, the economic effect from the introduction of more modern equipment as a result of the integrated programs will exceed 25 billion rubles by 1985.

In the last decade, more than two-thirds of the overall increase of labor productivity in industry has come from advanced, progressive equipment and the scientific organization of labor. It is very crucial that in the 11th Five-Year Plan the pace of replacing equipment increases by 1.5-fold.

Let us reinforce what has been stated by several facts and figures. Thus, in recent years the machine builders have begun operating at the large Siberian

coal mines rotary excavators with a productivity of 2,500 and 5,000 m<sup>3</sup> an hour. At the mines, this has raised labor productivity by 1.5-2-fold and has reduced work costs by 20 percent and specific metal intensiveness by more than one-third.

Scientific and technical progress also influences the development of military affairs where the most recent scientific and technical achievements are often employed more frequently and more rapidly than in other sectors of social life. But here it is essential to emphasize that military affairs is not the driving force of scientific and technical progress. Wars and defense production ultimately impede the development of the productive forces and progress in many scientific and technical sectors. However, the interests of the defense capability of the Soviet state have forced it to utilize science for improving military affairs and primarily their material-technical base and for increasing the combat readiness of the Army and Navy in order to repel any aggressive actions by the imperialist forces.

The conditions under which the national economy of our motherland will develop in the 1980's make it even more imperative to have an acceleration of scientific-technical progress and a strengthening of ties between science and production. At present, as was pointed out by the 26th CPSU Congress, in looking ahead 5 or 10 years, we must not forget that a national economic structure will be laid down and created and with which our nation will enter the 21st century. This should embody the basic traits and ideals of a communist society, be in the vanguard of progress and embody the integration of science and production and the unshakable union of creative thought and creative labor.

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## NAVAL UNITS SHOW WEAKNESSES IN IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING

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[Article by Rear Adm E. Zimin, chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Section and deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Navy: "A Continuous Influence"]

[Text] In the not distant past, many good words were said about the crew of the large ASW ship "Tashkent" from the Red Banner Pacific Fleet. This close-knit combat collective had repeatedly distinguished itself in long ocean cruises and in carrying out gunnery exercises and other difficult combat training tasks. During the last training year, in initiating a socialist competition among the Pacific Fleet sailors to worthily celebrate the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the men of the "Tashkent" completely carried out the assumed obligations. Here an important role was played by the ideological work ably conducted on the ship.

But recently the personnel has begun to fall behind somewhat. One of the reasons, in my view, is that the ideological influence on the sailors has weakened on the ship. Some of the non-T/O propagandists have allowed formalism in the ideological work. I was persuaded of this when I attended one of the political exercises in the group of Sr Lt N. Tsyganov. The subject of the lecture was timely and I thought it would evoke a lively interest among the listeners. But I saw something else: the sailors were bored. What was the problem? The officer merely read aloud a text with well-known truths, a text completely divorced from the life of the navy collective.

In this exercise, a different one involuntarily came to mind, and this was a seminar in a group of Marxist-Leninist officer training conducted by the commander of the large ASW ship "Azov" of the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet. During this he created a relaxed, creative situation which was conducive to a lively, interested conversation. One could feel that the leader was preparing the men for the exercise and had also carefully prepared for it. He had carefully thought out what to say and how to say it, what questions should be asked of whom and when, what examples should be referred to and where and how to better utilize the visual aids. The creative, thorough approach to the question made itself felt. The students in the exercise not only actively discussed the problems brought up at the seminar but after it exchanged opinions ardently.

Just two cases but they are enough to conclude that our exercises in the political training system are still conducted with a varying result. And these are the studies during which we should first develop in the sailors strong ideological tempering and high moral-political and combat qualities and see to it that the crews of the surface vessels and submarines with a full life, and each day compare their actions to the pace of the motherland and their successes in military service with the successes of the Soviet people in creative labor.

In truth, I can anticipate the question of whether it is valid to compare or put on the same level a political exercise for sailors conducted by a young non-T/O propagandist and a seminar for officers conducted by the ship commander? Certainly not. But it is not only valid but even essential to compare the attitude of the men to ideological work and place the results of their labor on the same scale. Certainly everyone knows the truth that the sailors and petty officers, the warrant officers ["michman"] and officers carry out the same task, the task of further increasing the combat readiness of their ships and strengthening the might of the Soviet Navy and the Armed Forces as a whole. They should be ready to deal a decisive rebuff to any aggressor at any moment. This readiness is formed in the process of all navy life and in particular in the course of the exercises in the political training system. Hence any exercise, regardless of what form it is or for what category of servicemen it is conducted, should be marked by high quality and effectiveness and arm the sailors with a profound knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and the ability to counter hostile ideological subversion and the evil attacks by bourgeois propaganda on real socialism, on the Soviet way of life, on our Armed Forces and their historic mission.

At all times, this demand has been crucial for our ideological workers. But it has assumed particular significance now, when the class enemy is undertaking the most massed attacks on Marxist-Leninist ideology and is waging true psychological warfare against the USSR and the socialist countries, when imperialism, and primarily the U.S. militaristic circles, are endeavoring to organize an anticommunist "crusade," threatening the world with nuclear war. Under these conditions it is important to constantly improve our agitation and propaganda work, to utilize in it diverse forms and methods for an ideological influence on the sailors and to conduct this continuously, effectively and aggressively. "A convincing, specific demonstration of our achievements, a serious analysis of the new problems constantly arising out of life, a freshness of thought and word--this is the way to improving all our propaganda which should always be just and realistic as well as interesting, accessible and hence more effective," pointed out the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, in his report "Sixty Years of the USSR."

Exercises in the political study system are the basic link in the chain of diverse ideological work. Consequently, the basic role in the ideological influence on the sailors is played by the leaders of the political exercise groups for men in the regular service, political studies for the warrant officers and Marxist-Leninist training for the officers. Upon them to a decisive degree depends what trace will remain in the hearts of the audience of the lecture, discussion and seminar. Will they, as was pointed out at the 26th CPSU Congress, be a place where boredom reigns, where the stipulated hours are merely "served out," or, on the contrary, will they become effective centers for lively party



thoughts and words? If the leader is aware of this and is earnestly concerned with his job, then he will prepare responsibly for each meeting with the students. And the men, in turn, will await such meetings and go willingly to the exercises in order to discuss urgent problems of party theory and policy, our domestic and international life and obtain replies to pertinent questions, add to their ideological and theoretical knowledge and better understand their tasks.

At the political exercise conducted by Sr Lt Tsyganov, the listeners, I repeat, were bored. They were bored because the lecture did not correspond to modern requirements and did not satisfy the increased needs of the men. He conducted the exercise formally for the sake of fulfilling his plan. But I am convinced that the group leader would not have conducted an exercise without preparing for it thoroughly if the command, the party organization of the large ASW ship "Tashkent," the formation's political section and its propagandist had always properly settled the questions of the effectiveness and quality of political studies. But here, as it was disclosed, for some time great exactingness had not been demanded of the group leaders and there was not true concern for them to increase their theoretical and educational preparation.

Unfortunately, one will not encounter proper supervision over the activities of the non-T/O propagandists or true concern for providing them with profound and solid knowledge and advanced educational techniques on certain other ships as well. To eliminate these shortcomings means to improve the ideological influence on the personnel and to mobilize them to more successfully carry out the combat training tasks. It is no secret that the sailors not only listen attentively to those persons who possess profound knowledge and high moral qualities but also willingly follow them, as they say, through fire and water. They follow those who have won the moral right to teach others.

For example, take Officer V. Adazhuk. He devotes all his knowledge and all his experience to agitation and propaganda work and puts all his heart into it. For this reason the sailors wait for their meetings with him. A lecture, talk or any measure conducted by this propagandist evokes interest in the men and causes serious reflection about honor and conscience, about one's duty to the motherland. Adazhuk works most carefully before a long cruise. During this period, he reads with particular thirst the literature on our nation's domestic and international situation. From his own experience the officer knows that here, on shore, one can relax for if a question asked by a student has not been answered you have merely to pick up the required book and find the reply. As a rule, on a long cruise, one can rely only on oneself, on one's own knowledge and on that store of political knowledge which you always have. For this reason, he prepares carefully for the cruise and also prepares the non-T/O propagandists too.

In a propagandist's work there is no pat formula for all instances of life. Particularly so on a long cruise when the psychological and physical strain fatigues the men and when at any moment so-called nonstandard situations are possible. Then each person who comes before a sailor audience is particularly confronted with the demand: speak so that you are heard, understood and believed, so that your words provide strength and inspire the men to unstinting military service. But it is no secret that the audience can be truly led only

by a person with profound knowledge and acquainted with the procedures of the propagandist profession. This is why the military councils and political bodies, the commanders and political workers in the Navy give daily attention to the training of the propagandists.

In speaking about the training of the non-T/O propagandists, I would like to say a word about such an important form as the assemblies of ideological workers. The Red Banner Black Sea Fleet has acquired positive experience in conducting them. Here during the last assembly reports and lectures were given full of rich, interesting factual material and this is now being successfully utilized by the propagandists in their work. A practical scientific conference and practical exercises on timely problems were conducted. Many participants in the assembly on the ships and in the units gave lectures on one of the subjects of the political exercises.

But here as well they have not succeeded in avoiding the shortcomings which were permitted in the past. The speeches of individual propagandists as before were reports on the measures they had carried out. But nothing or little was said about what new things had been introduced in ideological work, in what manner the new had been put into practice and what results ensued. But certainly the basic aim of the assembly was to grant the propagandists a broad forum for exchanging opinions on all problems concerning their work with the men. When such an opportunity is missed, this is a serious failing.

However, it must not be assumed that the assemblies fully solve the problem of training ideological workers. As is known, during them theoretical knowledge is increased and the educational skills of the non-T/O propagandists are improved. But the largest detachment of workers on the ideological front is the non-T/O propagandists. They play a very marked role in the ideological indoctrination of the men. It is a prime task to teach the leaders of the political study groups and the member of the agitation-propaganda collectives and groups the forms and methods for an ideological influence on the men and to enrich their political knowledge. And the work conducted with them by the political bodies such as seminars and instructional exercises, lectures and talks of course helps in the development of the young propagandists. But it is hard to achieve the proper return from such forms of study if the command and political personnel and the party organizations of the ship do not have a constant and specific influence on the non-T/O propagandists and supervise their activities. Liberalism accustoms a person to work without particular endeavor and allow formalism in work and this always leads to undesirable consequences.

For example, the party organization on the cruiser "Zhdanov" in the Red Banner Black Sea Fleet relaxed its demands on the non-T/O propagandists and some of them began to take their duties half-heartedly. And where a vivid, mobilizing word is not heard, interesting results are not obtained. There prerequisites and conditions are created for deviating from the requirements of the regulations and our moral standards and for violations of military discipline. And this happened in the collective described here. The results of the sailors in military and political training declined and major infractions of military discipline occurred.

This case convinces one that the ideological influence on the personnel must be constant, without relaxing it for a single moment. It is essential to know precisely what should be told the men today and what tomorrow, proceeding from the tasks confronting them. And it is not merely a question of knowing what to say but also how to say it and what form of influence to use. Propaganda and agitation go on the offensive usually in those instances when one form of ideological influence at the crucial moment is replaced and supplemented by another. This is particularly important on long cruises.

A majority of the propagandists is constantly concerned for making certain that the sailors serving at sea and far from the motherland promptly receive news from the homeland and do not suffer from "information starvation." Communication between shore and ocean is carried out by various ways. For example, it has become a rule that no auxiliary vessel sets out to supply the ships without picking up copies of newspapers, magazines and letters. If possible the mail is delivered ahead of time to foreign ports where our ships call frequently on official friendly visits or for service calls.

The last TASS statements on events in the nation and abroad and important materials published in the central periodic press are transmitted daily to the ships at sea by telegraph. The Navy Political Directorate sees to it that this information is pertinent and specific and that it considers the specific nature of the voyage and the nature of the tasks to be carried out. In the necessary instances commentaries are appended to the transmitted information as well as recommendations on how to better use it.

The press bulletin from the Navy Political Directorate "Okeanskim kursom" [By the Ocean Course] is also a great help in working with the men during long cruises. This is an unique newspaper devoted to the major events of our domestic and international life. A good deal of space in it is given to navy information. Along with textual material photographs are also published. This bulletin is prepared twice a week and transmitted to the ships which possess special equipment making it possible to receive a clear newspaper column.

The sailors are very fond of this bulletin. It brings them rich spiritual nourishment and contains diverse information. Here it is possible to read about the successes of the pacesetters of the socialist competition in the fleets, how the rights of the workers are being violated in the capitalist world and how the American military is increasing its aggressive preparations in various regions of the planet. The sailors are particularly interested in learning how the workers of our nation are fulfilling the quotas of the 11th Five-Year Plan. Under the heading "In an United Family," the men are accustomed to see interesting stories about the Union republics and oblasts. These stories are also closely tied to the service of the sailors who live according to the laws of military fraternity and vigilantly guard their great fatherland.

From the responses of participants in long cruises, such additions make it possible for them far from the motherland to keep touch with it. More than once we have heard from those who for the first time have set to sea as well as from those who have logged thousands of miles that the words about the life of the Soviet people and about their labor accomplishments encourage, add strength and lead to new successes. The commanders, political workers and propagandists also comment favorably about the bulletin.

Good initiative has been shown in the Red Banner Northern Fleet. The fleet political directorate and the Murmansk radio and television regularly broadcast to those at sea the radio program "Hear Us, Men of the Arctic" and the TV programs "The Oath." This experience merits attention and we are thinking about organizing similar radio and TV broadcasts for all Soviet sailors serving at sea.

Recently the fleets have adopted the interesting and combat form of propaganda work, namely the agitation cruises of ships and agitation flights of airplanes and helicopters to sea, to remote garrisons and posts. The program of such agitation brigades includes speeches by propagandists, the showing of films, the organizing and holding of question and answer evenings on urgent problems of domestic and international life as well as amateur artistic performances.

On many ships there has arisen the good tradition deriving from the needs of the sailors heart to write compositions on the motherland, the party, the heroism and romance of navy service while on a long cruise. These innermost lines cannot be read without being moved.

On the ships when they are at sea, each new day starts by the playing of the Soviet National Anthem over the ship's broadcasting system and then the song "My Motherland is Vast" is played. Far from the motherland these are received with particular pride.

The results of our political indoctrination are felt most often in so-called nonstandard situations.

...A Soviet naval vessel made an official call at one foreign port. Many local citizens visited it. They showed great interest in the life of the Soviet sailors. They asked about our nation and told about their life. The very fact that the foreigners left over 200 entries with warm words to the Soviet sailors in the ship's visitor book shows one thing that the ship crew had represented its fatherland far from home shores with dignity and honor.

In truth, among the visitors there were also those who came onboard not for the sake of learning about life in the Soviet Union, but rather exclusively in talking with our sailors to present life in the capitalist world in a more advantageous life in comparison with life in the socialist world, to ask provocative questions and to speculate on "human rights." But the sailors, indoctrinated in a spirit of high communist ideological loyalty, did not lose out in the talks with their opponents and convincingly showed the groundlessness of their assertions. Undoubtedly this was pleasing. It shows that the work of the ideological workers has left its mark.

A long voyage.... Precisely here the Soviet sailors fall into the zones of the strongest attacks by the bourgeois mass propaganda and information media and they encounter provocations and ideological subversion. The propagandists consider this and of course constantly and effectively conduct an offensive counteraction to the penetration of bourgeois ideology. They unmask it most actively in the political exercises. Many lectures, talks and other measures also serve the same purpose. Often they are based on what the sailors themselves have seen far from home shores.

In our view, work was successfully planned in unmasking bourgeois ideology during the long cruise by the agitation-propaganda group of the escort vessel "Rezvyi." Its members Capt 3d Rank Yu. Chudik, Capt-Lt Yu. Piskunovich and other comrades selected the subjects for talks, as a rule, from the life which the sailors would encounter abroad. Here is a characteristic example. During a call at a port in one of the developing countries, the personnel of the "Rezvyi" saw idle oilfields on shore. It turned out that the black gold so essential to the nation was remaining underground merely because the oil pumping equipment had broken down. The Western firms (it was they who installed it) refused to deliver new equipment as such sanctions are applied by the imperialists against all countries who do not wish to follow the capitalist paths of development. This fact stirred the sailors. The propagandists in responding to it, on the same day conducted talks with the personnel on the situation in the developing countries and on those difficulties which they experience as a result of the pressure from the imperialist forces.

On the surface vessels and submarines the propagandizing of the glorious revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces holds a prominent place in indoctrinating high political vigilance and implacability for the enemies of socialism among the men. The ideological workers, together with the Navy veterans, hold talks in front of the stands of the ship's campaign record and they play documentary tapes which reflect the development stages of the Soviet state.

Such work has been skillfully carried out on the large ASW ship "Gremyashchiy." Both during cruises as well as when the crew is at its base. For example, recently after the ship's return from a long cruise, the sailors were visited by the veterans of the "Gremyashchiy" A. Taysherskiy, M. Soygin, P. Zinchenko and K. Yudanov. They told the sailors about the battles against the Nazis and described the daring raids by the destroyer "Gremyashchiy" during the war years. The veterans sent a wreath to sea at the place where the escort vessel "Tuman" was lost. This meeting evoked profound reflection among the sailors and caused them to have a more responsible approach to assessing their combat labor. Undoubtedly, during the next cruise the words of the veterans, in touching the hearts of the young sailors, will produce their own seeds and impel the heirs of combat glory to the exemplary fulfillment of the set task.

...A ship's deck is a particle of the territory of our great fatherland. The Soviet sailors stand all their difficult service facing the winds and storms. This service will be all the more successful the more vividly we bring the word of party truth into each sailor's wardroom and to the hearts and minds of each defender of the motherland.

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## IDEOLOGICAL TRAINING, EFFECTIVENESS OF BORDER TROOPS

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 83 (signed to press 3 May 83) pp 53-56

[Article by Maj Gen V. Nazarov, deputy chief of the Political Directorate of the Border Troops of the USSR KGB: "A Feeling of the Frontier"]

[Text] The workers of our nation are carrying out the magnificent program of communist creation in a difficult international situation. This situation is characterized by increased aggressiveness among the imperialist forces headed by the U.S. militaristic bosses, by an arms race of unprecedented scope, by propaganda attacks on socialism and by the creation of centers of tension close to the USSR state frontiers. Our class enemy is conducting total espionage against our nation more actively and more extensively than before and is endeavoring to harm the Soviet economy and our socialist morality. In their subversive activities the imperialist special services assign an important place to hostile actions on the Soviet state frontier. In cynically flaunting the standards of international law, the Western intelligence bodies and centers of ideological subversion are endeavoring to send their agents and emissaries into our nation and to illegally ship into the USSR weapons and explosives, drugs, special radios and portable duplicating equipment and printed materials of a subversive nature.

Under these conditions the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet state have shown constant concern for further strengthening national defense capability and for improving the security of its frontiers. A new manifestation of this concern was the adoption of the Law "Governing the USSR State Frontier" by the Seventh Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Tenth Sitting. This was prepared on the basis of the USSR Constitution and the decisions of the party congresses and plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and conforms fully to Marxist-Leninist teachings on the socialist state and the defense of its interests. The law also considers the ideas and provisions of the first legislative enactment on the frontier, the Decree of the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars "On Establishing Border Security" which was personally edited and signed by V. I. Lenin on 28 March 1918. The law proceeds from the Leninist principles of the inviolability of frontiers, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the mutual rejection of the use of force and sovereign equality which underlie our relationships with neighboring countries.



The law assigns a prominent place to the Border Troops in the responsible question of protecting the USSR state frontier. For 65 years now, in being a component part of the USSR Armed Forces, they together with the Soviet Army and Navy and with the active support of all the nation's workers, have vigilantly guarded the frontiers of the socialist fatherland. For the Border Troops, high vigilance and constant readiness to thwart hostile enemy actions are the number-one task. In order to successfully carry out this, there must be daily work in indoctrinating the Border Troops in a spirit of communist conviction, ardent Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism and the readiness for a feat for the sake of the motherland.

Recently there has been a greater influence of ideological indoctrination on all spheres of activity of the Border Troops. Here a leading role has been played by the communists. The party organizations have had an active effect on all the outposts, ships, checkpoints and other border subunits. A constant improvement in the forms and methods of ideological work, a greater party influence directly in the combat formations of the troops and high militancy and principledness--this is the characteristic atmosphere in which a majority of the party collectives of the Border Troops is working. Among them are the party organizations headed by the officers and communists V. Stromskiy, N. Voronkov, V. Sizov and B. Yermolin.

In our troops great attention is given to the political training of the personnel and primarily the command and political personnel. At present, our officers are studying a more profound program of Marxist-Leninist training. In it an important place has been assigned to forming a communist ideology and to special questions. This has noticeably strengthened the link of the ideological and theoretical preparedness of the personnel with their actual combat and service activities. There is the widespread practice of having reports and statements by communists on their political self-education and the hearing of leaders of the Marxist-Leninist training groups. Political training is constantly being improved. For example, in the Baltic and Northwestern border districts elements of special problem training are being widely introduced.

We would also like to point out the following pattern. The communist officers who have profoundly mastered the program of Marxist-Leninist training, as a rule, better perform their official duties, they resolve the arising questions more competently and show a need for contact with the personnel. They achieve a unity in organizational and ideological work and this is the main condition for increasing the vanguard role of the communists.

The political workers and party organizations have begun to more widely use theoretical, practical scientific conferences and unified political days in their political indoctrination activities. In the course of the political days, the party organizations and the leadership of the Northwestern Border District, for example, have carried out a large amount of work in studying public opinion and the requests of the border troops and have responded immediately to them. In the border detail where the communist A. Kotlyarov is the chief of the political section, the task of revising ideological work is seen in ensuring primarily a close unity of ideological indoctrination and party organizational work, in strengthening a well-reasoned, vivid and convincing demonstration of the achievements of socialism and in increasing the offensive spirit of the

propaganda, unmasking and criticizing imperialism and its aggressive, antipopular policy.

In our men we instill a heightened "feeling of the frontier" and endeavor that each of them be profoundly aware for the need for the highest vigilance. The commanders, the political bodies, the party and Komsomol organizations of the Border Troops have acquired rich experience in the integrated carrying out of this task. As an example, take the party organization which is headed by Officer S. Fedorov. The role and influence of the communists in this collective is growing day by day. They effectively explain to the personnel the international situation and the conditions on the frontier and unmask the subversive activities of the imperialist intelligence agents. In widely using press, radio and TV announcements, the communists explain this information to the men and link the international situation with the present-day situation in individual regions of the frontier, thereby helping the border troops in profoundly understanding the tasks confronting them.

Characteristic of this party collective is a creative approach on the part of the communists to the questions of organizing service and implacability for any instances of laxness. The party organization has found forms of work whereby not a single border detail escapes their attention. Here also they correctly approach the placement of communists in the crucial areas of guarding the state frontier. The tasks of ensuring the vanguard role of the communists in service are regularly discussed at party meetings and party bureau sessions. Party groups are active in the outposts. All of this makes it possible to have a continuous party influence on the personnel and ensure the secure defense of the frontier. With good reason the party leader, the communist S. Fedorov spoke from the rostrum of the meeting of the primary organization secretaries of the Border Troops and shared his experience. There are many such collectives in the Border Troops.

If one were to try to define the end results in further improving the ideological and political indoctrination of the communists, its main result would be a high political upsurge in the personnel, a profound understanding on the part of the border troops of their patriotic and international duty, as well as courage and heroism shown in defending the USSR state frontier. This can be seen from numerous examples of their bold actions in apprehending border violators. In moments of major testing, the border troops demonstrate steadfastness, self-sacrifice and decisive actions. This was the case, for example, in apprehending a dangerous violator of the state frontier in the Pacific Border District. After an alert from the frontier, the alert group headed by Officer V. Boyko arrived in the area. Footprints were detected in the border zone. Pursuit began. This lasted several hours. In the course of the chase the border troops established that the intruder was armed. Danger threatened the men every minute. But none of the border troops hesitated or reduced the pace of pursuit. The violator, having realized that he could not escape, took cover in the rocks and began to shoot. In forcing the intruder to the ground by bursts of automatic fire, the alert group surrounded him. The intruder was disarmed.

The following episode occurred one night at a technical observation post. The radar operator Pvt R. Ayupov, in monitoring one of the sectors of the defended

area of the state frontier noted a characteristic bright blip on the screen. Officer V. Skanov, having received the report on the target from the technical observation post, sent a border detail headed by Sgt I. Tyumentsev to the designated area. Having cut off the escape route, the detail apprehended an unknown person who turned out to be a violator of the state frontier.

Such examples are not solitary ones. Not a day passes when the enemy does not endeavor on some sector of the state frontier to feel out the vigilance of the Soviet border troops. Not so long ago, for example, the border troops thwarted an attempt to bring narcotics into our nation. Over a short interval of time, foreign citizens three times endeavored to carry such "cargo" with them. But each time their attempts foundered on the high vigilance of the men in the green coats.

The border patrol boat under the command of Officer V. Bormotov apprehended a schooner in an area closed to navigation. To the score of the border patrol sailors of this ship are eight apprehended schooners which violated the state frontier. In stormy weather, with minimum visibility, the vigilant guards of the sea frontier were able not only to promptly spot the violators but also take every measure to apprehend them.

Border patrolmen from the outpost of Sr Lt A. Petrov apprehended two inveterate violators of the state frontier.

There is every reason to assert that by the efforts of the communist commanders and border troops and all the personnel, many border units have risen to still another level of military skill. According to the results of the socialist competition, the troop collectives headed by the communist V. Bondarenko, A. Ivchatov, A. Kazinachikov, A. Kochkin, A. Mironov and V. Stotskiy have achieved high results in service and in military and political training.

As always, the border details which are named after heroes are at the head of the competing collectives. Many of them have kept the honorary title of outstanding for a number of years. Among them are the border details imeni Hero of the Soviet Union V. Usov and imeni A. Gar'kavyi and N. Golubnitskiy.

The border troops of the 1980's hold secret and add to the glorious traditions of the elder generations of defenders of the Soviet frontier. Today's border troop is a man of high moral tempering, strong and profound knowledge. Virtually all the officers of the Border Troops have a higher military, political or special education. Around 95 percent of the soldiers and sergeants have completed VUZes, technical schools or secondary schools. A predominant majority of the troop personnel is communists and Komsomol members. "A border troop is not merely a serviceman," said Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "he is a political fighter, if you wish, a representative of our great power on the area assigned to him. Dedication to the cause of the party and the people, an active fighting position in the struggle against all that is alien to our society, a readiness to do everything for the motherland and if need be, to give up one's life for it--these qualities which characterize the men of our glorious Armed Forces apply fully to the Border Troops."

The Law "Governing the USSR State Frontier" which came into effect on 1 March 1983 reflects the profoundly internationalist standards of the relations of our state with the neighboring socialist commonwealth countries. The frontier with them is a new type of frontier, a frontier of friendship and cooperation.

The combat friendship of the Border Troops of the USSR and Bulgaria goes back more than 30 years. One of the Soviet outposts is named after the Bulgarian border troop Asen Iliev and in Bulgaria two outposts have been given the names of Soviet heroes of the frontier, Mikhail Kozlov and Aleksey Lopatin. The exchange of service experience, a competition between these troop collectives and meetings on Soviet and Bulgarian land have become traditional.

"I order the defending of the state frontier of the USSR!" are the solemn words said every day to the border details. These words reach the patrols and the southernmost outpost at Kushka, the northernmost in the Arctic, the westernmost along the Bug and the easternmost on Ratmanov Island. The command echoes across 11 time zones stretching some 60,000 km. It reaches the hearts of the border soldiers vigilantly standing their difficult but very essential duty.

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## MILITARY JOURNALS FALL SHORT IN MORAL TRAINING OF YOUTH

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 10, May 83 (signed to press 3 May 83) pp 88-91

[Review of military journals written up by Col V. Titov: "In Morally Strengthening the Youth"]

[Text] For the military journals the time which has passed since the 26th Party Congress has been marked by a creative search for further elucidating the ideological and political indoctrination work of the commanders, the political bodies and party organizations and for demonstrating its beneficial influence on the Army and Navy personnel. At present, our periodicals are giving great importance to forming the soldier's personality, in harmoniously combining high political and moral qualities, spiritual richness and moral purity.

This problem has been taken up consistently and effectively by the journal SOVETSKIY VOIN. In carrying out the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee "On the Creative Ties of the Artistic Literary Journals with the Practice of Communist Construction" (1982), the editorial staff has recently broadened the range of authors writing on moral and ethical problems.

Prominent military leaders and political workers, scientists, writers, masters of culture and leading servicemen have shared their reflections and observations with the reader, primarily the young one. Here the basic principles of the moral standards established in the nation are linked closely to the demands of the military oath and regulations and this further helps to develop the social activeness of the motherland's armed defenders.

On the magazine's pages, the heading "Spiritual Values of the Soviet Soldier" has become firmly established. Each talk published in it leads the reader to the conclusion that only adherence to elevated ideals allows an individual to acquire true spiritual richness. These ideals are: profound Marxist-Leninist knowledge, firm communist conviction and high moral qualities.

In developing and enriching the heading "The Army in My Life," the magazine has commenced a new section "My Destiny in the Destiny of the Fatherland" where articles are written by nationally famous persons who, in going through Army and Navy schooling, obtained good ideological and moral conditioning for all their lives.

Running through the publication is the basic notion that military service in the Soviet Armed Forces, in using the words of V. I. Lenin, develops a "heroic awareness" by which we understand a constant moral readiness to evidence the highest social activeness under any, even the most complex conditions.

This can be seen from the writings of the twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Army Gen P. Batov "Filial Duty." The author speaks with gratitude about the Soviet Armed Forces which for him became a school of restraint and discipline, ideological strength and command skill. The material is touching in its frankness and sincerity. The veteran turns to the young soldiers, urging them to sacredly preserve and add to the glorious combat traditions and to hold high the title of the armed defender of the socialist fatherland.

The subject of the struggle of the Soviet people for liberty and independence during the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars is constantly taken up on the magazine's pages. This is propagandized in materials published under the heading "The Questionnaire of SOVETSKIY VOIN" the authors of which are heroes of the Soviet Union, as well as under the heading "Courage, Valor and Heroism" as well as in the artistic prose, in particular in such a dynamic literary genre as a short story.

One can clearly see the editors' desire to take up as profoundly as possible the subject of moral indoctrination by artistic means on the basis of the experience in the combat training of the troops and naval forces. In honor of the 60th anniversary of the formation of the USSR, the magazine conducted a literary contest for the best short story and essay under the motto: "The People and Army are One." In the published materials, the attention of the readers has been drawn to the problems of indoctrination in a troop collective and through the collective as well as to the questions of the relationships between commanders and subordinates, seniors and juniors.

Using artistic literature and current events, the journal has described the noble international mission of the Soviet military and the struggle against bourgeois ideology and the enemies of peace and progress. This subject has been reflected, in particular, in chapters from the novel of K. Selikhov "The Undeclared War" (excerpts of it were published in six issues) and in the short story of N. Makhno entitled "Kyariz." Both of these are devoted to the socioeconomic changes in Afghanistan.

The magazine ZNAMENOSETS has also endeavored to take up questions of moral indoctrination. The article by the delegate to the 26th Party Congress, Sr WO S. Shchennikov entitled "A Proud Title, A High Honor" attracted reader attention.

"The days of the congress sessions," wrote the senior warrant officer, "became for me a great political school, a model of professionalism, strict exactingness and a unity of thought and deed. The decisions adopted by the congress forced us to look back, to critically assess our service and the service of our comrades and to draw definite conclusions."

The article evoked numerous replies. For several months there was a lively exchange of opinions on the magazine's pages. The results of the discussion were



summed up by the USSR Deputy Minister of Defense Army Gen I. Shkadov in the article "Reliable Assistants of the Officers" timed for the tenth anniversary of the establishing of the positions of warrant officers. The discussion, according to the responses from readers, forced many to reflect on their place in the general battle order, to more self-critically assess their personal contribution to carrying out the tasks posed by the 26th CPSU Congress for the Armed Forces and to be more profoundly aware of their responsibility for increasing the combat readiness of the units and subunits, for strengthening discipline and organization and for the military and moral indoctrination of the soldiers and sailors.

ZNAMENOSETS, in helping to embody the principles of the moral code of a builder of communism in the standards of daily conduct for the warrant officers, runs a heading "An Official Mission in Writing: Criteria of Morality." In it a series of articles has been published showing how the first assistants of the officers establish their relations with comrades and in their families and serve as an example of nobility. Instances of conceit, coarseness, disdain, greed or excessive drinking are sharply condemned. Indicative in this regard is the article "Until the Thunder Rolled." It was about the fate of WO A. Blinovskiy.

"Only after discharge," wrote Blinovskiy, "did I understand what military service had meant for me. Now when I see an officer or a warrant officer on the street, well...they are serving! I could be serving but I ruined everything myself...."

In truth: what we have we do not protect and what we have lost we regret!

Along with the successes in raising theoretical and procedural problems of ideological and moral indoctrination on the pages of ZNAMENOSETS there are also unused reserves. The editorial staff does not always show proper initiative in working out subjects which disclose legal aspects of moral and military indoctrination. At times the editors limit themselves to articles by lawyers and print consultation and advice to reader questions on military legislation. But how legal propaganda is conducted in the troops, how it develops a respect for the laws, for the requirements for the oath and regulations in the junior commanders for a desire to serve conscientiously and honestly--such materials appear only haphazardly.

The magazine does not have enough articles which would sharply pose the questions of strengthening the indoctrinational influence on the men of the junior commanders who are communists and Komsomol members and comprise the combat nucleus of the collectives and live together with their subordinates in the barracks. A number of materials on this problem has lacked a research nature and there has not even been any attempt to disclose the reasons of the phenomenon or give essential recommendations in the aim of increasing the effectiveness and quality of all indoctrinational work or provide advice on how the commanders, the political workers, the party and Komsomol activists should proceed in one or another situation.

The magazine AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA has also had its creative findings in dealing with moral indoctrination. In the articles "Concern and Attention to

Moral Indoctrination," "The Spiritual Culture of the Soviet Soldier" and others, the magazine has focused reader attention on the fact that with all the complexity, vastness and responsibility of the socioeconomic tasks being carried out by the party, Soviet man, his welfare and his ideological and moral make-up have been and remain at the center of party policy and its concerns.

It is pleasing to note that the magazine has evermore boldly begun to take up the moral aspects of revising ideological work in light of the party's demands. It has generalized the positive experience acquired in the troops and has shown how the agitators and political information officers influence the awareness and feelings of the men, arm them with essential political knowledge, show to them the historic advantages and achievements of real socialism and the heroics of our times and call for new accomplishments in military and political training.

The materials published under the headings "The Correspondence School of the Agitator" and "The Agitator Informs, Advises and Proposes" have attracted attention. Ones such as "The Agitator--A Political Fighter," "The Emotionality of a Speech. How Is This Achieved?" and "An Individual Talk" help the activists in grasping the secrets of oral agitation, to improve their skills and exchange opinions.

Of interest was the discussion of the components for the effectiveness of agitation work and the authority of the agitator. This discussion appeared on the magazine's pages after the publishing of a letter by PO 2d Class Yu. Shkumat "Establish Oneself by Deeds." In replies to this, a majority of the readers voiced the opinion that the reform in ideological work pursues the important goal of escaping from formalism and verbal twaddle and that the question is not so much the forms of ideological work as its content. If an agitator reads the newspaper in a collective or rephrases information transmitted by radio or television, then such a "talk" can scarcely interest anyone. But to make the listeners aware of the party's ideas, to show its domestic and foreign policy, to invest in this work all one's knowledge and abilities, the capacity to persuade and to make a comrade's heart purer and thoughts richer--here the role of the agitator is hard to overestimate. It is a question of the shaping of characters, establishing the principles of intercourse in the collective and creating an atmosphere of exactingness and mutual responsibility and a respectful attitude toward one another.

In the article "Components of Authority" which summed up the results of the discussion of the letter of Yu. Shkumat, the journal particularly focused on such moral qualities of the agitator as humility, honesty, responsiveness and respect for others. It goes without saying that he should be an ideological person, profoundly dedicated to the cause of the Communist Party and understand the tasks which the party has posed for the Armed Forces.

In terms of the level of his development, the agitator in any instance should not be below his fellow servicemen. But one must never present oneself as more knowing, more responsible or more intelligent than comrades surrounding one. With them it is essential to conduct, as they say, a conversation of equals. It does not work when an agitator in dealing with others allows himself a patronizing tone: this is essential, we must do so and so. This, as a rule, arouses unfavorable comment.

Well put! Unfortunately, the journal writes very little about this, only haz-  
hazardly, although it could create an image of the agitator which would be per-  
ceived as a discovery, which would influence the deeds of the men and serve as  
an example for all activists conducting agitation work.

AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA has still not shown its possibilities in taking up moral  
problems. It has not sufficiently brought out the role of the ideological  
fighters in indoctrinating the servicemen in an activist position in life, in  
the ability to live and serve out of conscience and honor and to be an example  
in military and political training. As yet its pages have not contained sound  
articles on the strengthening of military discipline, the unifying of army and  
navy collectives, and the creating in them of a healthy moral climate which  
would exclude manifestations of improper relations between servicemen. Materi-  
als are not frequently encountered on the indoctrination of the indoctrinators,  
including the sergeants and petty officers and warrant officers or on their  
ability to rely on the party and Komsomol aktiv, the agitators and political  
information officers. The demonstrating of thoughtful, individual work is  
lacking. The editorial staff has still not deeply examined advanced experi-  
ence in the struggle for proper order and timidly criticizes instances of de-  
viations from the standards of communist morality and all that impedes the  
strengthening of military discipline.

Certainly under present-day conditions when the exacerbated international situ-  
ation places special demands upon the combat training level of the units and  
ships, the further strengthening of military discipline is one of the prime  
tasks. Life urgently suggests to all periodicals that they face this question  
and draw particular attention to its moral aspect. A guide to action here is  
the statement by the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade  
Yu. V. Andropov, contained in his speech at the November (1982) Plenum of the  
CPSU Central Committee: "It is essential to struggle more decisively against  
any violations of party, state and labor discipline."

What, for example, are the readers of SOVETSKIY VOIN and ZNAMENOSETS expecting?  
An analysis of the articles shows that on the pages of these publications one  
does not always find the legal and moral aspects of the strengthening of mili-  
tary discipline and there is not enough tenacity in dealing with such questions  
as the high exactingness of the commanders, the struggle against improper ac-  
tions of individual servicemen, concern for increased discipline among the  
military construction workers, the role of the staffs in organizing patrol and  
interior duty or effective monitoring of the execution of orders and instruc-  
tions.

The journalists write a good deal about the mastery and combat employment of  
equipment and weapons. However, at times these materials merely popularize  
the omnipotence of equipment and the methods of operating it but little show  
the role of engineer and technical personnel in improving combat training, in  
strengthening discipline and proper order, in the ideological, political,  
moral and military indoctrination of the personnel or in explaining the re-  
quirements of the laws, the military oath and regulations.

Recently SOVETSKIY VOIN has lessened its treatment of the subject of developing  
high moral and combat qualities in the servicemen in the process of military

labor. The diverse life of the Army and Navy in the magazine is basically represented by photographic essays and fold-outs. There is no doubt that the photographs have been taken on a high professional level but the captions for them suffer from monotony and have the nature of a boastful report on one or another service or branch of arms.

In the new training year, a socialist competition under the motto "Increase Vigilance and Firmly Ensure the Security of the Motherland!" has developed widely in the Soviet Armed Forces. SOVETSKIY VOIN informed its readers of this only in the fourth, February issue, having published a selection of letters from the troops. From them it could not be seen that the competition covered all spheres of Army and Navy life and did not show how the competition was helping to create in each troop collective a proper moral and political atmosphere, a situation of comradely mutual aid, a high sense of responsibility for the fulfillment of obligations and implacability for shortcomings and violations of discipline.

The magazine has not always shown how people grow morally in the course of combat and political training and how their characters are tempered in tactical exercises and drills, in flights and sea cruises. In taking up the course of the combat training and service of the men, the editorial staff should more fully consider the relationship of the spiritual and material elements in the combat might of the army and show the complexity of military service and the need to prepare the troops for combating a strong, technically well equipped and perfidious enemy. From the pages of the magazine, one should be able to feel the breath of intense exercises and drills in which the men master the secrets of the difficult equipment and weapons and acquire high moral-combat and psychological qualities.

The ideological influence on the masses, the effectiveness of ideological work and the moral-psychological atmosphere in the units and on the ships are directly dependent upon the strength of the personal example set by the officer, the leader and indoctrinator, his viewpoint, his inner and external culture and tact.

The reviewed magazines have made very inadequate use of such an effective artistic literary genre as the essay for profoundly working out the problems of the indoctrination of the indoctrinators and showing their effectiveness in forming a healthy moral climate in the troop collectives. This has appeared particularly rarely on the pages of the magazines ZNAMENOSETS and AGITATOR ARMI I FLOTA. Certainly an essay provides an excellent opportunity to disclose the moral qualities of the men and to show the rich inner world and the spiritual mood of those who must lead their fellow servicemen.

The military magazines have great opportunities to describe in an accessible and vivid manner how the principles of communist morality are manifested in the life of the men and in their deeds. The journalists have it within their capacity to focus the attention of the military community on the specific questions of a moral level raised by life and requiring the mobilizing of public opinion. For instance, to declare a decisive struggle against improper relations and against the fact that individual servicemen try to put off a portion of their duties on the shoulders of the young soldiers.

The indoctrinational process is truly effective if it is conducted continuously and along an ascending curve. Moral indoctrination is a sphere which does not tolerate routine, red tape or hurry. To an equal degree it does not tolerate slowness, long vacillation or unjustifiably drawn-out pauses and preparatory periods. The military journalists could make a stronger contribution if they had a well-thought-out system of publications on a given subject. For example: to constantly take up the fundamental moral problems raised by the 26th Party Congress and the November (1982) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, to more fully bring out the advantages of the socialist way of life and using specific examples show the incompatibility of communist and bourgeois morality.

When it is a question of the effectiveness of indoctrinating high moral qualities in the servicemen, then it is essential to also bear in mind the possibility of the penetration of views and ideas which are alien to the socialist system into our milieu from outside. It is no secret that at present bourgeois propaganda is making constant attempts to impose private property attitudes on the Soviet people, arouse a passion for acquisition, develop individualism and egoism and sow national discord. SOVETSKIY VOIN, AGITATOR ARMI I FLOTA and ZNAMENOSETS have not always unmasked ideological subversion, effectively, acutely and convincingly, they have not acted with sufficient energy against a Philistine and consumer attitude toward life on the part of certain family members of the officers and warrant officers and the employees of the Soviet Army and Navy and have not conducted an effective struggle for healthy everyday life and the more rational use of free time.

It is important to fight steadily against any manifestations of idleness, apoliticalness, a parasitic and consumer psychology and to widely acquaint the younger generation with the priceless spiritual heritage, the social experience of the older generations and our revolutionary, military and labor traditions.

To be up to the demands means not only to succeed in time but also to look ahead, to effectively spot and consider in indoctrinational work the qualitative changes in the life of the Armed Forces and in the Army and Navy personnel. It is the honorable duty of the Soviet military press to establish a healthy and pure atmosphere in the Army and Navy collectives, to indoctrinate the servicemen in a spirit of loyalty to communist ideals and to form high moral culture in them.

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